

THE ATTITUDE OF ISLAM TOWARDS SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

— *A Translation of* —
IBN RUSHD'S (Averroës)
— *Famous Treatise* —
FASLUL-AL-MAQAL

— *Translators* —
Dr. HAMID NASEEM RAFIABADI
Dr. AMIR ALI HUSAIN

VISIT...

LANZAROTE
Caliente.COM

In the book, Ibn Rushd has attempted to discuss the problem of relation between Religion, science and philosophy from *Shariah* point of view of Islam. The author has proved on basis of sound and substantial arguments that religion and philosophy, (science included,) are complementary to each other and philosophy is the 'foster'sister' of religion of Islam. Ibn Rushd bring an important Jurist of Islam himself, has proved judgment about the affinity of philosophy and science to Islam. The positive attitude of Islamic *Shariah* towards Philosophy and science can not be elucidated in any better way than that of Ibn Rushd, as he has done in this important classical Islamic treatise.

**The Attitude of Islam
Towards Science
and
Philosophy**

This One



THE ATTITUDE OF ISLAM TOWARDS SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

A Translation of
IBN RUSHD'S (Averroës)
FAMOUS TREATISE

FASLUL-AL-MAQAL

Translators
DR. HAMID NASEEM RAFIABADI
DR. AADIL AMIN KAK

Sarup & Sons

New Delhi-110002

Published by
Sarup & Sons
4740/23, Ansari Road
Darya Ganj, New Delhi-110002
Ph. : 23281029, 23244664
email : sarupandsonsin@hotmail.com

The Attitude of Islam Towards Science and Philosophy

ISBN : 81-7625-413-4

© *Authors*

First edition 2003

PRINTED IN INDIA

Published by Prabhat Kumar Sharma for Sarup & Sons, Laser
Typeset at Manas Typesetter and Printed at Roshan Offset Printers,
Delhi-53

CONTENTS

<i>Preface</i>	i
<i>Biography of Ibn Rushd</i>	<i>Dr. Aadil Amin Kak</i> 1
<i>Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd</i>	<i>Dr. Hamid Naseem Rafiabadi</i> 44
<i>Conflict and Concord</i>	
	<i>Translation of Fasl-Al-Maqal</i> 135
<i>Appendix : I—The Question Mentioned by The</i> <i>SHYKH ABŪL-WALID in the</i> <i>Decisive Treatise</i>	173
<i>Appendix : II—Some Reflections on Thought and</i> <i>Works of Ibn Rushd</i>	187
<i>Index</i>	204

Preface

There is no dearth of literature available on Ibn Rushd (1126-1198 CE), popularly known in the west as Averroës. Much work is available on him and on his works also in various languages of the world. His important book *Tahafut al-Tahafut* has been translated by Simon Van Den Bergh, (printed at the University of the E.J.W.Gibb Memorial, Luzac & Co., 46 Great Russell Street, London, W.C.1, 1954.).

Agolb, M .R. has brought out in 1956-7: "*The Hebrew Translation of Avverroes' Fas al -Maqal*", (proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research, 25:91-113; 26:41-64,).

C. Genequand translated and introduced his works under the title of *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, (Leiden, 1984).

Leaman, O brought out in 1988, *Averroes and his Philosophy* which was published from Oxford. Apart from these books which are either consisting on the translations of the original writings of Ibn Rushd and their explanation, following are few important books which have been written on the life and philosophy of him: -

Bland, K (1981), *The Epistle on the Conjunction with the Active Intellect by Ibn Rushd with the Commentary of Moses Narboni* (New York)

Kogan, B.S, *Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation* (Albany),

Renan, E, *Averroes et l'Averroïsme*, Paris, 1861.

So far as the present book *Fasl al Maqal* (Religion & Philosophy, c. 1190 CE) of Ibn Rushd is concerned, it has

also been translated several times in to various languages. George F. Hourani translated it into English as: -

Averroës

ON THE HARMONY OF RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

A translation, with introduction and notes, of Ibn Rushd's

Kitâb fasl al-maqâl, with its appendix (*Damîma*) and an extract from *Kitâb al-kashf 'an manâhij al-adilla*

Also appended with it is an extract from *Kitab al-kashf'an manahij al-adilla*. It was printed for the Trustees of the "E. J. W. Gibb Memorial" and was published by Messers. Luzac & Co.46 Great Russell Street, London, W.C.1, 1961, reprinted in 1967,1976

The Contents of the book are as under:

Preface

Conventions

The decisive treatise (*kitab fasl al maqal*)

Ch 1: What makes philosophic studies obligatory

Ch 2: philosophy contains nothing opposed to Islam

Ch 3: philosophical interpretations of scripture should not be taught to the majority. The law provides other methods of instructing them.

Appendix: Damima

Before this translation there was another translation available in English made by Mohammed Jamil-al-Rahman, *Averroës, The Philosophy and Theology of Averroes*, trans. (Baroda: A. G. Widgery, 1921).

The Contents of this book are as: -

Introduction

Problem first: creation of the universe

Problem second: the advent of the prophets

Problem third: Of fate and predestination

Problem fourth: Divine justice and injustice

Problem fifth: The day of judgement

The present writer translated the book into Urdu that was published from Darul -Fikr- al-Islami, Doabgah Sopore Kashmir in 1993, and was entitled as *Harf-i-Aakhir*.

The present translation has been made with the hope that the shortcomings of the earlier translations of the book will be removed, about which some references can be found in the footnotes and elsewhere in this book. Though George F. Hourani, is one of the leading Orientalists of modern times, and he has made a remarkable translation of the book under discussion, but at several places he has not kept tract with the actual context of the book and the tune and tenor of the arguments as well. Moreover] he has rendered several Arabic terms into English which connote a different sense than the one presented by him. For example he calls '*Maujudat*' as "beings" and '*Amanah*' he translates as "deposit", but no scholar of Arabic language will entertain such farfetched renderings of otherwise these very lucid terms. This is not an exhaustive list of the mis translations made by George Hourani.

It is not the case only with George Hourani, most of the Orientalists have used such Arabic words in English which are "not translatable" to use the language of late Ismael Raji Faruqi, therefore could not do justice to the "intended meanings". Ismael Raji says: -

" The Orientalists may have used such translations with impunity because for them it is a foregone conclusion that all Islamic meanings must fit themselves under Western categories. But for the Muslims to imitate the Orientalists in their errors and misinterpretations, or to add to these their own, is unacceptable."

He says further: "The meanings embedded in Arabic language of the Quran are a precious legacy which no man is at liberty to tamper with or change. Besides the

ludicrous effect the noblest of meanings can sometimes produce when mistranslated, many meanings suffer change, loss or obliteration from consciousness through the translation process. It must be remembered that many of the meanings of the Arabic words and phrases are of divine provenance and may not be separated from their Arabic forms. And when Islamic meanings are altered, transformed and tranvalued through translation, it is an irreparable loss to Islam, to the Muslim and to human spirit." (Ismail Raji al Faruqi, Towards Islamic English, International Institute of Islamic Thought, 555 Grove Street. Herndon, VA 22070-4705 U.S.A, P-11)

This book is not exception to this rule. Therefore a painstaking effort has been made to mention the actual Arabic terms used by Ibn Rushd along with their English equivalents in the brackets in Roman script. This trend is to be strengthened and it will go a long way towards "Islamic English" to use the term coined by late professor Ismail Raji Faruqi.

Mohammed Jamilur Rehman has made the translation in a casual manner and has tried to give the explanation of Ibn Rushd's book in his own language, with out bothering about the real meaning of the words at several places. But the language of the translation is very simple and with out any verbosity. But in order to do justice with the text of the book and take care of the audience of the book, we have remained loyal to the text of the book on one hand and attempted to present Ibn Rushd in his total perspective on the other. We have given the extracts of the translations from Hourani and Jamilur Rehman at several places in the footnotes in order to present the problem under discussion in the real and comparative purview.

Dr Aadil Amin Kak is a budding linguist and a teacher of linguistics at the University of Kashmir and has worked in various capacities at Kashmir before finally joining his

present assignment. He has meticulously worked with me to render this treatise in a very simple and presentable translated form before the students of philosophy, science and languages. We are thankful to Mr. Prabhat Kumar Sharma, Sarup and Sons Delhi, who showed interest in the publication of this book on priority basis. My teacher, late Dr Nooru Nabi and Prof. T.B Irving, a famous neo Muslim and an American scholar have encouraged me from very beginning to do some research on Ibn Rushd along with Ghazzali. Because in their view Ibn Rushd is more relevant to the rationalistic environment of modern times. Therefore, the book is dedicated to these two great scholars and teachers.

Dr. Hamid Naseem Rafiabadi'

Baytul-al-Majeed, Lasjan, Srinagar'Dhil Hajj, 9, 1423,
Feb. 11, 2003

Biography of Ibn Rushd

“ ... *Averroes, old heathen, If only you had been right, if Intellect Itself were absolute law, sufficient grace. Our lives could be a myth of captivity. Which we might enter: an unpeopled region. Of ever new-fallen snow, a palace blazing With perpetual silence as with torches.*”

—From Funeral Music by Geoffrey Hill
'Somewhere is Such a Kingdom', 1975
DR. AADIL AMIN KAK

Every person who is even briefly acquainted with the History of Islam is aware that the Islamic Ideology and the Islamic world-view provided a most powerful source of inspiration especially for the quest for knowledge during the first few centuries after the *Hijra*. The new zeal produced a radical transformation in the Arabian Peninsula, as well as among the countries where Islam took firm root in the immediately succeeding centuries. The rich contributions that Islam has made in the various disciplines to a great extent served as the basis for the development of modern science and philosophy. The injunctions of the Qur'an and the teachings of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) laid great stress on the acquisition of knowledge and developing the spirit of inquiry. The Muslims strictly followed these precepts and spared no pains to acquire, preserve and spread

knowledge. As a result of their vigorous and dedicated efforts, an outlook that can be called truly scientific was developed. This, in itself, is a most valuable service of the Muslims to human civilization.

Syed Amir Ali in *'The Spirit Of Islam'* mentions: "The doctrine of the trinity in unity, of the three 'Nature' in one, of original sin, of transubstantiation, all gave rise to a certain intellectual tension. The dogmas of the Church accordingly required some such 'solvent' as scholasticism before science and free thought could find their way into Christendom. In Islam the case was otherwise; with the exception of the unity of God- the doctrine of *Tauhid*, which was the foundation of Mohammed's Church - there was no dogma upon which insistence was placed in any such form as to compel Reason to hold back its acceptance. The doctrine of 'origin and return' - *mabda* and *maad*, 'coming (from God) and returning (to Him)'- and of the moral responsibility of man, was founded on the conception of a Primal Cause- the Originator of all things. In the Prophet's time, as well as under the *Khulfah Rashidin* (The Truthful Caliphs), no doubt, free independent inquiry was naturally, and perhaps rightly, discouraged. No doubt questioning was silenced by terror of authority, and if the teacher was unable to answer the question, the inability was avowed in all humility. .. The greatest of the philosophers were al-Kindi, al-Farabi, Ibn-Sina, Ibn-Baja, Ibn-Tufail, and Ibn-Rushd.

Al-Kindi (Abu Yusuf Yakub Ibn Ishak), surnamed the Philosopher par excellence, was a descendant of the illustrious family of Kinda, and counted among his ancestors several of the princes of Arabia. Abu Nasr Farabi (Abu Nasr Mohammed bin Mohammed Turkhan al-Farabi), so called from his native city of Farab in Transoxiana, was a distinguished physician, mathematician, and philosopher. He enjoyed the patronage of Saif ud-Dowla Ali bin Hamadan, Prince of

Aleppo, and died at Damascus in December, 950 A. C. In the *Encyclopaedia of Science (Ihsa ul-ulum)* he gives a general review of all the sciences. A Latin epitome of this work gives an idea of the range over which it extends, being divided into five parts dealing with the different branches of science, viz language, logic, mathematics, natural sciences, and political and social economy. Another celebrated work of Farabi, largely utilized by Roger Bacon and Albertus Magnus, was his commentary on Aristotle's *Organon*. His *Tendency of the Philosophies of Plato and Aristotle*, his treatise on ethics, entitled *as-Sirat ul-Fazila*, and another on politics, called *as-Siyasat ul-Medineyya*, which forms part of a larger and more comprehensive work bearing the name of *Mabadi-ul-Moujudat*, show the versatile character of his intellect. Besides philosophy and medicine, Farabi cultivated music, which he elevated into a science. He wrote several treatises both on the theory and the art of music, as well as the manufacture of musical instruments. In one he compared the systems of music among the ancients with that in vogue in his own time. Abul Kasim Kinderski, no mean judge, places Farabi on a level with his great successor, Ibn-Sina. Of Ibn-Sina I have already spoken as physician. As a philosopher he occupies a position hardly inferior to that of the great Stagyrte.

Ibn-Rushd or Averroes (Abu'l Walid Mohammad Ibn Ahmed) was born in 520 A.H. (1126 AC) at Cordova (Spain), where his family had for a long time occupied a prominent position. His grandfather was the Qazi ul-Quzat of all Andalusia under the Almoravides. Ibn-Rushd was a jurisconsult of the first rank, but he applied himself mainly to medicine, mathematics, and philosophy. Chemistry, as a science, is unquestionably the invention of the Muslims. Abu Mus Jabir (the Geber of Christian writers) is the true father of modern chemistry. 'His name is memorable in chemistry, since it marks an epoch in that science of equal importance to that of Priestly and

Lavoisier' ... They calculated the size of the earth from the measurement of a degree on the shore of the Red Sea- this at a time when Christian Europe was asserting the flatness of the globe. Abul Hasan invented the telescope of which he speaks as 'a tube to the extremities of which were attached diopters.'

The Arabs built the first observatory in Europe these 'tubes' were improved and used afterwards in the observatories of Maragha and Cairo with great success. The Giralda, or tower of Seville, was erected under the super-intendence of the great mathematician Jabir Ibn Afiah in 1190 AC for the observation of the heavens. Its fate was not a little characteristic. After the expulsion of the Moors, it was turned into a belfry, the Spaniards not knowing what else to do with it! The Abbasids period is especially interesting for us because of the new interest in science which it started? Science, as you know, is a very big thing in the modern world, and we owe a great deal to it. Science does not simply sit down and pray for things to happen, but seeks to find out why things happen. It experiments and tries again and again, and sometimes fails and sometimes succeeds and so bit by bit it adds to human knowledge. This modern world of ours is very different from the ancient world or the Middle Ages. This great difference is largely due to science, for the modern world has been made by science. Among the ancients we do not find the scientific method in Egypt or China or India. We find just a bit of it in old Greece. In Rome again it was absent. But the Arabs had this scientific spirit of inquiry, and so they may be considered the fathers of modern science. In some subjects, like medicine and mathematics they learnt much from India. Indian scholars and mathematicians came in large numbers to Baghdad. Many Arab Students went to Takshashila in North India, which was stilling a great university, specializing in medicine. Sanskrit books on medical and other subjects

were especially translated into Arabic. Many things for example, papermaking the Arabs learnt from China. But on the basis of the knowledge gained from others they made their own researches and made several important discoveries. They made the first telescope and the mariner's compass. In medicine, Arab physicians and surgeons were famous all over Europe. Baghdad was, of course, the great centre of all these intellectual activities. In the West, Cordoba, the capital of Arab Spain, was another centre. There were many other university centres in the Arab world, where the life of the intellect flourished there was Cairo or al-Qahira, "the victorious", Basra and Kufa. But over all these famous cities towered Baghdad, "the capital of Islam, the eye of Iraq, the seat of empire, the center of beauty, culture and arts" as an Arab historian describes it. It had a population of over 2,000,000..... Thousands and thousands of people have never heard of the Abbasids Khalifas and of their empire, but they know of Baghdad of the *Alf Laila wa Laila*, the 'Thousand and one Nights', the city of mystery and romance, The empire of the imagination is often more real and more lasting than the empire of fact.

Many Sanskrit books on mathematics and astronomy were translated into Arabic. Thus the Arabs took much from the old Indo-Aryans culture. They took also much from the Aryan culture of Persia, and also something from Hellenic culture. They were almost like a new race, in the prime of their vigour, and they took advantage of all the old cultures they saw around them, and learnt from them; and on this foundation they built something of their very own- the Saracenic culture. Following the lead of their Greek and Indian predecessors, Muslim and non-Muslim scientists working in the Islamic world created a bridge between the quantitative study of natural phenomena and religious beliefs through the medium of philosophy. The philosophical underpinnings of Islamic science were

instrumental in preserving the religious and sacred concept of nature that was the subject of thorough empirical investigation of the natural scientists. This had a comparatively brief life, as cultures go, but it was a brilliant life, which shines against the dark background of the Middle Ages in Europe. This tradition was brought to an end in the modern period when the Islamic world lost its scientific tradition and adopted the paradigm of conflict and/or separation between religion and science with far reaching consequences still visible today. A historian, carried away by his enthusiasm a little, has said that: "The Moors organized that wonderful kingdom of Corhdova, which was the marvel of the Middle Ages, and which, when all Europe was plunged in barbaric ignorance and strife, alone held the torch of learning and civilization bright and shining before the Western world." Kurtuba (Cordova) was capital of this Kingdom for just 500 years. Kurtuba/Cordova is usually called Cordoba in English, sometimes Cordova. This was a great city of a million inhabitants, a garden city ten miles in length, with twenty-four miles of suburbs. There are said to have been 60,000 palaces and 700 public baths. These figures may be exaggerations, but they give some idea of the city. There were many libraries, the chief of these, the Imperial Library of the Emir, containing 400,000 books. The University of Cordoba was famous all over Europe and even in western Asia. Free elementary schools for the poor abounded. A historian says that: "In Spain almost everybody knew how to read and write, whilst in Christian Europe, save and except the clergy, even persons belonging to the highest ranks were wholly ignorant. Such was the city of Cordova that competed with the other great Arab City of Baghdad. Its fame spread all over Europe and a German writer of the tenth century called it "the ornament of the world". Students from distant places came to its university. The influence of Arab philosophy spread

to the other great universities of Europe, Paris, Oxford and the universities of northern Italy.' It was in such surroundings of Cordova that Averroes or Ibn Rushd was born.

Introduction:

Abu al-Walid Muhammad bin Rushd also known as Ibn Rushd (the Latinized form of the name of Ibn Rushd is Averroes) was born in 1126 A.D. in Cordoba which was the metropolis of Muslim Spain. He came from a family of distinguished scholars and jurists that held the office of the Grand Qazi for the last two generations. His grandfather Abu'l Walid Muhammad Ibn Rushd (1058-1126) was well versed in Jurisprudence (*Fiqh*) of the Maliki School of thought and was also the Imam of the Grand (*Jamia*) Mosque of Cordoba. Ibn Rushd's father also occupied the high office of the Qazi. The young Ibn Rushd received his education in his native city Cordoba, which was the highest seat of learning in the west at that time. He lived a quiet life, devoting most of his time to learned pursuits. He studied Arabic letters (*Adab*), jurisprudence (*Fiqh*), *Kalam*, medicine and philosophy with a number of teachers. Though the early life of Ibn Rushd is shrouded in mystery, it is claimed that he was taught Tradition by Abu'l Qasim, Abu Marwan Ibn Masarrat, Abu Jafar Ibn Aziz and Abu Abdullah Marzi. He studied Philosophy and Law under Abu Jafar Haroon who was a well-known rationalist of Andalusia. He learnt Jurisprudence from Hafiz Abu Muhammad Ibn Rizq. Ibn Baja, a reputed scholar, taught him medicine. Ibn Rushd soon acquired great scholarship in literature, law, philosophy and medicine. In the Muslim society to become a judge (*Qazi*) one not only had to have an extensive legal knowledge, but also have a strong background in Divine law (*Shariah*). Religion and theology are closely linked, and Ibn Rushd received substantial education in both disciplines.

Together with Ibn Massara and Ibn Arabi, Ibn Rushd forms the trio of the greatest Arabian thinkers of Spain. The first two were essentially mystic, while the third i.e. Ibn Rushd was a rationalist.

As already indicated the details of Ibn Rushd's life are somewhat vague and allow for variance in opinion, it is known that Ibn Rushd's scholarship was encouraged and developed through his relationship with his friend and mentor, Ibn-Tufayl who was the leading philosopher of the period and court physician to the Caliph. The two became acquainted when working in Marrakesh, Morocco, while helping to develop an Islamic educational system.

In 548/1153, Ibn Rushd was at Marrakush. Renan in his book supposes that he (Ibn Rushd) was occupied there in carrying out the intentions of the Almohad Abd al-Mumin in the building of colleges which Abd al-Mumin was founding at this time. However, in the Commentary of the *De Caelo*, it is mentioned that he was engaged there in astronomical observations. It is perhaps to this period of his life that he refers to in the 'Commentary of Book of the Metaphysics', when he speaks of the researches which must be done on the movements of the planets so that astronomy which would be physical and not only mathematical could be founded: 'I hoped in my youth that it would be possible for me to carry out this research successfully; but now that I am old, I have lost this hope...' It is believed that he met Ibn Tufayl at this time. Ibn Tufayl was to play an important part in his career as a philosopher by presenting him to Abu Yaqub Yusuf, the successor of Abd al-Mumin. Regarding the meeting of Ibn Rushd with Abu Yaqub, Al-Marrakushi claims to have obtained the account of the interview from a pupil of Ibn Rushd, who reported the actual words of his teacher. The prince questioned Ibn Rushd on the sky: is it a substance that has existed from all eternity, or did it have a

beginning? (It is known that, ever since Plato's *Timaeus* and the *De Caelo* and the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle down to Proclus and Johannes Philoponus (Yahya al-Nahwi), this problem had been fiercely debated). Ibn Rushd was worried by this dangerous question, but Yusuf understood this and began a discussion with Ibn Tufayl, displaying a wide knowledge of the ancient philosophers and of the theologians. Ibn Rushd was thus put at ease and he in his turn began to speak and the prince was impressed by extent of his learning. It is said that the Abu Yaqub rewarded Ibn Rushd with some money, a robe and a horse, asking him to continue his studies and to make an understandable summary of the works of Aristotle. Henceforth, Ibn Rushd enjoyed the prince's favour. This event may be dated to 1169 or slightly earlier. Al-Marrakushi also tells us that the Caliph complained to Ibn Tufayl about Aristotle's 'intractable and abstruse idiom' and of their translations. He wished them to be clearly explained. It is said that Ibn Tufayl, considering himself to be too old and too busy, asked Ibn Rushd to undertake the work. However, it is Abu Yaqub who is believed to have encouraged Ibn Rushd to expound the works of Aristotle by undertaking a project to simplify philosophy and to come up with a clear and accurate explanation of the true Aristotelian thought. The encouragement of the Caliph proved to be of utmost benefit to Ibn Rushd and with the backing of the Caliph, Ibn Rushd wrote his greatest works. Ibn Rushd is best known for his commentaries on Aristotle (for which he earned the name 'The Commentator' in the west). It should also be mentioned that when Ibn Rushd was presented to the Caliph Yusuf, he had already written some paraphrases or short commentaries (*dhawami*) on the *Organon*, the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics*, as well as the first redaction of his great medical work, the *Colliget* (*al-Kulliyat*).

For the task at hand Ibn Rushd had surroundings that were perfect for the task he had embarked on. Al-Hakam, the famous Umayyad Caliph of Spain, had constructed a magnificent library in Cordova, which housed about half a million books among which there were many rare books on eastern philosophy. He himself had studied many of these and had made brief marginal comments on them. This rich collection laid the foundation for intellectual study in Spain and provided the background for men like Ibn Rushd, who lived 2 centuries later. Furthermore, for several centuries, Muslims, whose literary and artistic culture far surpassed that of medieval Europe at that time, had controlled Spain. Cordoba's library contained 400,000 volumes – more, it is said, than all the other libraries of Europe combined. It appears that Ibn Rushd became a translator not only of books but also of civilizations as well. Cordoba became his laboratory and the works of Aristotle the materials he used for his experiments. For 26 years, Ibn Rushd put his mind to rescuing Aristotle, translating his works from Greek to Arabic. These works soon found their way into Latin and into the bloodstream of European intellectual life. Philosophy was transformed, East to West, from arid dogmatism into a robust new synthesis of reason and faith. The result: a 12th century European renaissance. Ibn Rushd's style was different and he approached the commentaries on three levels – beginner, intermediate and advanced. These works ranged from simple and concise phrases to line-by-line, in-depth discussions. Translated into Latin later on, his writings gave the West its first introduction to Hellenistic philosophy. Another point that deserves mention is that since the 6th century, classical scholarship had been neglected or suppressed by the Catholic Church. Centers of Islamic learning, however, had preserved the works of philosophers of antiquity, giving pride of place to Aristotle.

In 1182, Ibn Rushd was appointed physician royal at the court of Marrakech. By his mid-forties Ibn Rushd was appointed *Qadi* of Seville, but continued trips to Cordoba and Marrakesh. Several years later he became the Chief *Quadi* of Cordoba (a position which he retained for over ten years) and when his position terminated he succeeded Ibn-Tufayl as the personal physician to the Sultan Abu Yaqub of Marrakesh. Ibn Rushd developed a close friendship with the Sultan and spent the remainder of his life in his service.

After the Caliph's death, the new Caliph Yaqub al-Mansur retained him. During the reign of Ya'qub al-Mansur (580-95/1184-99), Ibn Rushd still enjoyed the prince's favour. It was only during the last years (from 1195) that he fell into disgrace. At the age of sixty-eight, Ibn Rushd became the victim of political intrigue. Several stories exist on this matter. It seems that the Caliph, at that time engaged in Spain in a war against the Christians, thought it advisable to gain the support of the *fuqaha*, who had long imposed on the people their rigorous orthodoxy. Another view is that when the pent-up Berber fanaticism burst forth, Ibn Rushd fell victim to religious fanatics who were jealous of his genius. Eventually, the Caliph had to banish him to Lucena, a Jewish colony southeast of Cordova. Indeed, not only was Ibn Rushd banished but his doctrine was also pronounced anathema following his appearance before a tribunal consisting of the chief men of Cordova. Edicts were issued ordering that his philosophical works be burned and studies, which were considered dangerous to religion were forbidden on the undefined charge of irreligion or heresy. His entire library consisting of invaluable books except the scientific ones (astronomy, medicine and arithmetic) was reduced to ashes in 1194-95. Those who were jealous of Ibn Rushd or doctrinally opposed to him took advantage of the occasion to criticize him in vulgar epigrams. But once he had

returned to Marrakush, to a Berber milieu that was less sensitive on matters of doctrine, the caliph repealed all these edicts and summoned the philosopher again to his court. Others ascribe the repealing the result of intervention of several leading scholars. Ibn Rushd came back to Marrakesh after a banishment of about four years and towards the end of the same year died at the age of seventy-two on 9 Safar 595/11 December 1198. He was buried there outside the gate of Tayhzut. Later his body was taken to Cordova. It is said the mystic Ibn al-'Arabi, still a young man, was present at his funeral.

Soon after his death, Islamic culture in Spain virtually disappeared; and even though his thought continued to influence Latin Europe, Ibn Rushd had surprisingly little impact on the Muslim world.

Some Contributions of Ibn Rushd:

Ibn Rushd commented those Islam aims at true knowledge, which is knowledge of God and of His creation. This true knowledge also includes knowing the various means that lead to worldly satisfaction and avoidance of misery in the Hereafter. This type of practical knowledge covers two branches: (1) Jurisprudence which deals with the material or tangible aspect of human life and (2) the spiritual sciences which deal with matters like patience, gratitude to God, and morals. He compared spiritual laws to medicine in their effect on human beings physically on one hand, and morally and spiritually on the other. He pointed out that spiritual health is termed '*Taqwa*' (righteousness and God-fearing) in the Qur'an.

In addition to the thirty-eight commentaries he produced on Aristotle, Ibn Rushd also wrote books on politics, religion, logic, astronomy, and medicine. Ibn Rushd made remarkable contributions in philosophy, logic, medicine, music and jurisprudence. Some of his contributions are mentioned below.

Medicine:

In Ibn Rushd's medical and philosophical works we see the depth of his faith and knowledge of the Qur'an and Prophetic traditions, which he often quotes in support of his views in different matters. Ibn Rushd said that true happiness for man can surely be achieved through mental and psychological health, and people cannot enjoy psychological health unless they follow ways that lead to happiness in the hereafter, and unless they believe in God and His oneness.

Ibn Rushd was the author of about twenty medical treatises including his encyclopedic work *Kitab al-Kulyat fi al-Tibb* (Generalities). This book was written between 1153 and 1169 AD. Its Latin translation was known as *Colliget*. In it Ibn Rushd has thrown light on various aspects of medicine, including the diagnoses, cure and prevention of diseases. The book concentrates on specific areas in comparison of Ibn Sina's wider scope of *at-Qanun*, but contains several original observations of Ibn Rushd. The subject matter of *al-Kulyat fi al-Tibb* leans heavily on Galen, and Hippocrates' name is also mentioned. *Al-Kulyat fi al-Tibb* is subdivided into seven books:

Tashrih al-a'lda' (Anatomy of Organs),
Al-Sihha (Health),
Al-Marad (Sickness),
Al-'Alamat (Symptoms),
Al-Adwiya wa 'l-aghddhiya (Drugs and Foods),
Hifz al-sihha (Hygiene) and
Shifa al-amrad (Therapy).

Among other things Ibn Rushd considered that no one suffers twice from Smallpox (indicating immunity). He also fully understood the function of the retina.

Solomon Ben Abraham Ben David knows two Hebrew versions of *Al-Kulliyyat* one by an unidentified translator, another. Bonacosa, a Jew, made the Latin translation, *Colliget*, in Padua in 1255. Syphorien Champier in again

translated it into Latin about 1537. The first edition was printed in Venice in 1482, followed by several other editions. There are important differences in the different editions of this book, e.g. in the Granada manuscript Ibn Rushd approves the opinions of Galen totally, but criticizes some of them in the Madrid manuscript, which has many other changes as well. A Leningrad manuscript has still more changes. The Latin and Hebrew translations represent a late tradition.

According to some sources Ibn Rushd himself, and according to other sources Ibn Zuhr, a close friend of Ibn Rushd on his (Ibn Rushd's) request wrote a book on *al-Umur al-juz'iyya* (Particularities), i.e. the treatment of head-to-toe diseases). This book is called *al-Taisir fi 'l-muddawat wa 'l-tadbir* (An Aid to Therapy and Regimen). *Al-Taisir* consists of useful excerpts and a clinical description of diseases including serous pericarditis and mediastinal abscess. Ibn Rushd personally suffered from the latter disease and is believed to have left very careful records of his own symptoms. The book is not known in Arabic, but there are several Latin editions.

Al-Kulliyat and *al-Taisir* were meant to constitute a comprehensive medical textbook (hence certain printed Latin editions present these two books together), possibly to be used instead of Ibn Sina's *al-Qanun*, which was not well received in Andalusia by Ibn Zuhr's grandfather.

Ibn Rushd also wrote a *talkhis* (abstracts) of Galen's works, parts of which are preserved in Arabic manuscripts. He showed interest in Ibn Sina's *Urjuza fi 'l-Tibb* (Poem on Medicine, Canticum de medicina . . .), on which he wrote a commentary, *Sharh Urjuzat Ibn Sina*. This was translated into Hebrew prose by Moses Ben Tibbon in 1260. A translation into Hebrew verse was completed at by Solomon Ben Ayyub Ben Joseph of Granada in Beziers (France) in 1261. A Latin translation of the same work was made by Armengaud, son of Blaise,

in 1280 or 1284, and a printed edition was published at Venice in 1484. Another revised Latin translation was made by Andrea Alpago, who translated Ibn Rushd's *Maqala fi 'l-Tiryaq* (Treatise on Theriac, *Tractatus de theiaca*).

An important point is that attempts made by Ibn Rushd to defend philosophers against theologians paved the way for a decline in Arabic medicine. The great image of the Hakim (physician-philosopher), which culminated in the persons of al-Razi and Ibn Sina, has been superseded by that of *faqih musharik fil- Ulum* (a jurist who participates in sciences), which included physician-jurists and theologian-physicians. The German physician Max Meyerhof has aptly remarked, 'In Spain, the philosophical bias predominated among medical men. The prototypes of this combination are the two Muslims, Ibn Zuhr (Avenzoar) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes)'. However, no one can deny that Ibn-Rushd was another example of the cultured Arabic physician and his impact on the study of medicine was felt for over 500 years.

Philosophy:

Ishaq Ibn 'Umran, a physician of Baghdad was the first person to introduce philosophy in Spain, which flourished thereafter, especially during the reigns of al-Hakam and Yusuf Ibn Mumin. Ibn-Rushd's first venture into philosophy seems to have been his summary of the fundamentals of logic. Its dating can be ascertained from a reference to it in, which was written in 554/1159. This collection is based on the works of al-Farabi, which in turn are based on the 'Organon of Aristotle', with a few additions. There is no evidence that this work, in spite of Ibn-Rushd's great strides forward in this science, was ever revised. Al-Alawi speculates that this may mean Ibn Rushd later cancelled or wrote off this work.

Oliver Leaman has categorized the philosophical

works of Ibn Rushd as follows

1. *Commentaries*

Ibn Rushd wrote commentaries on most of Aristotle's works. These commentaries took a variety of forms. Often he would write a summary, medium commentary and long commentary of the same text, the aim being to present the ideas of Aristotle to a variety of audiences; those who were seeking a detailed discussion of the whole text would look to the long commentary, while those who just wanted to get a flavour of the original could be satisfied with the paraphrase. As Aristotle's *Politics* was not available to him, he used Plato's *Republic* instead for his commentary on a political text.

One important feature of these commentaries is the way in which Ibn Rushd tried to get back to the original arguments of Aristotle without the Neoplatonic accretions that had developed into it across time. This was a difficult task, since a long and well-developed tradition of Neoplatonic commentary had very much set the agenda over the previous centuries in the Islamic world. However, Ibn Rushd was often able to distinguish between the points that Aristotle was trying to make and those which had been imposed upon him by the commentators. He certainly respected some of the classical commentators such as Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistus, as well as some of the Islamic philosophers and especially his own countryman Ibn Baja, but the style of his commentaries is to try to understand the text from a point of view which was fresh and to reconstruct the original Aristotelian argument. Furthermore, he was not averse to adding his own comments on the text when he felt this would be useful. The paraphrases are certainly a very loose summary of the originals, and often give Ibn Rushd the opportunity to express his own views on an Aristotelian theme. However, the long commentaries are very

impressive analyses of the text, especially given the nature of the translations with which Ibn Rushd was working, and they came to wield great influence in the Christian and Jewish worlds.

2. God and the world

On certain occasions Ibn Rushd does discuss theological topics in his commentaries but he usually reserves them for his more polemical works, where he has a more contemporary philosopher in mind. His *Tahafut al-Tahafut* (Incoherence of the Incoherence) is a response to an earlier attack upon philosophy by al-Ghazzali, the *Tahafut al falasifa* (Incoherence of the Philosophers). Al Ghazzali had argued in his work that there are two major problems with Islamic philosophy. The first problem is that it misapplies the very philosophical techniques that it advocates; that is, its arguments fall foul of the criteria for validity which philosophy itself advocates. The other problem is that the conclusions of philosophy go against the principles of Islam, which the philosophers pretend they are supporting. Al-Ghazzali produced accurate descriptions of philosophical arguments and then set about demolishing them, using the same philosophical principles that his opponents tried to employ. He argued that the philosophers are in fact involved in dismantling the religious notion of God, the afterlife and creation in the guise of merely analyzing these ideas although the philosophers claim to prove that philosophy is merely a more sophisticated analysis of the nature of reality than that available to ordinary Muslims,. Although the object of his attack is primarily the work of Al Farabi and Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd perceived that al-Ghazzali and he were challenging the whole peripatetic approach to philosophy like the philosopher he was, rushed to its defense.

Al-Ghazali's crucial ideas regarding his attack on philosophy is what he regards as its misguided

interpretation of the relationship between God and the world. According to al Ghazzali the Quran is full of references to the creation of the world and to its eventual destruction should God feel it appropriate, yet Islamic philosophy tends to argue that the world is eternal. If God really is an agent, al-Ghazzali asks, why cannot he just create the world *ex nihilo* and then later destroy it? Ibn Rushd argues that temporal and eternal agents act very differently. We can decide to do something, we can wait for a certain time before acting, we can wonder about our future actions; but such possibilities cannot arise for God. In his case there is no gap between desire and action, nothing stands in the way of his activity; and yet we are told by al-Ghazzali that God suddenly created the world. What differentiates one time from another for God? What could motivate him to create the world at one particular time as opposed to another? For us, different times are different because they have different qualitative aspects, yet before the creation of the world, when there was nothing around to characterize one time as distinct from another, there is nothing to characterize one time over another as *the* time for creation to take place.

For al-Ghazzali such a response is evidence of mental laziness. Even we can choose between two alternatives that appear to be identical in every respect except position. Al Ghazzali gives the example of a hungry man being confronted by only two dates, where he is able to take just one. Since they are to all intents and purposes identical, it would seem to follow that if the philosophers are right he must just stand there and starve since there is no difference between them. Ibn Rushd criticizes this analogy, since it is not really about a choice as to which date to eat but about a choice between eating and not eating. What al-Ghazzali is trying to do is establish some scope for divine action and decision-making which represents God as a real agent and not just as a cipher for

natural events which would take place anyway. Ibn Rushd comments that the main difficulty lies in distinguishing between the divine will and knowledge. Since an omniscient God knows exactly how the universe should be organized to produce the optimal arrangement, Ibn Rushd insists that there is no point in thinking of a gap in time existing between that conception and its instantiation. An omnipotent God does not need to wait for the appropriate moment to create the universe since nothing exists which could oblige him to wait, and he does not require time to bring about the creation. Ibn Rushd argues that given God's nature, we cannot think of his acting in any different way from that represented by the organization of the world. This does not imply a lack of freedom or ability to choose, but is merely a reflection of God's perfect nature.

Al-Ghazzali followed the Ash'arites in being so concerned to emphasize the power and ubiquity of God that he refused to accept that the ordinary world really consists of stable material objects between which there are relationships of natural necessity. Ibn Rushd claims that this theory leads to a denial of the possibility of knowledge of the world. Since al-Ghazzali accepts causality as a practical guide to our everyday lives, one might wonder what point Ibn Rushd is trying to make here. The point is that the nexus between a term and its causal properties is not merely contingent, but is really one of meaning. Al-Ghazzali gives the example of a decapitated person acting just like an ordinary human being, except for the absence of a head. No such event has ever taken place, but if God wills it could happen, because God is omnipotent and we can imagine such a possibility. If God wants to activate a headless person, he could do so. This shows that the connection between having a head and being an active human being is merely contingent, without necessity. Ibn Rushd wonders

whether this change to our conceptual scheme is really possible. There are some properties that are significant aspects of the meaning of the thing of which they are the properties, and there is a necessary relationship between what a thing is and what it does. The advantage of Ibn Rushd's response is that it provides an account of how naming is possible. We can set about naming things because we can identify relatively stable entities with law like patterns of behaviour with other things. We may often go awry in our naming, but if we could not be sure that on the whole our names correspond with stable and fixed essences, naming itself would be an empty procedure.

Al Ghazzali, along with his insistence that the deity is a real agent, was concerned to provide God with real knowledge of the everyday events of the world he created. Ibn Sina argued that God is limited to knowing only very general and abstract features of the world, since any other sort of knowledge would diminish him as an eternal and immaterial being. Al-Ghazzali objects that any God which is acceptable to Islam must know the everyday events of our world. Ibn Rushd suggests that on the contrary, this would make God into someone very like his creatures and would provide him with knowledge that is beneath his dignity. God's knowledge is superior and unique because he is not limited to receiving information from the world, as is the case with finite creatures like human beings. He is the creator of the objects in the world, and he knows them in a more perfect and more complete way than we can hope to attain. This suggests that God cannot know individuals as such. The best knowledge is abstract and universal, and this is the sort of knowledge that God can be thought to enjoy.

Ibn Rushd does not share Ibn Sina's view that God's knowledge is limited to universal judgments. He instead argues that God's knowledge is neither universal nor individual, although it is more like the latter than the

former. Our knowledge is the result of what God has brought about, whereas that which he himself has brought about, a reality that he has constructed produces God's knowledge. The organization of the universe is a reflection of God's thought, and through thinking about his own being he is at the same time thinking about the organization of the world that mirrors that essence. He cannot really be identical with contingent and accidental phenomena, yet his essence is not totally unconnected with such phenomena. They represent contingent aspects of the necessary and essential relationships that he has established. To take an example, God knows which physical laws govern the universe, but he does not need to observe any moving objects to understand the principles of movement. Such observations are only appropriate objects of knowledge of sentient creatures with sensory apparatus and are far beneath the dignity of the creator. Ibn Rushd argues that this is not to diminish God's knowledge, but rather emphasizes the distinctness of the creator from his creatures and their ways of finding things out.

3. The soul

Al-Ghazzali also argued that philosophy fails to allow the physical resurrection of human beings and the provision of physical rewards and punishments appropriate to their behaviour during their lives. He has in mind here the Aristotelian notion of the soul, which makes the idea of an afterlife difficult to grasp. This is because the soul is the form of the living being, an aspect of the being itself, and there is no point in talking about the matter existing without the form when we are considering living creatures. Persons are combinations of soul and body, and in the absence of the latter there are no persons left. Ibn Rushd appears to argue that as we become more involved with immortal and eternal

knowledge, and with universal and abstract principles, our mind becomes identical to a degree with those objects of knowledge. So, once we have perfected ourselves intellectually and know everything that there is to know about the formal structure of reality, there is no longer really any 'us' around to do the knowing. Ibn Rushd regards our progress in knowledge as equivalent to a lessening of our ties with our material and individual human characteristics, with the radical result that if anything survives death, it must be the species and not the individual. Temporal and finite creatures are destructible, but as members of a species we are permanent, although only the species itself is entirely free from destruction.

This seems even more incompatible with the traditional religious view of the afterlife than the position which al-Ghazzali attacks. Ibn Rushd follows this with a political account of the function of the religious language, describing the afterlife as providing ordinary believers with a motive for virtuous action and dissuading them from immorality. He does not entirely rule out the possibility of the sort of physical afterlife on which al-Ghazzali insists, but it is clear from his work that he regards such a possibility as wildly unlikely. The only meaning that can be given to such a notion is political, and there is nothing irreligious about such an interpretation, according to Ibn Rushd. It is difficult for unsophisticated believers to understand that it is worthwhile to act well and avoid evil, or that their actions have a wider reference than the immediate community of acquaintances, so any religion which is able to motivate them must address them in ways that they comprehend and in a language which strikes an emotional chord. Richly descriptive accounts of the afterlife, of God seeing everything which happens and of his creation of the world out of nothing, help adherence by the majority to the

principles of religion and are the only sort of language which most members of the community can understand. The arguments which Ibn Rushd presents for hedging in the notion of the immortality of the individual soul would not mean much to the unsophisticated believer, while the more intellectually alert are expected by Ibn Rushd to understand how that notion fits in with the basic principles of Islam.

4. Moral and political philosophy

Ibn Rushd presents a firm critique of the Ash'arite theory of moral language, which interprets rightness and wrongness entirely in conformity with the commands of God. The purpose of that theory is to emphasize the power and authority of the deity over everything, even over the meaning of ethical terms. What we ought to do then is simply equivalent to God's commands, and we ought to do it because God has commanded it, so that everything we need to know about moral behaviour is encapsulated in Islam. Ibn Rushd argued that on the contrary, a distinction should be drawn between moral notions and divine commands. Here he follows an Aristotelian approach. Since everything has a nature, and this nature defines its end, we as things also have natures and ends at which our behaviour is directed. The purpose of a plant is to grow and the aim of a saw is to cut, but what is the purpose of a human being? One of our ultimate aims is to be happy and to avoid actions that lead to unhappiness. It is not difficult here to align Islamic and Aristotelian principles: moral virtue leads to happiness since, if we do what we should in accordance with our nature, we will be able to achieve happiness. This happiness may be interpreted in a number of ways, either as a mixture of social and religious activities or as an entirely intellectual ideal. However, the latter is possible only for a very few, and neither religion nor philosophy would approve of it

as the ultimate aim for the majority of the community. There is an essential social dimension to human happiness that makes the identification of happiness with correct moral and religious behaviour much easier to establish. It is conceivable that someone would try to live completely apart from the community to concentrate upon entirely intellectual pursuits, but this way of living is inferior to a life in which there is a concentration upon intellectual thought combined with integration within the practices of a particular society.

One might expect that a thinker such as Ibn Rushd, who was working within an Islamic context, would identify happiness and misery with some aspect of the afterlife, but as we have seen, he was unable to accept the traditional view of the afterlife as containing surviving individuals like ourselves. What the notion of the afterlife is supposed to achieve is an understanding that the scope of personal action is wider than might immediately appear to be the case. Without religious language and imagery, ordinary believers may find it difficult to grasp that our moral actions affect not only ourselves but also the happiness of the whole community, not just at a particular time or in a particular place but as a species. When we behave badly we damage our own chances of human flourishing, and this affects our personal opportunities for achieving happiness and growing as people. It also affects our relationships with other people, resulting in a weakening of society. While it is possibly true that the misery consequent upon evil doing may not follow us personally after our death, it may well follow the community. The importance of the notion of an afterlife is that it points to the wider terms of reference in which moral action has life.

In his commentary on Plato's *Republic*, Ibn Rushd modifies Plato in terms of his own Aristotelian views and applies the text to the contemporary state. He uses Plato's

idea of the transformation and deterioration of the ideal state into four imperfect states to illustrate aspects of past and contemporary political organization in the Islamic world. He takes mischievous pleasure in comparing the theologians of his own time, the *Mutakallimun*, to Plato's sophists. He describes the theologians as a genuine danger to the state and to the purity of Islam, and suggests to the ruler that a ban on the publicizing of their activities is advisable. In this and many of his other works, Ibn Rushd stresses the importance of a careful understanding of the relationship between religion and philosophy in the state. Revelation is superior to philosophy in that it makes its message more widely available than is possible for philosophy. The prophet can do things which the philosopher cannot such as teaching the masses, understanding the future, establishing religious laws and contributing to the happiness of the whole of humanity. Through divine revelation or inspiration, the prophet establishes laws which make it possible for people to attain an understanding of how they should behave. The credentials of the prophet are to be established by political skill. Miracles are irrelevant here; only legislative abilities count.

The philosopher has all the theoretical knowledge that the prophet has, but only the latter can embody this knowledge in a law and persuade the general public that this is a law that must be obeyed. What the prophet has is practical knowledge as well as the theoretical knowledge which he shares with the philosopher, and so the content of the prophetic law (*Shari'ah*) is no different from the content of the philosophical law (*namus*). The prophet is much better at putting this content across to the community, and can transform abstract ideas about human happiness into political ideas and social norms that then are capable of regulating the life of the community. However, it is worth emphasizing that the

only advantage which religion has over reason is that the former involves a practical form of knowledge that is not necessarily possessed by the latter. The issue of the relationship between philosophy and religion fascinated the Islamic philosophers, and Ibn Rushd was no exception in this respect. He tried to refine this issue time and time again throughout his works.

5. The role of philosophy

The role of the philosopher in the state was a topic of continual interest for Ibn Rushd. He noticed that Aristotle seemed to hesitate between the view that the prime constituent of the good life is intellectual thought and the alternative, based upon a broader collection of virtues. These two alternatives have very different implications, especially within the context of a religious philosophy. The identification of a more social notion of happiness as living in accordance with a general mixture of virtues would make happiness more generally available to the public, since it would mean that the unsophisticated but dutiful believer could achieve a high level of perfection in their life. The idea that intellectual excellence is the highest form of human wellbeing or happiness implies that the great majority of the community, unable or disinclined to concentrate completely on intellectual issues, is thereby deprived of the very best form of life. No religion such as Islam with its claims to universality could tolerate such a confining restriction on human happiness. Ibn Rushd thinks he can avoid this dilemma. The basis to his solution is the argument that religion and philosophy are not incompatible. Islam is a rational system of beliefs and it requires its adherents to attend to rational arguments concerning how they are to behave and think. The rational arguments are there in the Qur'an and other places for those who can follow them, and for those who cannot there are other forms of presentation of

the truth which are easier to understand.

This might seem a patronizing way to describe the faith of the ordinary believer, but Ibn Rushd suggests that if we look at examples from law and medicine we shall see how acceptable it is. Lawyers may study in detail the principles behind legislation, yet most of the community just follows the law without thinking deeply about its rationale. Those who work in medical fields have a good understanding of how the body works and how different forms of treatment affect the health of the individual. The ordinary person does not understand much of this, and just goes along with what they are told by the medical experts. There is nothing wrong with this; there is no necessity for everyone in the community to be either a lawyer or a doctor. Different people have different attitudes to both the law and medicine, some based upon real understanding and some based upon casual acquaintance, and these differences do not interfere with the ability of everyone in the community to live in an organized and healthy society.

Any religion with claims to general acceptability must present its message in a suitable form for the particular audience it is addressing. Ibn Rushd argues that Islam is an especially excellent religion because it has the ability to present the important issues to the greatest variety of people. Some people will be attracted to Islam and strengthened in their faith if the philosophical arguments for being a Muslim are pursued and developed. Others, perhaps the majority, cannot really understand such arguments but can understand simpler arguments and parables which describe in simple terms what is wrong with other religions and why Islam is superior to them. Still others will not even be able to grasp such simple arguments and so must be persuaded by rhetorical devices, which include a grain of logical force but mainly consist of persuasive imagery and exhortation. The way

in which Ibn Rushd makes this distinction has led some commentators to think that his real view is that philosophy alone reveals the truth, and religion is only suitable for the intellectually weak who have to be satisfied with stories and doctrines which are, strictly speaking, false. Such a disingenuous interpretation is not required, however. Ibn Rushd is trying to highlight the fact that there are a variety of ways of coming to know something, some of which are surer than others, but all of which are acceptable. Once the object of knowledge is acquired then it is known, however that knowledge has been achieved. We know religious truths in different ways, but we really do know exactly the same thing.

One of the excellencies of Islam, according to Ibn Rushd, is its accessibility to a wide range of adherents. In many of his works, and especially in his *Fasl al-Maqal* (Decisive Treatise), he argues that the highest form of demonstrative reasoning cannot clash with the principles of religion. He claims here that philosophers are best able to understand properly the allegorical passages in the Qur'an on the basis of their logical training, and that there is no religious stipulation that all such passages have to be interpreted literally. Where demonstrative reasoning appears to conflict with the sense of Scripture, then those capable of demonstration (the philosophers) know that the passages must be interpreted allegorically so as to cohere with the demonstrative truths. Philosophers should be careful when they do this not to offend the religious sensibilities of the less sophisticated, in sharp contrast with the practice of the theologians. The latter frequently interpret such passages so crudely that they either throw doubt on religion itself, or threaten the pursuit of philosophy by raising doubts in people's minds concerning the orthodoxy of the conclusions reached by the philosophers. Language should be seen as a sophisticated vehicle for communicating information to

different categories of audience. Religion is a means for the easy comprehension of the majority of the people, and where a hidden meaning exists it is up to the philosophers to discover it and keep it to themselves, while the rest of the community must accept the literalness of Scripture.

6. Philosophy of language

Ibn Rushd is in a difficult position when trying to respond to al-Ghazali's attacks upon philosophy, since the former tried at the same time to distance himself from the sort of Neoplatonic approach to theoretical issues which Ibn Sina advocated, and it was Ibn Sina who was the direct object of al-Ghazali's critique. One of the most significant methodological disputes between Ibn Rushd and Ibn Sina lies in their differing analyses of the relationship between essence and existence, and this has an important influence upon Ibn Rushd's approach to meaning. Ibn Sina held that a state of affairs is possible if and only if something else acts to bring it into existence, with the sole exception of the deity. Ibn Rushd characterizes this view, quite correctly, as one in which possible states of affairs are nonexistent in themselves, until their existence is brought about by some cause. The possible is that whose essence does not include its existence and so must depend upon a cause that makes its actuality necessary, but only necessary relative to that cause. In this modal system there are really only two kinds of being, that necessary through another and that necessary in itself (that is, God), so that the realm of the possible becomes identical with both the actual and the necessary.

Both Ibn Rushd and Ibn Sina maintain that there is a logical distinction between essence and existence, but the former accuses the latter of conflating the order of thought with the order of things, the logical order with the ontological order. Ibn Sina does indeed start with the

logical distinction between essence and existence and then proceeds via his theory of emanation to show how existence comes to essence from the necessarily acting Necessary Being. The occasionalism Of Al-Ghazzali is like the theory of emanation of Ibn Sina, in that both doctrines interpret the contingent world as radically dependent upon something else. The account of essence and existence provided by Ibn Sina is perfectly acceptable to al-Ghazzali, with the proviso that direct divine intervention is required to bring existence to the essences. Ibn Sins. Divides up the world into existing things and essences, into what we can think about and what really exists, and into things that are necessary through another and are possible in themselves. These distinctions throw doubt on the sort of realism and emphasis upon substance that is so important for Ibn Rushd and his form of Aristotelianism. This latter is based upon a model of the world as one entity, as a single order of nature with no impenetrable barriers to human understanding and investigation. This leads Ibn Rushd to argue that although a logical distinction can be drawn between the existence and essence of a thing, there is nonetheless a necessary relationship between existence and essence. Without such a relationship, one could conceive of all sorts of things happening to essences without regard to how they are actually instantiated - the sorts of thought-experiments which al-Ghazzali advocates - which Ibn Rushd argues seriously misrepresents the nature of philosophy. The meaning of the name of a thing is intimately connected with the way in which it is instantiated, and it is a radical error in the philosophy of language to separate essence and existence.

To understand Ibn Rushd's account of a variety of paths to the truth, we have to grasp his theory of meaning. He emphasizes the importance of notions such as equivocation and ambiguity in language because he thinks it is important to be able to explain how names

can be used in similar ways in different contexts. Ibn Rushd agrees with Aristotle that there can be no priority or posteriority within the same genus, and so he develops an account of meaning that is based upon the *pros hen* rather than the genus-species relation. If the latter were used, meaning would come out as univocal and al-Ghazzali would be entirely justified in expecting the philosophers to account for God and his activity in the same sort of language as we use to describe ourselves. If meaning is expressed in terms of *pros hen* equivocal (*bi nisba ila shay' wahid*), then we can look for some similarity in the objects which form the basis to the sharing of the name, but we do not have to insist that exactly the same name be used in its different contexts with precisely the same meaning. We can also insist that the different contexts in which a name is used have to be taken into account when we come to ask for the meaning of the name. For al-Ghazzali, abstract terms have a meaning that is independent of their reference in the external world. The meaning of such terms is equivalent to the series of pictures or images in which the events they describe are characterized in particular ways. All that we have to do to conceive of God miraculously creating something out of nothing is to imagine it happening, and so it is possible. Ibn Rushd argues that, on the contrary, it is not enough to have a series of images in one's mind to establish the meaningfulness of that combination of images. A meaningful use of language is possible only through the connection of linguistic terms and ideas with a framework in which they make sense, and such a framework is connected to the varying uses of the terms and to the way in which the world is.

The concept that Ibn Rushd wants his account of language to characterize is that of a point of view. In Ibn Rushd's thought there is a continual contrast between different points of view, not just a distinction between

God's point of view and the human point of view, but also a differentiation of the standpoints of the whole of humanity based upon their forms of reasoning. For example, in the *Fasl al-Maqal* he talks about demonstrative, dialectical, rhetorical and sophistical people, all of whom are using similar language to discuss what is important to them, namely their faith, morality, the next life and so on. This language is not identical regardless of the way in which it is used, nor is it completely equivocal. There are connections between different applications of the same name, and these connections are strong enough for it to make sense to say that these uses are of the same name; so we can talk about there being a variety of routes to the same destination, a variety of views based upon the same ideas and beliefs, and a variety of ways of living which together add up to a morally and religiously desirable form of life.

Ibn Rushd extends the use of the notion of *ijma'* (consensus) from its theological role of establishing what is acceptable within Islam to an even more important role, that of establishing what words mean. If there is agreement in the community that particular scriptural passages are clear, then they are clear and that is the end of the matter. If it is felt by some that there is ambiguity in some passages, then there is ambiguity that has to be resolved in some way if practice is not to suffer. Those who feel that there is ambiguity have to try to resolve that ambiguity in a way that enables them to follow the route to salvation. They must do this without challenging the views of the rest of the community, since to do so would threaten the ordinary meanings of the terms that are being used. Ibn Rushd suggests that if the theologians publicize their confused thoughts about the meaning of the Qur'an, ordinary believers would doubt that they understood the texts they originally thought they knew. If doctors were to do this sort of thing, then their patients

would come to think that there is no such thing as health and illness.

Ibn Rushd argues that we know from our everyday experience that there exists health and illness, and that religious texts contain important information as to how we should behave. We also have to pay attention to the different ways in which different people relate to these facts. There exists a whole variety of different views on a particular issue, and this variety of views is represented by the variety of language which is available to describe this continuum of views, ranging from the entirely demonstrative to the purely poetic and expressive. Equivocation in language is not something to be challenged; rather it is to be accepted, since it represents a feature of our lives as different people living in a community with a whole range of ends and purposes. We should respect the different uses of the same word because they represent different points of view, different perspectives on the same thing. When Ibn Rushd tries to reconcile apparently contradictory views his approach is to argue that all these views are acceptable as different aspects of one thing. Throughout his philosophy he tries to show how it is possible for one thing to be described in a variety of ways.

Many Muslim scholars criticized Ibn Rushd for this book *Tahafut al-Tahafut* (Incoherence of the Incoherence), which, nevertheless, had a profound influence on European thought, at least until the beginning of modern philosophy and experimental science. His views on fate were that man is neither in full control of his destiny nor is it fully predetermined for him. As already mentioned he wrote three types of commentaries on the works of Aristotle, as these were known then through Arabic translations. The shortest *Jami* may be considered as a summary of the subject. The intermediate was *Talkhis* and the longest was the *Tafsir*. These three types of

commentaries would seem to correspond to different stages in the education of pupils; the short one was meant for the beginners, the intermediate for the students familiar with the subject, and finally the longest one for advanced studies. The longest commentary was, in fact, an original contribution as it was largely based on his analysis including interpretation of Qu'ranic concepts.

Phillip K. Hitti on Ibn Rushd says: 'He was a rationalist and claimed the right to submit everything save the revealed dogmas of faith to the judgement of reason, but he was not a free thinker or disbeliever'. George Sarton also holds similar views: 'Ibn Rushd was not by any means less honest and sincere, nor was he necessarily less pious, than the other schoolmen, but he was more intelligent, and his deeper vision enabled him to reconcile statements which seemed irreconcilable to others'. His contemporary Abdu'l Kabir, a highly religious person, describes him as a person anxious to establish harmony between religion and philosophy. Renan in his well-known book 'Averroes and Averroism' writes: 'There is nothing to prevent our supposing that *Ibn Rushd* was a sincere believer in Islamism, especially when we consider how little irrational the supernatural element in the essential dogmas of this religion is, and how closely this religion approaches the purest Deism'.

List of works

Some of Ibn Rushd's works are now only extant in Hebrew or Latin, and some not at all. The most useful bibliography is Rosemann, P (1988) 'Ibn Rushd: A Catalogue of Editions and Scholarly Writings from 1821 onwards', *Bulletin de philosophie medievale* 30: 153-215. Ibn Rushd (1169-98) Commentaries on Aristotle, *Aristotelis opera... cum Averrois Cordubensis vards in eosdem commentariis*, Venice: Juntas, 1562-74; repr. Frankfurt: Minerva, 1962. (Ibn Rushd's commentaries as they

appeared in Latin and formed part of the approach to Aristotle in Christian Europe).

- (C.1174) Middle Commentaries on Aristotle, ed. C. Butterworth, *Averroes' Middle Commentaries on Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983. (Translation and commentary on two of Ibn Rushd's major works on philosophical logic and language.)

- (Before 1175) Short Commentaries on Aristotle, ed. C. Butterworth, *Averroes' Three Short Commentaries on Aristotle's 'Topics', 'Rhetoric' and 'Poetics'*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1977. (A translation and commentary on three of Ibn Rushd's main discussions of different forms of language.)

- (1179-80) *Fasl al-Maqal* (Decisive Treatise), ed. G. Hourani, *Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy*, London: Luzac, 1961; repr. 1976. (Translation and discussion of the *Fasl al-Maqal* and two other short pieces on the same topic.)

- (1180) *Tahafut al-Tahafut* (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), ed. S. Van den Bergh, *Averroes' Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence)*, London: Luzac, 1954; repr. 1978. (The standard translation of Ibn Rushd's response to al-Ghazzali, incorporating the latter's text.)

- (C.1190) Long Commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, ed. C. Genequand, *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, Leiden: Brill, 1984. (A translation and commentary of Ibn Rushd's commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Book Lambda.)

- (1194) Middle Commentary on Plato's *Republic*, ed. R. Lerner, *Averroes on Plato's 'Republic'*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974. (The most modern translation with extensive commentary of Ibn Rushd's commentary on Plato's *Republic*.)

Music:

Muslim Spain produced some talented musicians, both theorists and practical musicians. Ibn Baja known as Avempace, who lived around 1138 as a musical theorist, occupies the same place in the west that Al-Farabi occupies in the east. Ibn Baja was Ibn Rushd's teacher. Ibn Rushd in his turn also made invaluable contribution to musical theory by writing a commentary on Aristotle's 'De Anima' dealing perspicuously with the theory of sound. Michael Scot translated this into Latin in 1232.

Astronomy:

In Ibn Rushd's writings we find the quotation, "Anyone who studies anatomy will increase his faith in the omnipotence and oneness of God the Almighty", which indicates that he was a deeply religious man. In astronomy he wrote a treatise on the motion of the sphere, *Kitab fi-Harakat al-Falak*. Draper credits Ibn Rushd with the discovery of sunspots. He also summarized *Almagest* and divided it into two parts:

- Description of the spheres and
- Movement of the spheres.

Jacob Anatoli translated this summary of the *Almagest* from Arabic into Hebrew in 1231.

Jurisprudence:

Ibn Rushd wrote many books on the question of theology, where he tried to use his knowledge of philosophy and logic. It is not surprising then that his works greatly influenced European religious scholarship, though it should be mentioned that Ibn Rushd (Averroes) is innocent of many views of Western so-called Averroism.

In jurisprudence, his book *Bidayat al-Mujtahid wa-Nihayat-al-Muqtasid* has been held by Ibn Jafar Zahabi as possibly the best book on the Maliki School of

Jurisprudence (*Fiqh*).

According to Ibn al-Abbar, Ibn Rushd's writings spread over 20,000 pages, the most famous of which deal with philosophy, medicine and jurisprudence. As has been mentioned above, Ibn Rushd's writings were translated into various languages, including Latin, English, German and Hebrew. Most of his commentaries on philosophy are preserved in the Hebrew translations, or in Latin translations from the Hebrew, and a few in the original Arabic, generally in the Hebrew script. This reveals his wider acceptance in the West in comparison to the East. Ibn Rushd's commentary on zoology is entirely lost. Ibn Rushd also wrote commentaries on Plato's Republic, Galen's treatise on fevers, Al-Farabi's Logic, etc. Eighty-seven of his books are still extant. Ibn Rushd has been held as one of the greatest thinkers and scientists of the 12th century. According to Philip Hitti, Ibn Rushd influenced Western thought from the 12th to the 16th centuries. His books were included in the syllabi of Paris and other universities till the advent of modern experimental sciences.

Alfred Guillaume says: 'We may be sure that those who accuse the Muslim scholars of lack of originality and of intellectual decadence have never read Ibn Rushd or looked into Algazel but have adopted second hand judgements. The presence of doctrines of Islamic origin in the very citadel of Western Christianity, the 'Summa' of Aquinas, is a sufficient refutation of the charge of lack of originality and sterility.'

BASIC THOUGHT

One important aspect of Ibn Rushd's thought is explained in the following passage. *"The religion of Islam urges us to read the books of the civilization that preceded us provided that their aim was to guide people to the truth which our faith urges us to follow. This includes the use of our powers*

of comprehension and reasoning in studying all created beings". Ibn Rushd then adds: "We must study and understand what they wrote in their books .It is then up to us to accept what is consistent with our beliefs to be grateful to them. However, whatever is not consistent with our beliefs should not confuse us, but we should reject it, warn others about it and not blame them in any way".

Basically it appears that Ibn Rushd attempted to counter two misconceptions. First, he wrote his commentaries to rid the writings of Aristotle from the misinterpretations of Ibn Sina and others. For example, Ibn Rushd rejected Ibn Sina's doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Instead he agreed with Aristotle that individual souls cannot exist apart from a body. But in agreement with the teachings of the *Qur'an*, Ibn Rushd also taught that there is a bodily resurrection. According to Ibn Rushd, after death we receive new bodies that "emanate from the heavenly bodies." In this way he denied Ibn Rushd's immortality of the soul and managed to agree with both Aristotle and the *Qur'an*.

Though Ibn Rushd was opposed to several of Ibn Sina's teachings, he was much more opposed to Ibn Sina's chief critic, Al-Ghazzali. Al-Ghazzali (1058-1111) had opposed Ibn Sina's controversial positions, claiming that Ibn Sina had put philosophy above the *Qur'an*. In his major work, *The Incoherence of Philosophy*, Al-Ghazzali had argued that philosophy led to disbelief in Allah. In his rejoinder, *The Incoherence of the Incoherence*, Ibn Rushd sought to refute al-Ghazzali by dividing people into three classes and identified three methods to knowledge. The *burhan* (method of logical demonstration) was the most superior method and in the opinion of Ibn Rushd, only the elite i.e. the philosophers were capable of employing this approach and understanding truth in its true rational form. The philosophers can read the Quran for its deeper allegorical meanings. The second was *Jadal* (dialectical).

According to Ibn Rushd, *Jadal* was the method used by a smaller group of people i.e. the theologians who can understand dialectical arguments and draw probable inferences from the Quran. And finally *Khatabah* i.e. rhetoric, sophistry and persuasion. According to Ibn Rushd argued this was the method to be used while dealing with the masses for whom philosophy would be dangerous and they must take the Quran literally.

As Ibn Rushd's teachings reached Christendom, his allegorical conviction was taken to mean that he advocated a "double truth": Truth in philosophy might be entirely different—even opposite—from truth in religion. Ibn Rushd himself denied this, claiming that there is only one truth, but that there are many ways to access this truth. Unfortunately for Ibn Rushd's reputation, the work that made this clear, his *Decisive Treatise Determining the Nature of the Connection Between Religion and Philosophy*, was lost to the West until the Renaissance.

The repudiation of personal immortality caused a great controversy and was later declared heretical by both the Moslems and Christians alike because it contradicted the doctrine of personal immortality

Conclusion:

During an age when philosophers were arrogant, Ibn Rushd was the exception, a man known for his humility, generosity and hospitality making no distinction between his friends and foes. He was more than a scholar, he was a perfectionist. Being pensive by nature he had no desire for power, position, wealth or possessions. The one strength he esteemed was learning. He was a great lover of his native land. Like Plato who in his "Republic" has highly praised Greece, *Ibn Rushd* has claimed his native land, Spain, to be the rival of Greece. According to Ptolemy, Greece possessed the best climate in the world,

but *Ibn Rushd* claims the same distinction for Cordova, the capital of Muslim Spain.

Alfred Gillaume in his article on philosophy and theology in his "Legacy of Islam" writes: 'Ibn Rushd belongs to Europe and European thought rather than to the east ... Averroism continued to be a living factor in European thought until the birth of modern experimental science. Latin is said to have preserved more than one of Ibn Rushd's works which Arabic had lost'.

Ibn Rushd, well versed in the matters of philosophy and as a doctor, had taken the position that scientific scholarship was not incompatible with theology and faith. Ibn Rushd's writings on philosophy, jurisprudence, theology, and medicine, which have all survived in Arabic or Hebrew and Latin translations, place him in the forefront of writers on these subjects in the world of medieval Islam and beyond. He was recognized in Western Europe, starting with the thirteenth century, which witnessed the translation of his commentaries on Aristotle, as The Commentator, or as Dante has put it, '*che gran commento feo*'. These Latin translations early in that century caused a genuine intellectual stir in learned circles and laid the ground for the rise of Latin Scholasticism, one of the glories of European thought in the later Middle Ages. However, apart from his contribution to Aristotelian scholarship, which was almost unmatched until modern times, Ibn Rushd has dealt more thoroughly than any other Muslim philosopher with theological questions, including the perennial question of the relation of faith and reason, which became the pivotal issue in the Scholastic disputations of the thirteenth century and beyond in Western Europe. His contribution to those disputations is embodied in three theological treatises: The Decisive Treatise (*Fasôl al-Maqal*), written in 1179; The Exposition of the Methods of Proof (*Al-Kashf `an Manahij Al-Adilla*), written in the same year; and a short tract

dealing with the question of God's eternal and unchanging knowledge of particulars or contingent entities. To this trilogy should be added his systematic rebuttal of Al-Ghazali's onslaught on Islamic Neoplatonism in the *Incoherence of the Philosophers* (*Tahafut al-Falasifah*), written in 1195 and entitled the *Incoherence of the Incoherence* (*Tahafut al-Tahafut*).

Munk says of Ibn Rushd, 'He was one of the profoundest commentators of Aristotle's works'. Abu Jafar Dhahabi calls his "*Bidayatu'l Mujtahid wa Nihayatu'l Muqtasid*" the best book ever written on this subject. Renan has given a detailed list of his writings in his book. (3rd Ed, Pgs 58-79). The list totals 67 works of Ibn Rushd, including 28 on philosophy, 5 on theology, 8 on law, 4 on grammar and 20 on medicine.

The depth of influence of Ibn Rushd's work expanded beyond the Islamic world and also deeply influenced Western thought. In the Middle Ages he particularly influenced Christian theologians, such as St. Thomas Aquinas. His writing continued to be studied through the 14th and 15th centuries, especially his innumerable treatise on Aristotle. The apparent universality and timelessness of his works alone classify Ibn Rushd among one of the greatest Islamic philosophers.

Ibn Rushd, like Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina before him, saw no discordance between religion and philosophy. He maintained that both philosophy and religion were capable of leading humanity to truth. Unlike other philosophers, Ibn Rushd recognized the validity and significance of prophecy. He also believed that *Shariah* derived from prophecy was definitely superior to the *nomos* (laws) derived from reason. However, Ibn Rushd was also convinced that the philosophers approach to both nature and revealed text was superior to that of the *fuqaha* (jurists) and the *mutkallimoon* (theologians). One important aspect is that Ibn Rushd used Quranic

injunctions to reflect upon and to observe Allah's signs as an injunction to philosophize. Genuinely believing that the methodology of the theologians was not adequate to elucidate the divine *Shariah*, Ibn Rushd in an extremely clever fashion underscored the religious necessity of philosophy. His contribution in reconciling philosophy and religion actually was a deconstruction of the differences between Asharite theologians and ancient Greek philosophers. He was able to show what the Ash'arites deemed unislamic (the elements of Aristotelian and Platonic philosophy) were indeed within the domain of the freedom of thought allowed by Islamic *Shariah*. Some believe that Islamic theology has become stunted because Islamic theology was deprived of the intellectual challenge from philosophy. Islamic philosophy had played a major role in the development of Islamic theology and *Fiqh*. Initially the sources of Islamic Law were The Quran and the *Sunnah* alone. But the development of the *Usul al-fiqh* and the use of *ijtihad* (independent reasoning) has led to the recognition that public interest and reason can also contribute to legislation, particularly in areas on which the original sources (Quran and *Sunnah*) are silent. This development transpired when Islamic theologians and jurists were forced to respond to challenges posed by rational theologians like the Muttazilites and philosophers. Thus the dialectics between reason and revelation was played out as debates between philosophers and theologians, between *Sufis* (mystics) and *Fuqaha* (jurists). The debates between Al-Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd, and Ibn Rushd and Ibn Taymiyyah, are great milestones in the general development of Islamic thought.

Ibn Rushd as a great philosopher enriched Islamic discourses through his writings on Law and his debates with the theologians. He also enriched and indeed transformed Christian theology through Aquinas and Jewish theology through Maimonides. It is indeed sad that

Ibn Rushd did not have a great impact on Islamic thought though the West has benefited from him quite a lot. His role in the most fascinating debate between philosophers and theologians that spanned four decades remains an integral part of the development of Islamic thought. It is to be understood that Ibn Rushd has contributed not only in the heritage of Islam but also in the legacy of World civilization. Ibn Rushd may not have been a Philosopher-King but he was indeed remembered as a King amongst philosophers.

George Sarton in his introduction of history of science said "Averroes was great because of the tremendous stir he made in the minds of men for centuries. A history of Averroism would include up to the end of the sixteenth-century, a period of four centuries which would perhaps deserve as much as any other to called the Middle Ages, for it was the real transition between ancient and modern methods."

Professor Bammate in his booklet "Muslim Contribution to Civilization" quotes Renan: St. Thomas Aquinas was "the first disciple of the Grand Commentator (i.e., Averroes). Albert Alagnus owes everything to Avicenna, St. Thomas owes practically everything to Averroes." Professor Bammate continues: "The Reverend Father Asin Palacios, who has carried out intensive studies of the theological Averroism of St. Thomas and, in no way classifies Averroes with Latin Averroists, takes several texts of the Cordovan philosopher and compares them with the Angelic Doctor of (St. Thomas). The similarity in their thought is confirmed by the use of expressions similar to that of Ibn Rushd. It leaves no room for any doubt about the decisive influence that the Muslim Philosopher (Averroes) had on the greatest of all Catholic theologians'.

GHAZZALI AND IBN RUSHD - CONFLICT AND CONCORD

Dr. Hamid Naseem Rafiabadi

Ghazzali's impact on Ibn Tufayl is very evident, especially on his epistemological ideas, while as this impact can be found on almost all aspects of Ibn Rushd's thought. Ibn Rushd's all three philosophical and theological treatises were mainly written in response to Ghazzali's books. No doubt, Ghazzali attacked philosophers in *Tahafut al Falasifah*, Ibn Rushd responded to that attack with a rebuttal in his *Tahafut al Tahafut*, but in the latter work full length quotations from the former are the greatest evidence of the concern of Ibn Rushd with Ghazzali's thought. In the same way in *Kitab Fasl al Maqal wa Taqrir ma bainal Shariate wal Hikmati min al Ittisa*, he has dealt with the views of Ghazzali and refers to him at several places. In yet another treatise of Ibn Rushd entitled *Al kashf an Manhij al Adiliah fi Aqaidil millah wa tarif matwaqfiha bi hasb il Tawil minshubhil Muzibah wa Bid ill Mudillah*, Ibn Rushd quotes full extracts from Ghazzali's book like *Faylal Tafriqa bainal Islami wa zindiqah*, about various kinds of existence with approval.

Moreover, he quotes Ghazzali in his defense about interpretation and also about the problems of bodily and spiritual resurrection.

The second aspect of this influence is that nowhere does Ibn Rushd complain about the non-availability of Asharite books, including Ghazzali in Spain, Ibn Rushd

complains, no doubt, about the non-availability of the Mutazilite books, but never about Asharite books. As he says:

"As to the Mutazilites, their books have not reached us in sufficient number in this peninsula (Spain) that we may be able to form a fair estimate of the method which they have adopted in this matter. But it seems that their methods are like those of the Ash'arites". 1/

Moreover apart from mentioning the name of Abul Maali, the teacher of Ghazzali, Ibn Rushd has mentioned Ghazzali's different books as *Almaqasid*, *Tahafut-al al Falasifah*, *Jawahir al Quran*, *al Maznun ala Ghairi Ahlihi*, *Mishkat al Anwar*. 2/ *Munqidh min al Dalal*, *Kimiyai saadat*, *Al Tafriqa bain al Islami wa Zindiqah*. Moreover, Ghazzali has commented on the contents and substance of each of these books. This is extra evidence about his indebtedness to Ghazzali.

Apart from Ibn Rushd's commentaries on Aristotle, almost all his philosophical and theological treatises were written in response to Ghazzali's views. In this way Ghazzali awakened Ibn Rushd from his "dogmatic Slumber" by writing *Tahafut al Falasifah*. Ghazzali's *Tahafut* was a great challenge to all those Muslim thinkers who had accepted the intellectual leadership of Aristotle. One such thinker was Ibn Rushd (Averroes) who accordingly took up the challenge and examined the arguments of Imam Ghazzali in a work known as *Tahafut al Tahafue*. 3/

Ghazzali's criticism of philosophers in this way was a catalyst for the supporters of Greek philosophy. It was bliss in disguise for philosophy. Abul Hassan Ali Nadvi says:

"The courageous criticism and to an extent, the denigration of philosophy by Al Ghazzali began a new chapter in the history of Islamic scholasticism, which was later brought to a successful completion by Ibn Taimiyah".

Tahafut al Falasifah caused a stir in the ranks of philosophers who had to suffer an irreparable loss on account of it. However, after Al Ghazzali there arose no philosopher worthy of note for one hundred years. At last, Ibn Rushd, a great admirer of Aristotle and as a spirited defender of philosophy wrote *Tahafut al Tahafut* (Incoherence of Incoherence) by way of rejoinder to *Tahafut al Falasifah* by the close of the sixth century. Many scholars are of the view that if Ibn Rushd had not put up the defense on behalf of philosophy, it would have been crippled by the hostile criticism of Al Ghazzali'. Philosophy was granted a fresh lease of life through the effort of Ibn Rushd for another one hundred years. 5/

The *Tahafut al Falasifah* provoked a healthy criticism. Ibn Rushd wrote a rebuttal of it in 1180 in one of the greatest philosophical theological works, known as the *Tahafut al Tahafut* (Incoherence of the Incoherence), the *Tahafut al Tahafut* was rebutted by another *Tahafut* and so arguments and counter arguments went on for a long time. 6/

Philosophy can not be killed by philosophy, for in the attempt to demolish philosophy another philosophy comes up. The criticism of philosophy is a philosophy itself. In criticizing the philosophies of his predecessors, Ghazzali gave birth to a new philosophy. 7/

In this way Ghazzali's criticism had a positive role to evoke response from Ibn Rushd, which gave philosophy a new life in the Islamic world.

After these preliminary remarks we can divide the sphere of Ghazzali's impact and influence on Ibn Rushd, into three headings. First there are several issues on which there is agreement between Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd. For example their views pertaining to *Kalam* (Scholasticism), Varieties of Existences, Categories of people, and their verdict about Ibn Sina have many common points to share.

The second level of impact or influence becomes

evident in several other issues, where the views of these philosophers seem in conflict to each other. Mysticism, classification and validity of sciences, Miracles and causation are such topics that are very prominent in this regard. Though the twenty points on which Ghazzali charged the Aristotelian philosophers especially Ibn Sina and Al Farabi; with incoherence and inconsistency apart from declaring them as infidels on three of these. Ibn Rushd follows with criticism and rebuttal of all these points. Much research has been done on almost all these aspects. We have chosen above topics under the title of conflict between the two philosophers.

Between these two extremes of agreement and conflict there are several points where reconciliation between the views of the philosophers seems very evident. The issues like *Tawil*; Accord between Religion and philosophy, intellect or reason etc. may be discussed in this regard.

Apart from these aspects, Ibn Rushd had to respond to Ghazzali's decree against philosophy and philosophers, which could amount to an accusation of *kufr* (Infidelity). If this accusation was true, the philosophers according to Islamic law would be put to death, unless they gave up philosophizing or proclaimed publicly that they did not believe in their philosophical doctrines.

Therefore, Ibn Rushd tried to accord reconciliation between various views of Ghazzali with his own and in this way attempted to safeguard philosophy. It is in this back drop that he attempts for a type of reconciliation with some of Ghazzali's theories and his attempt at showing harmony between religion and philosophy can be fully appreciated.

Since we want to confine our attention mainly to epistemological aspects of Ibn Rushd while showing influence or impact of Ghazzali on him, we will not deal with metaphysical or ethical issues in this context. Moreover the main questions for which Ghazzali charged

the philosophers of being irreligious amount to three, i.e., eternity of the world, denial of God's knowledge of particulars, and bodily resurrection. These questions have now merely a historical value and are not very relevant to the main subject of our research problem.

To start with there are several areas of agreement between Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd. For Example in chapter three of the *Fasl al Maqal* that is clearly a conciliatory work, Ibn Rushd pays tribute to Ghazzali for his contribution to the development of the "sciences of asceticism of the future life". 8/ Moreover, we find Ibn Rushd in agreement with Ghazzali on the need to avoid *Kalam*. If Ibn Rushd's criticism lacks the moral condemnation which is characteristic of Ghazzali's position, Ibn Rushd's polemic disqualifies *Kalam* on methodological grounds. In the *Fasl al Maqal*, his discussion of *Tawil* considers three kinds of interpretative method regarding theological issues, "rhetorical, dialectical and demonstrative" 9/. The *Mutakallimeen* employ dialectical proofs which Ibn Rushd rejects as illegitimate, even though he was prepared, like Ghazzali, to extend a qualified tolerance to other aspects of *Kalam*. 10/ Ibn Rushd while showing the incompetence of *Kalam* arguments explains: -

"From the forgoing it has become clear that the well-known methods adopted by *Ash'arites* for the knowledge of God are certain neither philosophically, nor by law. This would be quite clear to anyone who would look closely into the kind of arguments advanced in the Divine Book about the Knowledge of the existence of the creator". 11/

Ghazzali's views vis-a-vis *Kalam* are very similar to Ibn Rushd. Though Ghazzali allows indulgence in *Kalam* sciences at the time of urgency, yet he cautions against obsession with *Ilmul al Kalam*. While explaining the need of *Ilmul al Kalam*, Ghazzali says:

"Therefore the introduction of new terms to signify a definite meaning is just as legitimate as inventing vessels

of new shape and far from use in permissible things. If it is the meaning of these terms which is dangerous, we do not mean to attain through them anything except the knowledge of the proofs for the creation of the universe, the unity of the creator and (the nature of) His attributes as they have come down to us in the Law". 12/

Ghazzali considers it obligatory to reply the questions of the misguided people and dispel the doubts of people or innovators. For example, the rejection of philosophers in the matters of the eternity of the world, His knowledge of Universals on the expense of particulars and resurrection of souls instead of bodies warrants our attention to study the arguments of the philosophers as they have expressed pertaining to these matters. In this way Ghazzali regards the study of *Ilmul al Kalam* as *Fard al Kifayah*, although according to Ghazzali its harm to common people is very enormous. 13/

About the real status of *Ilmul al Kalam*, Ghazzali Says:

"We return now to the science of scholastic theology (*Ilmul al Kalam*) to say that it has advantages and disadvantages, usefulness and harms. With regard to its usefulness whenever it is useful it is either lawful or commendable or obligatory, as the occasion demands. As to its harm, whenever it is harmful it is unlawful. Its harm lies in raising doubts and undermining the articles of faith by taking them out from the realm of certitude and determination. These things are lost at the beginning and their restoration by means of proof is doubtful, further more it varies with the individual". 14/

When both its harm and benefit are fully understood by a man, he should be like the Physician who is expert in the use of dangerous drugs, which he does not apply except to the right place only at the time of need 15/

Still more degree of disgust can be imagined by Ghazzali 's these remarks concerning '*Kalam*' or scholastic fanaticism. He says:

“As to the lay man who believes in a certain innovation he should be called back to the truth with kindness and tact and not with fanaticism, with soft words which are convincing to the soul and effective in the heart, words similar to those of the arguments of the Quran and the tradition mixed with a little admonition and warning. This is much better than debate along the lines set down by the scholastic theologians”. 16/

It means that the indulgence in acquiring *Ilmul al Kalam* is justified only when need for refutation of innovators is felt. At that time, it may take a form of an act one of *Fard al Kifayah*. But at the same time Ghazzali warns:

“For this is like drugs, and jurisprudence is like food, the harm of food is not dangerous but the harm of drugs is dangerous”. 17/

According to Ghazzali the learned men of this science should confine their instruction to men who have the three following traits:

1. Devotion to knowledge and passion for it.
2. Sagacity, intelligence, and eloquence.
3. A man, by nature should be good, religious and pious, he should not be dominated by passions. 18/

Ghazzali justified the debate with innovators at the time of need by quoting the reports of Ibn Abbas's debate with the Kharijites, Ali's debate concerning free will (*Qadr*) which show that their solution was of the clear and intelligent kind, carried out at the time of need. Ghazzali claims that:

“This is the rule of the creed which God imposed on man and the method of defending and preserving it”. 19/

From these passages the following points became clear

1. Ghazzali made the rejection of the misguided people and innovators as an obligatory duty for the Muslim scholars, which can be only performed after the in-depth study of the former's views and thought patterns.

2. Ghazzali regards *Ilmul al Kalam* harmful for the common masses, but when the times demand regards, indulgence in this science for defending religion and combating innovators, necessary in order to dispel the doubts raised by the skeptics and heretics. In the same way, Sciences of the predecessors, for example, philosophers, (though these sciences are harmful for common masses) should be acquired for getting deeper insights in these sciences and this reliance on these sciences becomes obligatory when the circumstances demand. 20/ The study of this science is analogical to *Ilmul al Kalam*, which aims at condemnation and rebuttal of the misguided people, *Zanadiqah* and innovators. 21/

In this way this criticism of *Kalam* occurs throughout Ghazzali's writings and is central to his thought. After his analysis of *Kalam* in the kitab *Qawaid al aqaid*, he concludes: -

"Listen to one who has familiarized himself with the *Kalam* and after a careful study and thorough investigation- has come to dislike it and has ascertained that the road to what knowledge really is closed from this direction". 22/

It is on grounds of its inability to provide a true knowledge of God that Ghazzali like Ibn Rushd passes an ultimately negative judgment upon *Kalam*, even while according it a qualified usefulness, in the hands of suitably learned scholars, in defending the varieties of revelation.

Ibn Rushd excludes *Kalam* from treating basic theological questions. His criticism is based not only on its negative results, but also on the wrongfulness of its arguments. In the *Tahafut al Tahafut* he often complains that the *Mutakallimeen* employ false premises in their arguments; on other occasions, he accuses them of falling back on acts of sophistry like the use of "transference". 23/

Ibn Rushd says:

"When the theologians answered that will is a quality the nature of which is to differentiate the similar from the similar, in so far as it is similar, the philosophers objected that this is not understood or meant by the idea of will. They therefore appear to reject the principle, which they granted them in the beginning (i.e. they reject the idea of a divine will, at least in the theological sense). This is in short the content of this section. It saves the arguments from the original question to the problem of the will, to shift ones ground, is an act of sophistry". 24/

In *Fasl al Maqal*, Ibn Rushd while discarding the arguments both of *Mutazilites* and *Ash'arites* as against the pattern established by the Quran says that their arguments lack "convincing truth- fullness", "universal acceptability righteous call" which is the raisin dater of the divine arguments of the book. He says:

"Their interpretations are neither generally acceptable, nor do they make any call to the righteous, nor are they right in themselves. It is for this reason that innovation has increased" 25/

In *Manahijah al Adilah* he says:

"The Ash'arites are of the opinion that the verification of the existence of God cannot be attained but by reason. But about this they have adopted a method, which is not among the methods adopted by law, nor are the people invited through it to believe". 26/

According to J. P. Montada we can find no reasons for a polemic between Ibn Rushd and Ghazzali. Both agree that *Kalam* is not the way to truth. Though they do not agree upon where the way to it is to be found. Montada says further that Ibn Rushd does not reject the intuitive Knowledge of the Sufi *dhawq*; nor Ghazzali the rational knowledge of the philosophers. Yet the polemic does take place because both are moving on a rational level and because Ghazzali in spite of his critique, makes use of *Kalam*. 27/

Though Ibn Rushd does not reject mystical knowledge in an explicit manner, yet his views regarding mysticism are negative in nature, as he does not consider mystical experience as a universally acceptable channel of genuine knowledge. 28/

"*Burhan*" according to Ghazzali is not less important for theologians as it is for philosophers. Ibn Rushd and other philosophers have insisted on its use, while they laid emphasis on acquiring insight from the doctrines and sciences of their predecessors. Since this enterprise encompasses all the modes and styles of arguments, their prerequisites, methods of evidence, it is not possible for an individual to undertake this responsibility. Hence a person has to depend and rely on the efforts of his predecessors. Ghazzali has in the same way made deep study of and mastery over *Ilmul al Kalam* necessary and declared indulgence in it very urgent and as a *Fard al Kifayah*. So that the person involved in this enterprise may be able to establish an argument.

Ghazzali in the similar manner thinks that the misguided people should be combated with "*Burhan*" (demonstration), for that reason Ghazzali made its use for its own sake as an obligation as was done by Ibn Rushd that the search for "*Burhan*" from the books of the predecessor philosophers is as an obligation. Though Ghazzali assigns great importance to *Ilmul al Kalam* but at the same time, he cautions us against a dogmatic obsession with *Ilm-al-Kalam*. Ghazzali employed the same criterion for himself in these matters as he had done about the problem of concern with philosophy, especially the study of the Greek philosophy. 29/ He says:

'The people who are busy with the recognition of the facts, they need a complete attention in this regard. The common people should be kept away from *Ilm-al-Kalam*, as the children should be stopped from going near to the banks of river Tigris for the fear of their getting drowned

there. The people, who are capable for undertaking study of these sciences, are like the master divers, as this place is very dangerous and prone to slippery as each person, who is weak in mental competence, presumes that they are the best in mental capabilities as they are fully competent to comprehend all facts.... 30/

The crux of these discussions is that Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd both have allowed the study of the books of the predecessors for the sake of getting acquaintance with "*Burhan*" (demonstration), but Ghazzali allows this study to only a small quantity of people, who are well established in reasoning and in possession of vast information about religious matters. Even in that case he narrowed their scope, i.e. if they are not prone to misguidance and he also precautions that the common masses should not follow them even in this restricted sphere. At the most he allowed it as a theoretical enterprise and prohibited from its practice. But so far as Ibn Rushd is concerned, he regards this study immune from all precautions for the superior class of people. 31/

We are led logically from the discussion of *Kalam* to the classification or categorization of people that was made by Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd on a somewhat similar plane. Because the indulgence in "demonstration" has been approved by both Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd from the people who are very sound mentally and fully conversant with the science of law. For the common masses both the thinkers consider following the authority (*Taqlid*) as the safest course.

Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd agree that when revelation and reason run into a conflict with each other, the revelation should be interpreted metaphorically except when its conclusion is categorical. Here, Ghazzali gives revelation preponderance over reason. Because, for him conflict with reason alone is not enough-to justify-the-interpretation of a scriptural text. There needs to be

additional evidence to justify the interpretation. Ghazzali holds that human beings, with regard to the understanding of the texts of the Divine law, fall into two categories; the generality of men and the "Men of Speculation." The duty of the masses is to follow the apparent meanings of the revelation and refrain from any attempt at their interpretation. But the duty of the men of speculation is to interpret those scriptural texts for that there is decisive proof to warrant their interpretation. 32/

Ghazzali says about the latter group and categorizes them as:

"The men of speculation whose traditional belief has been troubled". 33/

Ghazzali explains that the duty of the first of these two categories of people, the masses, is to follow the apparent (Literal) meanings of the Revelation and refrain from manipulation or even interpretation of it. They should also abstain totally from inquiry, involvement in theological discussion, and investigation of the "allegorical" texts (*mutashabihat*) of the Quran and the Hadith. 34/

As for the second category of people men of speculation, the theologians, they can investigate the meanings of texts of the Revelation according to the dictates of necessity and interpret them on the basis of a decisive proof that justifies the interpretation. 35/

Ghazzali cites two examples from the past for this category of people thus:

"This is like what has been related about Umar -God be pleased with him that some one asked him about two conflicting verses of the Quran, and he struck him with a whip. It is also like what has been reported of Malik - God have mercy on him, that he was asked about the being firmly seated" (*al Istiwa*: i.e. on the throne), and he replied: "The being firmly seated is something well known, and faith in it obligatory, but the modality is unknown, and

inquiry about it is an innovation". 36/

Yet in another book i.e. *Al-Qistas al Mustaqeem*, Ghazzali classifies people at least into three categories from the point of view of calling them to God. There is a section of people who are to be invited to the way of Allah with "*Hikmah*" (wisdom). The second group of people will be invited to the way of God with good admonitions and sermonizing. The third group will be invited to the way of Allah by the help of "polemical argumentation". 37/ At this place, also Ghazzali categorized people into common masses and men of demonstration. The former group must be invited to Islam with "*Muazit -u-al al-Hasanah*" (good admonition) while as the other groups are to be called unto the way of God with "*Hikmah*" (wisdom) and "*Mujadilah*" (Polemical demonstration) respectively. 38/

Yet from another angle, Ghazzali shows categories of people from the point of view of various maladies i.e. spiritual and physical. These categories are comprising on common people, who because of various reasons are not able to acquire any kind of knowledge. Some people according to him are afflicted with the disease of forgetfulness (*Al Nisiyan*) about their memories. There is another group of people who busy themselves whole of their lives, but do not understand anything, but due to their perverted natures (*Fasad- i- Amzajatihim*) do not respond to any cure or treatment. The third group of the people is in between these two categories of people. These people are very clean and pure in their natures at beginning. But with the passage of time their natures get afflicted with various disorders by their indulgence in bodily and ostentatious luxuries, therefore such people are in earnest need of a passionate guide (*Mu'alim Mushfiq*). 39/ Therefore, Ghazzali has mentioned about various categories of people and has shown their propensities and spheres of indoctrination accordingly.

However, from the general classification, he categorizes people into two main groups i.e. common masses and people of speculation.

Ibn Rushd divided mankind into three categories instead of Ghazzali's two. The first two categories are basically the same as those of Ghazzali. The third category however, is the "People of demonstration" (*Ahlal- al-Burhan*) i.e. the philosophers. By implication, this suggests that Ghazzali, contrary to Ibn Rushd, disapproves of the philosophers being the interpreters of the scripture, or at least does not give them any distinct position higher than that of the jurists and theologians on the issue. However, the former suggestion, i.e. that he disapproves of philosophers, at least those who are not at the same time jurists or theologians, as interpreters of the scripture seems to be at least as likely. 40/

The most complete expression of Ibn Rushd's rationalism is to be found in his *"Decisive treatise on Harmony of Religion and philosophy"* a work in which he divides people into three categories "the rhetorical class," the "dialecticians" and the "demonstrative class" (*Ahlu al Tasdeeqh, Ahlu al Mujadilah* and *Ahlu al Burhan*). For the first category, the convictions are the fruit of rhetorical arguments to which they turn when they wish to convince their listeners of a certain point into account. The second category uses dialectical arguments," in the Aristotelian sense of the term, that is to say their opinions are based on "generally accepted" plausible premises, unsuitable for procuring true knowledge. Members of the third category reach their convictions through demonstrations based on sound premises 41/.

Ibn Rushd identifies the rhetoricians with the "Overwhelming mass" with the "crowd," that is, the body of faithful, who do not aspire to the subtleties of theology, and even less to those of philosophy, The dialecticians are the representatives of speculative (Theoretical,

theology) and those who belong to the demonstrative class "are the philosophers who in all societies, constitute a small intellectual elite which is alone capable of acquiring true knowledge". 42/

Ibn Rushd has taken strong exception to Ghazzalian explanations about the problem of interpretations. He does not support disclosure of demonstrative argumentation before common masses. But Ghazzali himself, as a matter of fact, has confined and restricted scope of several of his books to the elite classes only instead of the common masses, as alleged by Ibn Rushd. For example Ghazzali has overtly declared that books like *Al Maznun Ala Ghair Ahlihi* and *Al Maznun al Sagheer* are strictly meant for the elite class only. While as in another of his important book entitled *Iljam ul al Awam fi Un fi Ilmul al Kalam* has warned against indulgence of common people in such "doctrinal absurdities". Whatever Ghazzali has said in his books, Ibn Rushd in the same essay lays much emphasis on the point that common masses should depend and rely only on the explicit transparent teachings of *Shariah* and should remain strictly attached to the religious obligations and duties, as this remains the only way for them to get guidance from. As far as the interpretation or speculation about religious matters is concerned, it is wholly and solely the prerogative of the elite class i.e. well established scholars in religious discourse (*Rasikhoon -Fil-al-Ilm*) as they cannot rest satisfied merely with dialectical or rhetorical modes of argumentation, with which the scholastics or the *Mutazilites* and *Ash'arites* get satisfied. This class of people (*Ahlu al Burhan*) receives mental satisfaction by utilizing various means to interpret religious doctrines, apart from employing different styles, as dogmatic instruction itself is not sufficient for their fuller satisfaction. 43/ Ibn Rushd says:

"We have said there that the law is of two kinds:

exoteric and esoteric. The duty of the common people is to follow the exoteric law, while as the duty of learned men is to follow the esoteric one, so the duty of the common people is to follow the meanings of the law in their literal sense, leaving aside every interpretation of it'. 44/

Here it should be noted that Ibn Rushd did not regard mystic knowledge as an esoteric knowledge in the manner of Ghazzali. He calls knowledge of interpretation as an esoteric knowledge, but for Ghazzali this knowledge is confined to the saints only. For example he says: "Furthermore, the science of revelation is the science concerned with the saints and the favorites of God. It stands for a light, which shines in the heart when it is cleansed and purified of its blameworthy qualities. Through this light is revealed the truth of several things, whose names have hitherto often been heard, and to which ambiguous and obscure meanings have been attached. Through it, those truths are classified until the true knowledge of the essence of God is attained together with that of His eternal and perfect attributes, His works of wisdom in the creation of this world and the hereafter as well as the reason for His exalting the latter over the former. Through it also is attained the knowledge of the meaning of prophecy and the import of revelation". 45/

In this manner Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd though agree that the esoteric knowledge is the prerogative of selected or chosen few, yet the connotations of their views are very much different from each other. We will discuss Ibn Rushd's views *visa vis* esoteric knowledge at different level later on. Here it seems pertinent to keep this difference between the meanings assigned by both the thinkers on esoteric knowledge in mind. Moreover, Ibn Rushd does not allow revealing an interpretation to the common masses as this may lead them to doubts and suspicions .He says:

"The learned men are not permitted to expose their interpretations to the common people, as Ali (upon whom be peace) has said, "tell the people what they can understand. Do you wish to give the lie to God and His apostle". 46/

Because according to Ibn Rushd the masses can grasp things of their senses: while as the learned men can go further, and learn by reasoning also, besides learning by senses: A learned man can derive benefits from the knowledge of the members of human and animal body thousand and one. Since the common people have limited reasoning power, they lack knowledge about a single things even". 47/

Ibn Rushd says:

"For all that such a man (common man), can know about it is that it (the universe) has been made, and that there must be a maker of it. But, on the other hand the learned look into the universe, just as a man of knowing the art would do, try to understand the real purpose of it. So it is quite clear that their knowledge about the maker, as the maker of the universe, would be far better than that of the man who only knows it as made. The atheists, who deny the Creator altogether, are like men who can see and feel the created things, but would not acknowledge any creator for them; but would attribute all to chance alone, and that they come into being by themselves". 48/

Ghazzali, for the same reason, restricted the revelation of aspects of divine knowledge to very limited level. He says:

"It is necessary that one who wants to teach the knowledge of these things (Attributes and Essence) to the common people should tell them as much as the law orders to do, and that is only a confession of their

existence without entering into details". 49/

With regard to the problems of *Shariah* the people are divided into three classes according to Ibn Rushd .He says:

"In the first place there are people who cannot notice any doubt arising out of them, especially in things which the law has left to be taken exoterically. These people are the greatest in number and may be described as the masses. Then the second group of men is one that has doubts but has not the power to solve them. These are above the masses and between the learned people. It is for them that there are found in the law allegorical sayings, and it is they whom God has ensured. For there is no allegory in the law for the learned or the common people, and it means that in this light that all the allegorical sayings of the Quran should be understood". 50/

Ibn Rushd cites an example as regards the law and says that the law is like the example of the bread of wheat which though useful cereal for the large number of human beings may prove harmful to some. He says that such is also the case with religious teachings. It is useful for the many but sometimes becomes harmful to some. 51/ According to Ibn Rushd the dogmatic and Scholastic theologians have done in respect to the law, the worst treatment by interpreting much which they thought was not to be taken literally, and then said that their interpretation was the thing intended and that God had mentioned it parabolically only to test and try his creatures. 52/

Ibn Rushd discusses that the primary purpose of knowledge for the common people is action, so that what is most useful in action is not suitable for them. But for the learned men, the purpose of knowledge is both knowledge and action. The man who interprets anything of the law, thinking that his interpretation is the real

purpose of it, and then discloses it to the common people, "is like a man, who finds a medicine which an expert physician had compounded to preserve the health of all, or of a majority of the people, then there comes a man with whom that medicine did not agree on account of the coarseness of his disposition. He presented it to some people, and then thought that by some drug, which the first physician had clearly specified, as composing that universally useful medicine, he did not mean the drug commonly known by that name but another which he really meant, but used this name for it by farfetched metaphor".

Ibn Rushd thinks that a change was made in..this great medicine" by the *Kharijites* the *Mutazilites* and the *Sufis*". Ibn Rushd challenged that Ghazzali explained philosophy to common masses and disclosed to them the opinions of the philosophers in *al- Maqasid al Falasifah*_while as according to Ibn Rushd the law should be taken literally and the conformity of religion to philosophy should not be revealed to common people. He says:

"For by exposing the results of philosophy to them (common people) without their having intelligence enough to understand them.-it is neither permissible nor desirable to expose any thing of this result of philosophy to a man who has no arguments to advance, for there are no arguments either with the learned people who have mastery over both the subjects, or with the common people who follow the exoteric of the law" .53/

But as we have shown in the foregoing pages that Ghazzali has himself warned that several of his books like *Al-Maznun Ala Ghair Ahlihi*_and *Al-Maznun al Sagheer*_and other books are not meant for common people. He wrote a separate book in which he tried to divert the attention of the common people from scholasticism and ratiocination. Therefore, Ghazzali can not be blamed for exposing the interpretation to the common people as

alleged by Ibn Rushd

In *Tahafut al Tahafut*, Ibn_Rushd rejects as illegitimate the dialectical proofs that have been employed by the *Mutakallimeen*. "Tawil (interpretation)", he argues can only be undertaken legitimately by philosophers on the basis of natural understanding or demonstrative proofs

"The dialectical way in the discussion is forbidden when talking about how the Creator knows Himself and the other beings, let alone putting it down in a book". 54/ According to Ibn Rushd the only way to discuss these questions is by way of strictly philosophical reasoning - the *Tariq al Burhan*'. Few people are capable of pursuing this path, for few possess the requisite moral and intellectual qualities. Where these are lacking, Ibn Rushd warns against any form of knowledge other than common sense". 55/

Ibn Rushd says:

"It is appropriate for you to keep yourself to the apparent meaning (Zahir) of the Divine law (Shar) and not to look for these new dogmas (e.g.. Asharism) in Islam : for if you adhere to them, you will be neither a man of certainty (Philosopher) nor a man of Divine law". 56/

Ibn Rushd states emphatically that the two kinds of interpretations, especially the demonstrative interpretations should be restricted to their respective adepts, violating this leads both the one who expresses them and the one to whom they are expressed to disbelief. As the former by doing so falsifies the apparent meaning and thus fails to affirm the interpretation in the mind of the latter. Consequently, he leads him to disbelief, if the text in question deals with the fundamentals of religion. The masses, therefore, should be told about matters that need allegorical interpretation that they are ambiguous, and no one knows their real interpretation except God.

Ibn Rushd says:

"Allegorical interpretation ought not be expressed to

the masses nor set down in rhetorical books, i.e. books containing these two sorts, as was done by Abu Hamid. As for the man who expresses these allegories to unqualified persons, he is an unbeliever on account of his summoning people to unbelief'. 57/

In the foregoing passage, Ibn Rushd pronounces Ghazzali to be "an unbeliever on account of his summoning people to unbelief' by expressing false allegorical interpretations concerning the principles of Islam to the masses in rhetorical and dialectical books, i.e. *Faysal al Tafrughah* and *Tahafut al Falasifah* respectively. Likewise does Ibn Rushd tax Ghazzali with infidelity because of the latter's claim that some texts, (which Ibn Rushd perceives as out rightly conflicting with the scripture), do not admit of allegorical interpretation; and therefore they should be expressed to the masses in their apparent meaning, without interpretation.' These are the same texts for which Ghazzali allegedly expressed false allegorical interpretation to the masses. They are the scriptural texts pertaining to:

- I. The eternity of the world
- II. God's knowledge of the particulars and
- III. Corporeal resurrection. 58/

Before concluding this subject about the categories or classes of people, some important points warrant our attention. The first point is that Ghazzali wrote different books to meet the demands of various sections of people and explained the real import of such books in their preface. Ghazzali explicitly made evident whether a book was meant for a rhetorical or dialectical class of people or demonstrative class in his writings. He explains this fact in *Jawahir al Quran* in the following manner:

"As for the first category of books is concerned i.e. to know the arguments or proofs of external religious commandments of Islamic faith, we have written a treatise

on this subject in about 20 pages, which includes a portion of foundations of articles of faith. Still for laying more emphasis on the same subject with sufficient evidential aspect, we have devoted our book *Al- Iqtisad Fil al Itiqad* consisting of more than a hundred pages, this book is a unique book, which encompasses the whole science of Scholasticism and want to substantiate the subject about various sources of knowledge, though some points to this direction have already been mentioned regarding this subject in the chapters comprising on the first portion of *Ihya. In al Maqsad (al Asna)* some points relevant to knowledge have been already discussed. I intended to come out with more substantial facts with regard to gnosis, which do not in any way run contrary to my views except to our book entitled, *Al Maznun Bihi Ala Ghair Ahlihi*". 59/

In the same book Ghazzali says in a similar way, "the second purpose of my articulation was to establish evidence against the unbelievers and rebut them. To this objective *Illmul al Kalam* owes its origin, which aims at rejection of misguidance, innovations dispelling doubts, the assignments which the *Mutakallimeen* have undertaken. I have elaborated this science in *Al Risalah al Qudsiyah* and in a higher level book *Al- Iqtisad Fil al Itiqad*. The objective of this science is to safeguard the faith of the common people from innovative suspicions. This science does not aim at revealing the realities and facts, it is in one respect related to *Tahafut al Falasifah*. Still there is another book entitled *Al-Mustazhari* in which we rejected the doctrines of the Batiniyyah sect. While books like *Hujjat al Haq*, *Qasimul Batiniyyah* and *Mufasilul al Khalaf* were written on theology". 60/

The second point which we want to mention is that the contradictions or inconsistencies which apparently are striking in his writings is not because of Ghazzali's unstable temperament or for the desire of general

acceptability. Ghazzali has rather deliberately adopted various styles, modes and methods to address cross sections of society according to their mental level and intellectual competence. 61/

Shibli writes after quoting these passages that such extracts show explicitly that his books on beliefs (*Aqaid*) are of various grades. Few of these books are written keeping in view the taste and temperament of the common people; others are a little higher in status. Still in some other books he has unveiled few of the secrets and revealed some mysteries, while as there are still other books, where Ghazzali unmasked some hidden facts openly. 62/

It means that in Islam there were two types of views held by Muslims from the very beginning. A group of Muslims viewed that there are no secrets or mysteries in *Shariah*. A commoner understands the beliefs of *Shariah* as by an elite, therefore the arguments to convince all the sections of people should be similar in all cases. There was yet another group among the Muslims, who thought contrary to this view. 63/

Ghazzali belonged to the second group of the people. For that reason he explained various religious doctrines according to the competence of the audience. For example he says in the preface of *Ihya*, that: - "You should understand that the division of these sciences can't be ignored by any person of insight, but those people may, of course, deny it who have learnt some thing during their childhood and became attached to it". 64/ Yet in more concrete manner Ghazzali has expressed the same view in *Jawahar ul al Quran*, as follows:

'The first imperative is to know the arguments in favour of external belief without worrying about discerning the mysteries in it. The second imperative, however, is to know their mysteries and secrets, levels of meanings and realities of their external aspects. But both

these imperatives are not compulsory for the people". 65/

In *Iljam ul Awwam*, Ghazzali has dealt with this subject also. He says: - "God has commanded the prophet to invite people to the way of God with wisdom and good sermonizing and argue with them in a beautiful way. Therefore, there is a group of people who are to be invited to the way of God by wisdom, others by good sermonizing and still others by good discussion"

In the same book, Ghazzali writes at Page 39 (published Egypt) that: - "The second type of arguments are based on *Kalami* proofs, which are prevalent among the scholars and opposite of which is well known". In *Jawahar al Quran*, he writes further: - "The mention is made of the premises of both the groups and discussions relating to resurrection, Reward, Balance, path are made accordingly. It has external aspects which are like food for common people and also subtle secrets which are specific with special people."

The quoting of all these passages was warranted only for removing the suspicion created by Ibn Rushd about Ghazzali that he has exposed common masses to interpretation about esoteric matters, by which Ibn Rushd meant interpretation of various religious doctrines. But we have shown with ample evidence from Ghazzali's books that Ghazzali wrote different books to meet various religious, theological and intellectual challenges of his period, which were presented by the rising tides of heresy, innovation and atheism.

After dispelling doubts about Ghazzali's erudite controversial academic and scholarly career, we want to conclude the discussion with the following remarks: "Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd have similar views about the nature, requirements and determination of *Tawil* with very little difference of opinion. About the application of the interpretation both the thinkers agree that, within the interpretation group, no one should charge another with

unbelief merely because he considers the evidential proof the other has adduced in any particular case to be erroneous, as long as the text in question is susceptible to interpretation. Like wise, they agree that the interpretation of scriptural texts whose apparent meaning is intelligible to all and sundry, and which therefore do not need or receive interpretation of any kind, is a sin, the gravity of which corresponds with the nature of the text interpreted. It is infidelity if the text deals with something secondary to them". 66/

Regarding the categories of people as discussed by Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd are virtually similar with some minor differences. We have discussed that in Ghazzali as well as Ibn Rushd there are the three dimensions, which require rhetorical, dialectical and demonstrative arguments respectively. Ghazzali regards jurist consultants and *mujtahids* to interpret the scripture, while as Ibn Rushd that the philosophers because of their disposition of *Hikmah* are entitled to demonstrate the allegorical meanings of the religious text. But the demonstrative class is there in both the thinkers apart from common masses who get convinced with rhetorical arguments only. Even among the common masses Ghazzali has classified people into at least three groups which need different kinds of introduction in religious matters. The problem of various types of existences or levels of existence is closely related to the concepts of *Tawil* (interpretation) of Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd. As both the philosophers have talked about various categories of people, different types of Quranic verses, they have talked also about different varieties of existences.

As already said Ibn Rushd supports Ghazzali's classification of existences in *Manahij al addilah* while dealing with the perimeters of interpretation. He attempts to defend various interpretations and the interpreters against the alleged labeling of heresies and blasphemy

on them on the basis of their demonstration about religious principles.

Before saying something about Ghazzalian classification of existences, which was appreciated and approved by Ibn Rushd later on, let us have a brief account about the Ibn Rushd's views on *Tawil* as he has expressed in *Manahij al adillah*.

Ibn Rushd says that there are various things of religion in which interpretation is allowed and others where it is not allowed.

According to Ibn Rushd the things found in the law can be divided into five kinds of things: indivisible and the divisible. The second one is divided into four kinds. The first kind that is mentioned in the Quran, is quite clear in its meanings. The second is that in which the thing mentioned is not the thing meant but only an example of it. This is again divided into four kinds. First, the meanings that it mentions are only illustrations such that they can only be known by farfetched and compound analogies, which can not be understood, but after a long time and much labour. None can accept them but perfect and excellent natures; and it cannot be known that the illustration given is not the real thing; except by this far-fetched way. The second is just the opposite of the former. They can be understood easily, and it can be known that the example is just what is meant here. Thirdly, it can be easily known that it is merely an illustration but what it is the example of is difficult to comprehend.

The fourth kind, according to Ibn Rushd is quite opposite to the former. The thing, of which it is an example, is easily understood while it is difficult to know that it is an example at all. The interpretation of the first kind is wrong without doubt. The kind in which both the things are farfetched: its interpretation particularly lies with those who are well-grounded in knowledge, and an exposition of it is not fit for any but the learned. Ibn Rushd

says that the interpretation of its opposite that which can be understood on both the sides- is just what is wanted, and an exposition of it is necessary.

The case of the third kind is like the case of the above. For in it illustration has not been mentioned because of the difficulty for the common people to understand it: It only incites the people to action. Such is the case with the tradition of the prophet: "The black stone is Gods' action on Earth" etc. etc. That which can be easily known that is an example, but difficult to know which it is example, should not be interpreted but for the sake of particular persons and learned men. Those who understand, that is' only an illustration, but are not learned enough to know the thing which it illustrates, should be told either that it is allegorical and can be understood by the well-established learned men, or the illustration should be changed in a way which might be near to their understanding. This would be the best plan to dispel doubts from their minds. 67/

After discussing these interpretations and the issues that warrant it, Ibn Rushd quotes Ghazzali's statement pertaining to various kinds of existences as follows

"The law about this should be that which has been laid down by Abu Hamid (Al - Ghazzali) in his book, *Al-Tafruqa bainal Islam wal Zindiqah*. It is understood that one thing has five existences which he calls by the name of essential (*Dhati*), sensual (*Hissi*), rational; imaginative (*Khayali*) and doubtful (*Shibhi*). So at the time of doubt it should be considered which of these five kinds would better satisfy the man who has doubts. If it be that which he has called essential than one illustration would best satisfy their minds. In it is also included the following traditions of the prophet, "Whatever the earlier prophets saw I have seen it from my place here, even heaven and hell." Between my cistern of water and the pulpit, there is a garden of paradise" and "The earth will eat up the

whole of a man except the extremity of the tail" All these, it can easily be known, are but illustrations, but what is the thing which they illustrate, it is difficult to be comprehended. So, it is necessary in this case to give an instance to the people that they may easily understand. This kind of illustration, when used on such an occasion is allowable; but when used irrelevantly it is wrong. 68/

However, Ghazzali, according to Ibn Rushd has not decided about the occasion then both the sides of the question - the illustration and the illustrated- be both far-fetched and difficult to understand. About which to Ibn Rushd, "but a doubt without any foundation. What should be done is to prove that the doubt has no basis, but no interpretation should be made, as we have shown in many places in our present book against the *Mutakallimeen*, *Ash'arites* and the *Mutazilites*". 69/ Before embarking on Ghazzali's views on various levels of existence, we want to give more details about Ibn Rushd's views about interpretation.

Ibn Rushd holds that the fourth kind of occasions is quite opposite to the former. In this it is very difficult to understand that it is an example, but when once understood, you can easily comprehend the thing illustrated. In the interpretation of this also according to Ibn Rushd, there is a consideration: about those people who know that if it is an example, it illustrates such and such a thing, but they doubt whether it is an illustration at all. If they are not learned people, the best thing to do with them is not to make any interpretation, but only to prove the fallacy of the views that they hold about its being an illustration at all. Ibn Rushd thinks that it is also possible that an interpretation may make them still distant from the truth, on account of the nature of the illustration and the illustrated. According to Ibn Rushd, for these two kinds of occasions if an interpretation is given, they give rise to strange beliefs, far from the law which when

disclosed are denied by the common people. Ibn Rushd includes Sufis and their learned followers among these people and says that when this work of interpretation was done by people who could not distinguish between these occasions, and made no distinction between the people for whom the interpretation is to be made, there arose differences of opinion, at last forming into sects, which ended in accusing one another with unbelief. Ibn Rushd calls this as a "pure ignorance of the purpose of the law". 70/

While concluding this discussion on interpretation Ibn Rushd says:

"From what we have already said the amount of mischief done by interpretation must have become clear to you. We always try to acquire our purpose by knowing what should be interpreted, and what not, and when interpreted, how it should be done; and whether all the difficult portions of the law and traditions are to be explained or not. These are all included in the four kinds which have already been enumerated". 71/

If these four kinds of occasions that necessitate interpretation are seriously studied, it will become clear that Ibn Rushd has followed Ghazzali in ascertaining the validity of interpretation.

Ghazzali maintains that where the evidence for the intended interpretation balances in strength against other possible meanings of the text in question, the *mujtahid* (the man of interpretative class) should then use his judgment to choose which ever of them he conceives to be the most probable. Ghazzali reinforces this position of his by saying that not every interpretation is acceptable by virtue of its supporting evidence. Rather, the attitude towards an interpretation in terms of acceptance or rejection must vary according to its strength and the strength of the evidence upon which it is based, yet, Ghazzali admits like, Ibn Rushd, that there are no clear -

cut rules for the mujtahids regarding this issue. 72/

According to Ibn Rushd there is possibility of difference of opinion in matters of interpretation (*Tawil*) and according to *Shariah*, a mujtahid is rewarded two fold, if his *Ijtihad*, is correct, other wise he deserves a single reward.

To make judgement about existence or being is the most important sphere for a Mujtahid according to Ibn Rushd. Therefore a "Mujtahid" who passes judgements on the problem of existence or being cannot be labeled as infidel in case he commits a mistake in his judgement. Ibn Rushd here refers to Ghazzali who has said that a person does not warrant allegation of blasphemy, if he confines his interpretation to the five levels of existences and a person who accepts or interprets *Shariah principles* in light of any of these five levels of existence cannot be declared as an unbeliever. 73/

In *Faysal -al -Tafruqah* Ghazzali, initially, divided existence into five different degrees all of which he claims to be unanimously recognized by all the Muslim schools of thought. In *Maqsad-al-Asna*, Ghazzali gives similar exposition to his views about existences. He says:

"The essence and limit of name is that the things have existence in senses and existence in minds, and existences in language. The existence in senses or sensible existence is the essential and real existence and the mental existence is an epistemological and imaginative existence. The linguistic existence is a verbal and argumentative existence". 74/

Ghazzali maintains that the first and the highest degree of existence is the essential existence (*al wujud al dhati*). It is the real existence, he observes, that it stands outside of sense and intellect. But both sense and intellect receive an image from it. Such an example is the existence of *al- Arsh*, the Throne, and the seven Heavens about which the prophet has given us information. These

expressions, Ghazzali observes, signify really existing bodies regardless of whether or not they can be perceived by sense and imagination. Therefore, such words should not be interpreted in a way whatever, they should be accepted in their apparent meaning. Earth, animals and vegetables are also included in this category of existence.

2 Ghazzali then goes on to state that sensible existence, (*al wujud al hissi*), is the next degree. This kind of existence, he explains, represents itself into the visual faculty of the eye but does not exist outside the eye. Thus, it is peculiar to only the person who senses it. An example of that is what a person sees in a dream or daydream, 75/ or as a sick man sees when he is awake. Some times the prophets and the saints in a waking condition see a beautiful figure, presumed to be of an angel, which brings forth the divine message to them. Mary (AS) had such a vision about which God says:

“It appeared before her in a complete human form”. 76/ In the same way as the prophet (SA W) saw Jibrael (AS) in different shapes, while he saw him in his real shape only twice, the other shapes in which the prophet (SAW) saw him were the symbolic existences (*Mithali*). In the same way a person sees the prophet in a dream, as the prophet (SAW) has said that if a person sees me in a dream, his seeing is real, as the Satan cannot take my shape. But the seeing of the prophet (SAW) never means that the sacred body of the prophet (SAW) has come out of its sacred abode and reached to the person who sees him in dream. But seeing the prophet (SA W) in the dream is in the sight of the seer or his senses only. 77/

3. The third degree of existence is the imaginative existence, (*al wujud al khayali*). This type of existence is the image of sensible objects one creates in ones mind while those objects are absent from sensation. 78/ For example you can create in your mind the images of an elephant and a horse if you close your eyes till you feel as

you are perceiving these things and you imagine that these things are present in your mind not outside from it. 79/

4. Following this existence in degree, is the mental existence (*al-Wujud al aqli*). This occurs, Ghazzali holds, when something has a soul, (*ruh*) an objective reality (*haqiqah*), and a meaning (*maana*), but the intellect acquires only its meaning without its image being present in the imagination, or the senses or externally at all. For example, hand has both a sensible and an imaginative image, and it also has a meaning that stands for its essence. The meaning is the ability to strike (*al qudrat al al batsh*). The ability to strike then is the "intellectual hand". 80/

In the same way the pen has both a sensible and an imaginative image; and it also has a meaning that stands for its essence. 81/ That meaning is the ability to note down the sciences. This meaning is given to it by the intellect without its having any image of wood or bamboo or any other sensible or imaginative image apart from these. 82/ The last degree of existence in Ghazzali's opinion is what he calls analogical existence (*al wujud al shibihi*). According to his definition this kind of existence deals with any thing whose image and objective reality are not present in the senses, the imagination, the intellect or externally at all. But what is seen or felt in any one of these is something else that resembles it in one of its qualities or characteristics. 83/

Ghazzali believes that the first of these five degrees is not an interpretation. It is the real meaning and therefore the real existence. On the other hand, he believes that the rest of the degrees necessitate interpretation whose strength corresponds with the descending order of the kind of the existence to which it belongs.

To Ghazzali the degrees of textual interpretation are parallel, in number and kind, with the degrees of existence maintains thus: when an existence mentioned in the Revelation (Quran and Hadith) is real, that is essential, it

should not be interpreted. Instead it must be retained with its apparent meaning. 84/

Ghazzali then goes on to cite one example or more for each of the remaining four degrees of existence as applied to interpretation. We cite one example from each as applied to interpretation. He notes that there are several examples in the Revelation for sensible existence. One such existence is the one mentioned in the tradition that says thus:

"On the Day of Resurrection death will be brought (to the presence of mankind) in the form of a black and white ram, and it will then be slaughtered (in a place) between paradise and Hell", 85/ Ghazzali then points out that those scholars who adduce proof that death is an accident and therefore cannot be possibly transformed into a substance (which is the ram in this case) interpret the tradition to mean that: on the Day of Resurrection people will see the ram and believe it to be the death. This will eventually lead them to feel certainly secure from death after it has been slaughtered, but in reality the ram and its slaughter exist only in their sense and not outside it. The existence in the tradition is thereby interpreted as sensible existence.

Nonetheless, those who have no evidence of the impossibility of the transformation of accident into substance believe that it is death itself that will be actually transformed into a ram on the Day of resurrection and then be slaughtered. This of course would mean an imaginative existence because it is not an interpretation but the literal meaning of the text.

For the imaginative existence, Ghazzali quotes as an example the tradition of the prophet that says:

"It seemed as if I was looking at Yunis (Johnah), the son of Matta (Mathew), clothed in two '*aba*' *al qatwaniyah* ("a wide striped white garment with short fringes.") making the *talbiyah* (I have answered your call, O' God I

have answered) and being replied to by the mountains, and (it seems as if I heard) God the Exalted saying to him e,g, I have answered your call, O' Yunis". 86/

Ghazzali holds that this tradition informs about the existence of that figure in the prophet's imagination. Although the very image had existed in the past, even before the prophet's lifetime, it was no longer existing at the time he uttered the tradition in question, Ghazzali stresses that the word (Ka anni), "it seems as if I", emphasizes the fact that the narration was not real but an imaginative experience. 87/

Ghazzali gives two examples from the tradition for mental existence. The first of these will be quoted here, "Whoever is taken out of Hellfire shall be given, (as his portion) of paradise, ten times the equivalent of this world". 88/

Ghazzali then observes that the apparent meaning of the above tradition signifies that the position which will be given in paradise is going to be ten times the equivalent of this world in size, this would definitely represent both sensible and imaginative disparity, But one would find it difficult to reconcile this notion with what the Revelation apparently indicates, namely that the paradise is in Heaven. "How then, Ghazzali asks, "can the heaven be broad enough to contain ten times the equivalent of the world when the heaven also is part of the world", 89/

The only way to avoid this question being raised effectively is to interpret the tradition to mean abstract and mental disparity and not sensible and imaginative one. 90/

Ghazzali's argument on this example is founded on a linguistic ground: that Heaven is part of the world, whereas paradise is in Heaven. It would therefore be absurd that one could be given as his position of paradise, ten times the equivalent of the world because a part of something cannot be Larger than it's whole. This is why

Ghazzali is of the opinion that the text in question needs to be interpreted as the above.

It can be argued with good reason that the first premise of the forgoing argument that Heaven is part of the world is false and subsequently so is the conclusion drawn from it. That is because throughout the Quran "Heaven" is referred to as an antonym or to say the least, as different entity from "the world". There are several verses of the Quran, which substantiate this assertion 91/

Moreover, contrary to Ghazzali's assertion, the Quran indicates in an evident way that this world will undergo physical change and then be turned to be a part of the Heaven. 92/ Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the words *dunya*: "world" and *akhirah* "heaven" are not only antonyms and signify different entities and connotations as the Quranic terms and connotations, but are also clearly differentiated in correct Arabic usage. The very roots of these words are indicative of their being antonyms. 93/

As for the analogical interpretation, Ghazzali continues, anger, craving, joy, patience and such attributes of God mentioned in the Revelation are typical samples of it.

Anger for example, Ghazzali illustrates, is the ebullition of one's heart blood because of the desire to gratify one's thirst for revenge. Imperfection and pain are inherent in this attitude. Therefore, those scholars who adduce proof that this very anger, because of its inherent imperfection, cannot be attributed to God as an essential, sensible, imaginative or mental attribute, interpret it to an another attribute that has some of the characteristics of anger i.e. the will to punish. 94/

Ghazzali then asserts that whoever confirms any of the texts of the Revelation to fall in one of the five degrees of existence, is a believer. However, he asserts equally that to reject all of these degrees of interpretation with regard to any revealed text under any pretext whatsoever, is

outright disbelief and atheism. 95/ Nevertheless, Ghazzali holds there are rules that safeguard interpretation. And as long as the rules are followed, one need not charge an exegete with infidelity. 96/ The rules, as laid down by Ghazzali are as follows:

1. One should not attempt to interpret a text (reduce its meaning to a degree less than that of the essential existence) unless there is apodeictic (demonstrable) proof of the possibility of the apparent essential meaning.

2. In interpretation, one must start with the highest degree: sensible interpretation, unless one finds it impossible. Then, one should turn to the next degree: imaginative interpretation; and should not after that turn to the degree next degree to it unless one finds the second category to be an impossible interpretation, and so forth.

It is noteworthy that Ghazzali asserts that each of the higher degrees of interpretation automatically contains the meaning of the degrees below it. 97/ Ghazzali then sums this second rule up by saying:

"Now it is not permissible to turn from one degree to what is below it except because of a warranting apodictic demonstration". 98/

Ghazzali now points out that it is clearly around apodeictic proof that the controversy among the various Islamic schools of thought about interpretation revolves. That is because the *Hanbalis* for example, contrary to the Ashari's belief, hold that there is no apodeictic proof of the absurdity of God's being specified by the direction of "above". The Ash'arites on the other hand, as against the Hanbalis doctrine, assert that there is no apodeictic proof of the absurdity of the ocular vision of God in the hereafter. One gathers from these controversies, Ghazzali observes that each group rejects what its adversary puts forth as decisive evidence. Yet, Ghazzali emphasizes, it is not proper for any group to charge another with unbelief because it considers the apodeictic proof the other group

has adduced in any particular case to be erroneous. At the same time, Ghazzali is of the opinion that the supposedly righteous group may call the supposedly wrong group "erring" (*dall*), since in the opinion of the former, the latter has gone astray on the issue in question, or "innovating" (*mubtad'î*) because in his own view, the group has initiated an opinion no pious Muslim predecessor had ever held 99/

Ibn Rushd has complained also that the various sectarian divisions which emerged among the Muslims as the Mutazilites, the Ash'arites, the Kharijites, the Batinites, the Hassawites etc etc. and regarded misuse of interpretation as the sole cause of this division. He thinks that the disorder in religion takes place when interpretations are exposed which should not be exposed. Ibn Rushd supports Ghazzali when he says that if the interpretation is made by the people who are entitled to interpret, then there will be no disorder or division in the Muslim community.

To level a decree of blasphemy against other sections of people on the basis of interpretation has been disapproved both by Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd. Ibn Rushd says: "He (Ghazzali) has also insisted upon the fact that he knew the cause of doing so, as he did in his *Al Tafruqa bain at Islami wa zindiqah*. In it he has noted down many kinds of interpretations the upholders of which were not infidels though they may go against the consensus of opinion". 100/

Then Ibn Rushd defines interpretation that signifies the same sense as Ghazzali's definition as has been already seen in the foregoing pages. Ibn Rushd says:

..... " extension of the significance or an expression from real to metaphorical significance, without forsaking therein the standard metaphorical practices of Arabic, such as calling a thing by the name of something resembling it or a cause or consequence or accompaniment

of it, or other things such as one enumerated in accounts of the kinds of metaphorical speech". 101/

Ghazzali's definition stipulates that the interpreted meaning has to be supported by evidence. In other words, his definition stipulates that the interpreted meaning of an expression can only be resorted to when there is evidential proof that justifies it. This condition is not present in Ibn Rushd's definition. Naturally enough each of these two definitions has bearing on the position of its exponent in his theory of interpretation.

Ibn Rushd then observes:

"So we affirm definitely that whenever the conclusion of a demonstration is in conflict with the apparent meaning, it admits of allegorical interpretation according to the rules of much interpretation in Arabic. This proposition is questioned by no Muslim and doubted by no believer indeed, we may say that whenever a statement in scripture conflicts in its apparent meaning with conclusions of demonstrations, if scripture is considered carefully, and the rest of its own texts searched page by page, there will invariably be found among the expressions of scripture something which in its apparent meaning bears witness to that allegorical interpretation or causes close to bearing witness". 102/

The above statement represents the core of Ibn Rushd's thesis: There can be no real conflict between Scripture and reason. This position of Ibn Rushd on Scripture Vs Reason is essentially Ghazzali's position in *al Iqtisad* 103/

We can draw a conclusion from the ongoing discussion that Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd agree that Revelation contains some contexts whose apparent meaning contradicts or appears to contradict reason. 104/

In this way we have seen that Ibn Rushd accepts with approval the various kinds or categories of existences which have been discussed by Ghazzali in his *Faysal al Tafrughah* and moreover, with little minor differences, Ibn

Rushd accepts Ghazzalian views pertaining to interpretation as well.

Except in a few odd cases, Ibn Rushd's concept of *Tawil* i.e. interpretation is similar to that of Ghazzali. But when it comes to the method of application of the interpretation the two scholars are far apart. They both agree that scripture contains both apparent meaning and esoteric interpretation; their definition of interpretation is basically the same; regarding interpretation, they both divide scriptural texts into various similar kinds as already discussed in detail, and Ibn Rushd even actually adopts Ghazzali's rules of interpretation instead of formulating his own. 105/

However, according to J.P. Montada:-

"Ibn Rushd was not prone to making wide use of *Tawil*: it becomes necessary only if the revealed text contradicts the results of demonstration. In such a case, he looked for the metaphorical meaning".

"On the other hand, Al -Ghazzali had frequent recourse to *Tawil* but never accepted, as did Ibn Rushd, that it can be used in order to cause reason to prevail over revealed texts when ever both are in apparent contradiction". 106/

After making this detailed discussion about Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd on the categories of existence visa vis interpretation, the following points come inevitably to our notice:

From the statements and quotations of both the philosophers it becomes very evident that both the philosophers agree that only people who are competent for such studies must consult demonstrative treatises and philosophical books. But such studies are prohibited in favour of incompetent and weak people. Naturally intelligent and religiously just and balanced persons can take this job in their hands. Ibn Rushd blames Ghazzali that he exposed common people to philosophy by

expressing and explaining philosophical subjects in his books, and considered it possible for common people to pursue such sciences.

Ibn Rushd has made it explicitly clear that he is against proclamation of Greek philosophical books to those people who are not competent for it. He rather makes it obligatory for the Muslim heads to prohibit demonstrative books from the common people as well as Ghazzali's books.

He says:

"Hence, it is necessary for the doctors of Islam to prevent men, except the learned from reading his books: as it is incumbent upon them to hinder them from reading controversial writings which should not be studied except by those fit to do so. As a rule the reading of these books is less harmful than those of the former. For the majority cannot understand philosophical books, but only those endowed with superior natures." 107/

In this way Ibn Rushd prohibited the study of *Burhan* Books for the common people. But if we look minutely, Ghazzali has showed the same attitude. He does not allow study of philosophy but only to the competent reader who can differentiate between truth and falsehood and can distinguish right from wrong. He supports that people are known by truth not truth by the people. Though Ghazzali allows study of such books for the competent people to understand the nature of misguidance of the wrongful philosophy. But Ghazzali also observes that there are people who though very credulous, yet claim to be intelligent enough to involve in such studies in order to distinguish truth from falsehood, and they claim to know people by truth, rather the truth by people and consider themselves as the people of vision. Ghazzali stopped their way in front of them with a precaution, so that these deceived and enchanted men, with weak minds, so that they may not get in any trouble. 108/

Ghazzali has warned against study of Burhan Books by incompetent people in almost all his books. For example in *Al Munqidh*, Ghazzali says:

"It is customary with weaker intellects that to take the men as criterion of the truth and not the truth as criterion of the men. The intelligent man follows, Ali (May God be pleased with him) when he said "Do not know the truth by the men, but know the truth, and then you will know who are truthful". The intelligent man knows the truth, then he examines the particular assertion. If it is true, he accepts it, whether the speaker is a truthful person or not. Indeed he is often anxious to separate out the truth from the discourse of those who are in error, for he knows that gold is found mixed engraved with dross". 109/

He says further

"The majority of men, I maintain, are dominated by a high opinion of their own skill and accomplishments, especially the perfection of their intellects for distinguishing true from false and sure guidance from misleading suggestion. It is therefore necessary, I maintain, to shut the gate so as to keep the general public from reading the books of the misguided as far as possible". 110/

This total rejection about the study of all books by Ghazzali on philosophy leads us to following points.

First, If Ghazzali prohibits study of all books on philosophy, is he exempted from this general rule. As we know that Ghazzali has not only gone through books on philosophy, but apart from writing a rejoinder to philosophers, he summed up their views in the *Maqasid al Falasifah*, which was followed by a rebuttal i.e. *Tahafut al Falasifah*. Secondly: Ghazzali made study of philosophical books objectionable to all and sundry in order to rescue them from falling in pitfalls and trouble therefrom. But at the same time he made it clear that if a person is not prone to fall in any trouble, he can study

these books, as the main cause of trouble remains there no more .He, warned, however, that he feels that the people who are immune from these dangers are only a few in number i.e. erudite scholars.

He says:

"In view of this danger the reading of philosophical writings so full of vain and delusive utopias should be forbidden, just as the slippery banks of a river are forbidden, to one who knows not how to swim". 111/

A perusal of these false teachings must be prevented just as one prevents children from touching serpents. A snake charmer himself will abstain from touching snakes in the presence of his young children because he knows that the child, believing himself as clever as his father will not fail to imitate him, and in order to lend more weight to his prohibition the charmer will not touch a serpent under the eyes of his son. Such should be the conduct of a learned man (*Al Alim al Rasikh*) who is also wise. 112/

From these passages, it seems that Ghazzali does not prohibit the study of the philosophers who preceded him to the masters of sciences, rather to the weak intellect, by considering themselves equal to the learned ones. Otherwise no science or knowledge is blame worthy according to Ghazzali as he says:

"Knowledge is not held to be blameworthy except for one of three reasons. Firstly, if it leads to the harm of another it becomes blameworthy, such as magic, talisman, sorcery, secondly it causes much harm to the acquirer, thirdly it becomes of no use to one who acquires it". 113/

It means that knowledge has an intrinsic value as long as it is not associated with any appendages that may affect it with the passage of time. Thirdly, Ghazzali regards preaching towards Islam with an argument as necessity and obligation. He shows that from *Shariah* point of view dispelling of doubts and confusions which disturb people

in religious matters assumes an obligatory importance when times demand. It is for the same reason that he calls *Ilmul al Kalam* as a -*Fard al Kifayah* to dispel the confusion created by the heretical people and the innovators. Therefore when Ghazzali felt that some books of the philosophers are creating confusion in the minds of the Muslims by philosophy of Aristotle and his followers, he declared rejection of such people as an obligation on the Muslim scholars. Since this task warranted complete acquaintance with the books of the philosophers for reaching to the root cause of their misguidance, to which even the philosophers themselves could not reach. Therefore, under such circumstances, it becomes incumbent on a person who wants to defend Islam to study seriously the books of his predecessors. 114/

Ghazzali says:

"In a way this criticism is justified. Ahmad B. Hanbal once criticised al Harith al Muhasibi (May God have mercy on them) for his book, *The Refutation of the Mutazilah*. "It is a duty to refute heresy". Al -Harith replied. "Certainly", said, Ahmad, "but you first give an account of their false doctrines and afterwards a refutation of them. How can you be sure what men will do? A man might read the false doctrines and grasp them with his understanding without turning afterwards to the refutations; or he might peruse the refutation without understanding its full import".

"Ahmad's observation is justified. But it applies to false doctrine, which is not widely and generally known. Where such doctrine is widely known, it ought to be refuted, and refutation presupposes a statement of the doctrine". 115/

Ghazzali's position vis-à-vis interpretation has become more evident after removing these doubts which would arise after reading the above mentioned remarks of Ibn Rushd. Ghazzali's approach to this problem is very

similar to Ibn Rushd. In other words if we say that Ibn Rushd has consciously or unconsciously accepted Ghazzali's views about this problem word by word, it will be not an exaggeration. After endorsing Ghazzali's classification about various categories of existence, Ibn Rushd makes this classification as a guiding principle in elaboration of his views vis-à-vis interpretation.

Though not directly related to this topic, Ghazzali's and Ibn Rushd's agreement about condemnation of Ibn Sina and taxing him with blasphemy is somehow rooted in their concept of interpretation. There is agreement between Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd in condemnation of Ibn Sina, although the reasons for this condemnation are somewhat different. In *Tahafut al Tahafut* Ibn Rushd agrees with Ghazzali and joins him in condemning Ibn Sina as a disbeliever for his denial of bodily resurrection. Ibn Sina, he says, "merits more than any one else that the charge of disbelief should be laid against him. And he is liable to the penalty for unbelief in the religion in which he has been brought up". 116/

In advance to Ghazzali, Ibn Rushd even goes on to charge Ibn Sina with *Zandiqah* (atheism) which is a stronger legal term than *Kufr* (disbelief). He says:

"And the same may be said of the doctrine of the beyond in our religion, which is more conducive to virtuous actions than what is said in others. Thus to represent the beyond in material images is more appropriate than purely spiritual representation, as is said in the divine words: "The likeness of the paradise which those who fear God are promised, beneath it rivers flow". And the prophet has said "In it there is what no eye has seen, no ear has heard nor ever entered the mind of man". And Ibn Abbas said, there is no relation of the other world to this world but the names." And he meant by this that the beyond is another creation of a higher order than this world, and another phase superior to our earthly phase.

He need not deny this who believes that we see one single thing developing itself from one phase to another, for instance the transformation of the inorganic into beings conscious of their own essences, i.e. the intellectual forms. Those who are in doubt about this and object to it and try to explain it are not those who seek to destroy the religious prescriptions and to undo the virtues. They are, as every one knows, the heretics and those who believe that the end of man consists only in sensual enjoyment. When such people have really the power to destroy religious belief both theologians and philosophers will no doubt kill them, but when they have no actual power the best arguments that can be brought against them are those that are contained in the Holy Book. What Ghazzali says against them is right". 117/

Here Ilysa Bello makes a very important remark when he says after quoting the above statement; that:

"The above passage appears to explain one of the reasons why Ibn Rushd departing from his habit, does not quote Ghazzali's discussion of bodily resurrection in the *Tahafut* before replying to him this time. There is no need to do that here because he only quotes Ghazzali's argument, when he does, in order to draw a counter argument against it, and that, as can be seen, is not the case here". 118/

Though Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd charged Ibn Sina with infidelity, but the reasons were different.

Ghazzali taxes Ibn Sina with disbelief because he denies a fundamental of Islam, the scriptural texts of which are not receptive of the allegorical interpretation, Ibn Sina imposes on them. In this connection one should note that in *Faysal al Tafruqah*, he argues that the texts in question come down to us through innumerable corroborative reports, and according to Ghazzali a denial of such texts warrants taxation with disbelief because it implies the imputation of falsehood to the prophet. 119/

Ibn Rushd on the other hand condemns Ibn Sina as an infidel, not because he denies bodily resurrection but because he violates the rule of interpretation by revealing to the masses the demonstrative interpretation of the texts dealing with resurrection. This demonstrative interpretation, according to him, ought to be restricted to the people of demonstration i.e. the *Falasifah*. He then says:

"It belongs to the necessary virtue of him (who belongs to the demonstrative class) that he should not describe the doctrines in which he has been brought up and that he should explain them in the fairest way, and that he should understand that the aim of these doctrines lies in their universal character, not in their elitism, and that, if he expresses a doubt concerning the religious principles in which he has been brought up, or explains them in a way contradictory to that of the prophets and turns away from their path, he merits more than anyone else that the charge of disbelief should be laid against him:" 120/

After these preliminary remarks it will be of a greater interest to try to know what are the actual grounds on which Ghazzali labels infidelity on Ibn Sina. Moreover we would also make a brief survey of the views of Ghazzali and Ibn Sina on the problem of bodily resurrection.

Ghazzali considers Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina as the chief representatives of Greek philosophy, because "in transmitting the philosophy of Aristotle, however none of the Islamic philosophers has accomplished anything comparable to the achievements of the two men named". 121/

However, Ghazzali more emphatically concentrated on Ibn Sina's views and refuted him. In the same way when Ghazzali attacks philosophers on their views regarding resurrection of souls, not of bodies, he is mainly attacking Ibn Sina's views about this problem. While enumerating the heresies of the philosophers that they

have gone to the extreme and have, therefore, committed blasphemy, Ghazzali says about their views about bodily resurrection that:

“They say that for bodies there is no resurrection; it is bare spirits which are rewarded or punished; and the rewards and punishments are spiritual, not bodily. They certainly speak truth in affirming the spiritual ones, since these do exist as well; but they speak falsely in denying the bodily ones and in their pronouncements disbelieve the Divine laws”. 122/

Ibn Rushd assumes that Ghazzali bases his taxation of these philosophers with disbelief on their violation of *Ijma* formed on these two questions. On this ground, Ibn Rushd argues that since it is impossible to form *Ijma* on theoretical matters because the scripture has, besides the apparent meaning esoteric meaning which ought not to be told to anyone who does not belong to the esoteric class, no definite *Ijma* can be formed on these two questions because they are both of theoretical matters. Hence, Ghazzali's claim of *Ijma* on both of them is false, and therefore his condemnation of these two philosophers to infidelity for their violation of *Ijma* formulated on the two questions is unfounded. But Ibn Rushd is mistaken here. Because some of the fundamentals of Islam e.g. the belief in God, the Angels and the day of Resurrection, are theoretical matters, yet the Muslims have certainly established *Ijma* on them.

Moreover, Ibn Rushd's claim that Ghazzali bases his condemnation of Ibn Sina and al-Farabi, for their theories of the eternality of the world and the denial of bodily resurrection, on their violation of *Ijma* is false. Ghazzali does not condemn the philosophers as infidels on those two accounts because of their violation of *Ijma*. Rather, he condemns them on the question because of their wrong interpretation and their contradiction of the text of the Quran, a measure that, Ghazzali contends, implies the

imputation of a lie to the prophet (SAW) and therefore constitutes outright disbelief. 123/

After showing the reasons on which Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd have condemned Ibn Sina and taxed him with infidelity, it seems very natural to say few things about Ghazzali's and Ibn Sina's views about bodily resurrection.

Ibn Sina's statements in his *al Shifa* and *al Najat* on the hereafter are ambiguous, if not outrightly contradictory. He seems to maintain that there is both bodily resurrection and immortality restricted to immaterial souls. The ambiguity seems deliberate and used as a protective device against charges of irreligion. A careful reading of the psychological parts of these two works will show that his system cannot allow a doctrine of bodily resurrection. A very explicit denial of bodily resurrection is to be found in his short treatise called: *Risalah Adhawiah Fi Amr al M'aad* that as its title suggests, was written exclusively on his conception of the hereafter. Ghazzali's exposition and refutation of Ibn Sina's theory on bodily resurrection are in the main, based on this short treatise. 124/

But this theory can be refuted if Ibn Sina's views are deeply scrutinized in this regard. To start with, Ibn Sina divides the salvation of the world hereafter death consisting of three degrees or states, as salvation can never be without either completion in knowledge and practice, or incompleteness in both of these two, or be completion in one of these, and incompleteness in the latter one.

Then he divides this third degree into two parts, either it may be complete in knowledge and incomplete in practice or vice versa. Ibn Sina then divides this third, degree into two varieties. That may be complete in knowledge, but incomplete in practice or vice versa: Then he says: - " The degrees of the selves will be graded according to the division, which has been made in the Quran. As the Quran says:

"And ye shall be sorted out into three classes. Then (there will be) the companions of the Right Hand. What will be the companions of the Right Hand?

And the companions of the left Hand, what will be the companions of the left Hand"

After wards Allah says:

"And those Foremost (in faith) will be foremost (in the Hereafter). There will be those nearest to Allah." (Al Quran 56: 7: II)

Ibn Sina continues after quoting these Quranic verses: The people well-versed in knowledge and established in practice are those who have been called as "*Saabiqoon*" (the foremost), and they deserve the highest or the uppermost stage in the paradise full of pleasures.

These people are associated from the three worlds to the world of intellect, and these people constantly refrain from the bodily concerns. These people are the foremost, and will be stationed in the uppermost stages in the paradise.

"The companions of the Right Hand", will be stationed at the middle stage, who get rid of the concerns with this transitory world and get related to the world of heavens, remain aloof from the pollution of the phenomenal world, damned in the house of destruction, where they will not ask for a single perseverance, but manifold instead".

These are the three degrees or states of the soul which Ibn Sina has inferred from the Quranic verses, though the influence of Plato in context of the first degree is still there, which indicates the transcendence of it from the vicinity of the bodies and the souls of heavens are there, but still he accepts that there will be sensuous pleasures from various delicious food stuffs, and varieties of the flesh of birds etc in favour of the people of the middle degree, here too he does not seem to be without influence from platonic views, when he confesses that the people of the

middle stage will be raised to the degree of "*Quswa*" by their efforts to purge themselves from material aspects to the possible extent. 125/

Ibn Sina confesses that the people of the lowest stage or degree will be given bodily punishments also. In this way he does not deny bodily resurrection in all cases, but only in few cases with relation to only few people. Therefore Ibn Sina does not warrant allegations of amputating falsehood on the prophets. Because he interpreted the Quranic verses in a philosophical manner under the influence of platonic school of thought. This sort of interpretation has led Ibn Sina to hold the views that for a specific group of the people there will be no bodily resurrection. But even these views don't amount to the denial of the prophetic teachings or an absolute rejection of bodily resurrection. But rather this philosophical interpretation is an attempt on the part of Ibn Sina to bring accord between religion and platonic thought. Therefore, he accepts that several people will get bodily resurrection, while others will be only resurrected spiritually. He does not oppose the spirit of the *Shariah* in this regard as to hold solitude of the self or possibility of pleasures in the life hereafter as superior to the sensuous pleasures and does not challenge the *Shariah* in any big way. 126/

Ghazzali also says about the same fact that: - Most of these things are not opposed to religion. We do not deny that the pleasures in the Hereafter are superior to sensible pleasures. Nor do we deny the immortality of the soul separated from the body. But we know these things on the authority of religion, as expressed in the doctrine of Resurrection. No doubt, the Resurrection will not be comprehensible, if the immortality of soul is not taken far granted. But we take objection, as we did before, to their assertion that mere reason gives them final knowledge of these things. Moreover, there are elements

in this theory, which do come into conflict with religion. From the earlier passages it has become clear that such views are the denial of the revivification of bodies, denial of physical pains and pleasures in hell and paradise, and the denial of the existence of paradise and hell as described in the Quran.

It is very clear that Ibn Sina does not deny resurrection of bodies, neither does he deny heaven or hell, nor the sensuous pleasures and physical penalty in the life hereafter death. Rather Ibn Sina compressed these beliefs about the second and the third stage of the life hereafter death, while as in the first stage he specifies it with the resurrection of the souls and spiritual pleasures. Whatever he speaks in this regard, he tries to refer repetitively to the Quran and the Sunnah of the prophet (SAW). Therefore, we find here a close and glaring similarity between Ghazzali and Ibn Sina despite the fact that the former has taxed the latter with infidelity on his three theories, one of them being rejection of this bodily resurrection. Ibn Sina lays much emphasis on the fact, for us, that he believes in the resurrection of bodies as indicated by the Quran...

He says:

"You must understand that life after is to be believed on the authority of *Shariah* as there is no other way to understand or know it except on the authority of *Shariah* or to believe in the statement of the prophet (SAW) about it, as has been indicated that the body will have its rewards and penalties with it at the time of resurrection, which is very evident... *Shariah* which has been brought to us by our chosen prophet (SAW), has elaborated on the condition of salvation". 128/

"Damnation which is directly related to body, which can be understood by reason as well as demonstrative analogy, which has been already established by the

prophet (SAW), i.e. Salvation and damnation established for the self, though our imagination may not reach to it at this stage as the reasons cannot be fully explained, in favour of it, ...

The Religious philosophers are inclined to establish the superiority of this aspect of spiritual salvation in comparison to bodily salvation, which sometimes seems as they do not believe in the latter, or if they believe in it they do not make it superior to the former type of salvation because it's a priority etc."

From this passage it is very clear that Ibn Sina does not deny resurrection of the bodies, but believes in this doctrine as demanded by *Shariah*, though he believed in the spiritual resurrection and salvation supported by rational arguments and endorsed by the prophets also. In this way he agrees with Ghazzali about the combined salvation, i.e. of soul and body in life hereafter, as both agree also about the superiority of the former on the latter. Therefore, Ibn Sina's views regarding this matter did not warrant the decree of blasphemy. 129/ Despite this fact Ghazzali has taxed Ibn Sina with infidelity, which is a sheer injustice on his part. Taftazani defends Ibn Sina against Ghazzali's decree and says:

"Ghazzali has exaggerated in proving the resurrection of souls and description of various kinds of rewards and penalties from spiritual point of view, which sometimes led him to lapse into superstitions, it was for that reason, that some people start saying that Ghazzali is denying the resurrection of bodies, that was certainly an allegation against Ghazzali evident and unjustified, while as the fact is that Ghazzali has explained in and other books(this doctrine in a detailed manner) and regarded its denial tantamount to infidelity"? 130/

Turning to Ghazzali's concept of bodily resurrection, Al Taftazani says that Ghazzali believes in both kinds of resurrection i.e. resurrection of souls and bodies and

describes what is the meaning of the renewal of the dead. He says:

"God will create from the dissolved particles a new body for the body and the soul will return to it which had departed from it at the disintegration of the body, its being body of some else than its earlier body will not effect us, not is the renewal impossible. The Quran and Hadith also support this view".

In reply to the philosophers, Ghazzali defends the doctrine which upholds that there is an immaterial, individual soul in his *Iqtisad-fi l' Itiqad* (The Golden Mean of Dogmatics), a work of Asharite doctrine of resurrection. He states quite explicitly in this work that the doctrine he defends in the *Tahafut* is not the true doctrine and that he defended it, for the sake of argument, to show that even if one accepts the doctrine of an individual, immaterial soul, one can show that the philosophers have not demonstrated the impossibility of bodily resurrection. 131/

However, Ibn Rushd's position on bodily resurrection is confusing, inconsistent and seemingly contradictory. He has four diverse opinions about this question.

In his *Tahafut al Tahafut*, he agrees with Ghazzali in convicting Ibn Sina of infidelity on this question, but for a different reason from that of Ghazzali. He condemns Ibn Sina for disclosing the allegorical interpretation of the scriptural texts of bodily resurrection to the public, not for interpreting them allegorically, as does Ghazzali.

In *Al Kashf an Manahij al Adillah fi 'Aqaid al Millah*, Ibn Rushd endorses resurrection of souls in bodies other than their former bodies, but allows allegorical interpretation of the texts by the "people of interpretation." For example he says:

"The other party says that existence is physical only, but they at the same time believe, that the body will be different from our present body. This is only transient that

will be eternal. For this also there are religious arguments. It seems that even Abdullah B Abbas held this view. For it is related to him that he said, "There is naught in this world of the hereafter, but names", it seems that this view is better suited to the learned men because its possibility is based upon principles, in which there is no disagreement according to all men, the one being that the soul is immortal, and the second is that the return of the souls into other bodies does not look so impossible as the return of the bodies themselves. It is so because the material of the bodies here is found following and passing from one body to another i.e. one and the same matter is found in many people and in many people and in many different times. The example of bodies cannot be found, for their matter is the same". 132/

In *Fasl al Maqal wa Taqrir Ma Bayan Al Shariah wal Hikmahmin al ittisal*, he holds that the texts concerning bodily resurrection (but not the principle of resurrection itself), do not clearly and unmistakably belong to that category of the Divine law that ought to be interpreted, and hence there is controversy about their interpretation. Therefore, Ibn Sina is excused if he commits an error in their interpretation. In this matter then Ibn Sina does not commit any act of disbelief, since he believes in the principle of resurrection per se. He says:

"For, if one acknowledges the reality of the Day of Judgement, and then begins to apply the principles of interpretation to the description, and not its reality, he does not in any way deny it. A denial of its reality is infidelity, for it is one of the fundamentals of law, and it can be easily verified by any of the methods of argument common to all men". 133/

In *Talkhis kitab al Nafs*, Ibn Rushd denies resurrection altogether since he maintains that the only active intellect that exists in every rational human being is eternal and separable. The rational soul, he continues, has two aspects:

the practical and the theoretical. The former i.e. the practical aspect of the rational soul, which is responsible for every moral action, does not survive death. Neither do all the lower parts of the soul, which contain memory. 134/

After giving the above details about the views of Ibn Sina, Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd, we arrive to the following conclusions.

Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd tax Ibn Sina with infidelity, but both for different reasons. Ghazzali taxes him for his denial of bodily resurrection while as Ibn Rushd for his disclosure of interpretation about it to the people not entitled to be addressed in such matters. But as we have shown above that Ghazzali has exaggerated about the bodily resurrection, although Ibn Sina believes in bodily resurrection side by side with spiritual resurrection, though with several specification. Therefore, according to Taftazani and even Ibn Rushd, Ibn Sina does not deserve this decree against him, as he does not disbelieve in the Day of Judgment in principle.

Since Ibn Rushd's position *visa vis* resurrection is confusing, therefore, though he agrees with Ghazzali in condemning Ibn Sina, but at other places he defends Ibn Sina on the same issue.

It seems very remotely connected with the preceding discussions to talk about the views of Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd on Mysticism. But if we see minutely, Ghazzali's treatment of all other subjects is some how or the other related to his mystical approach in one way or the other. Actually Ghazzali became aware about the limitations of human observation, sense perception, reason and competence after a hectic intellectual pursuit and finally was attracted towards mysticism. The epistemological curiosity led him to mysticism and he regarded intuition or mystical experience as a valid source of knowledge.

The intellectualized rationalism did not satisfy

Ghazzali, he realized that Sufis were truly godly, their life most unsullied, beautiful and pure, "illuminated with the light that proceeds from the central radiance of inspiration". He advanced "from witnessing forms and similitudes to stages where the power of the language fails and no rendering in words is possible." These transcendental experiences convinced him of the actuality of receiving knowledge that was beyond other human reasoning intellect.

The essential feature of the "mystic consciousness" which is the acute consciousness of God and the belief in the capacity of the human soul to realize the living presence of God within it, purification of the soul is the first prerequisite and that is why Ghazzali had to free himself from "all engagements" and take the first step towards "*Tazkia-al Nafs*", (purification of soul). 135/

As has been rightly said that Ghazzali's final resort to Sufi -mysticism was merely the result of his disillusionment with philosophical hairsplitting of the Muslim adherents of Greek philosophy and his dissatisfaction with scholastic theology.

But this is only a part of the truth. Sufistic influences had all along been working upon his mind right from his early childhood. We need only recall that his father was a pious dervish and his guardian a Sufi devout, that in his youth he studied and even practiced sufism first under Yusuf al Nassaj in Taws and then under al Farmadhi at Nishapur and that his own brother Ahmad al-Ghazzali (d. 520/1126) made a name as a great Sufi. It is also possible that he should have also learnt of Sufism from his teacher Imam al Harmayn, for it is reported that the Imam, himself had been the pupil of the renowned Sufi Abu N'quaim al Isfahani (d. 430/1038). So Ghazzali's eventual adoption of the Sufi way of life was in reality a continuation of these early influences and not simply the consequence of his failure to find the philosophical

solution of theological problems. Therefore Ghazzali's adoption of Sufism never amounts to his rejection of philosophy, reason or science. Since in philosophy, almost all, what are designated natural sciences, were included, therefore Ghazzali's reliance on philosophical argumentation speaks amply about his adherence to this edifice of knowledge. In spite of his explicit official denunciation of philosophy, Ghazzali could never completely part company with it. His Sufi mysticism was as much influenced by his thorough study of philosophy, as by theology, in its final development it was the mysticism of a philosopher and a theologian. 136/

According to Ghazzali complete mystic 'way' (or sufism) includes both intellectual belief and practical activity and getting rid of the obstacles in the self and in stripping off its base characteristics and vicious morals, so that the heart may attain to freedom from what is not God and to constant recollection of Him. 137/.

Ghazzali went through the books of some stalwart Sufi masters like *Quwat al Qaloob* of Abu Talib al Makki, Harith al Muhasibi, the various anecdotes about Junayd Baghdadi, Abu Bakr Shibli and Abu Yazidal Bistami. But despite Ghazzali's vast study of Sufi doctrines, it became clear to him that Sufi stages could not be reached by mere instruction, but only by transport, ecstasy, and the transformation of the moral being. He says:

"It became clear to me, however, that what is most distinctive of mysticism is something which cannot be apprehended by study, but only by immediate experience (*dhawq*-literally, tasting), by ecstasy and by a moral change... There is a difference between knowing the true nature and causes and conditions of the ascetic life and actually leading such a life and forsaking the world". 138/

In the above extract, Ghazzali lays emphasis on the fact that Sufism is more a practical discipline than merely an intellectual enterprise. It is a "fruitional activity" or

"experiential discipline", as it consists in experiences, rather than definitions. Moreover, it deals with ecstasy and intuitions than with discussions or intellectual apprehensions. He says:

"I apprehended clearly that the mystics were men who had real experiences, not men of words". 139/

The way to salvation according to Sufism is found in devotion and the conquest of one's passions, a procedure that presupposes renouncement and detachment from the worldly attraction. Ghazzali says:

"It was clear to me too that the key to all this was to sever the attachment of the heart to worldly things by leaving the mansion of deception and returning to that of eternity, and to advance towards God most high with all earnestness. It was also clear that this was only to be achieved by turning away from wealth and position and fleeing from all time consuming entanglements". 140/

After detaching one's self from the mundane entanglements, a Sufi proceeds to meditative practices and such things are revealed to him which are impossible to recount: Sufi realizes that mysticism is the path of Allah and Sufis are the true pioneers on the path, as there life is the most beautiful and their conduct the most praiseworthy. Ghazzali says:

" .. I learnt with certainty that it is above all the mystics who walk on the road of God, their life is the best life, their method the soundest method, their character the purest character, indeed, were the intellect of the intellectual and the learning of the learned and the scholarship of the scholars, who are versed in the profundities of revealed truth, brought together in the attempt to improve the life and character of the mystics they would find no way of doing so; for to the mystics all movement and all rest, whether external or internal, bring illumination from the light of the lamp of prophetic revelation: and behind the light of prophetic revelation

there is no other light on the face of the earth from which illumination may be received". 141/

The first step in the way of the Sufis in their cathartic method is to purge the heart of all that does not belong to God. Sufis get revelations when they set out on this path of Sufism. They come to see in the waking state angels and souls of prophets, they hear their voices and wise counsels. By means of this contemplation of heavenly forms and images they rise by degrees to heights which human language cannot reach, which one cannot even indicate without falling into great and inevitable errors. The degree of proximity to Deity, which they attain, is regarded by some as intermixture, of being (*Haloul*), by others as identification (*Ittihad*), by others as intimate union (*Wasl*). But according to Ghazzali all these expressions are wrong. He says:

"With this first stage of the way there begin the revelations and visions. The mystics in their waking state now behold angles and the spirits of the prophets, they hear these speaking to them and are instructed by them. Later, a higher state is reached, instead of beholding forms and figures. They come to stages in the way' which it is hard to describe in Language, if a man attempts to express these, his words inevitably contain what is clearly erroneous?" Ghazzali continues:

"In general what they manage to achieve is nearness to God, some however, would conceive of this as 'inherence' (*Haloul*), some as 'union' (*Ittihad*) and some as connection (*Wasl*) All that is erroneous. In my book, *The Noblest Aim [AL Maqsad al Asna]*, I have explained the nature of the error here yet he who has attained the mystic state need no more than to say":

"Of the things I do not remember what was, was, think it good, do not ask an account of it" (*Ibn al Mutaaz*)" 142/

OR

"What I experience I shall not try to say: call me happy, but ask me no more". 143/

According to Ghazzali, he who does not arrive at intuition of these truths by means of ecstasy, knows only the name of inspiration .He says:

"The miraculous graces given to the saints are in truth the beginnings of the prophets: and that was the first 'state' of the Messenger of God (peace be upon him) when he went out to Mount Hira; and was given up entirely to his lord, and worshipped, so that the Bedouin said; Mohammad loves his lord passionately". 144/

Ghazzali thinks that Sufism is just a discipline that is subservient to prophethood. About the state revealed to the initiated in ecstasy and to him who is incapable of ecstasy, by obedience and attention, Ghazzali says:

"Now this is mystical state, which is realized in immediate experience by those who walk in the way leading to it. Those to whom it is not granted to have immediate experience can become assured of it by trial, (so contact with mystics or observation of them) and by hearsay, if they have sufficiently numerous opportunities of associating with mystics to understand that (sc.. ecstasy) with certainty by means of what accompanies the 'states' whoever sits in their company derives from them this faith, and none who sits in their company is ruined". 145/

According to Ghazzali certainty reached by demonstration is knowledge, (*ilm*); actual acquaintance with that state is immediate experience (*dhawq*); the acceptance of it as possible from hearsay and trial (or observation) is faith (*Iman*). According to Ghazzali, those are three degrees. He quotes the following Quranic verse for support:

"God will raise those of you who have faith and those who have been given knowledge in degrees of honour"

(Q. 58, 12) 146/

Ghazzali concludes his views on Sufism in the *Munqidh* by saying:

"... among the things that necessarily become clear to me from my practice of the 'mystic way' was the true nature and special characteristics of prophetic revelation. The basis of that must undoubtedly be indicated in view of the urgent need for it..... " 147/

In *Kitabul al Ilm of Ihya ulum Al-Din*, Ghazzali while dealing with the definition of

Sufism says:

"The Sufis pointed to Sufism as the branch of knowledge which was intended, some saying that it is the science where by the creature, realizing his position in relation to the divine, has a mystical experience (in communion with his God) Other Sufis said that it comprises knowledge what sincerity is and what the afflictions of the soul are, as well as being able to distinguish between the followers of God and the followers of Satan. Others again said that it was the esoteric Science whose acquisition was required only of the qualified, select few, and accordingly they dismissed the accepted meaning of the word in favour of its esoteric connotation". 148/

Yet in a more explicit manner Ghazzali discusses the problem of intuitive knowledge in one of his other books. He indicates the stages that are found into the process of intuitive knowledge as follows:

"In his initial stages, the mystic, by concentrating on the perfect, eternal and absolute reality, loses even his self consciousness. He gets empty of feelings and even of ideas. He even ignores himself, as being now inside the Divine presence and living together with it and having communication with it. His physical being continues, but, his individuality has departed; though for his fellow men he still has his physical body and appearance. This is a

type of an ecstatic stage, of contemplation, Inspiration and illumination, which is most glorious attainment and very near to the goal of life; a state of concentration, of unification, of liberation, of discovery, of heightened and intensified powers and without a burst of joy, of rapture and of radiance". 149/

Ghazzali explains the same point and says that it is a point with in the human - selves which as the mystic holds, equally God's central reality and ours where spirit with spirit meets. Ghazzali says further:

"One who gets rid of his senses, in order to meditate over Divine Reality does not stand in need of his body or mind for spiritual subsistence, for it is the body which functions as the source of the diverting influences or preoccupations". 150/

From the above discussion on Ghazzali's views about Sufism and intuitive knowledge, we come to the following conclusions.

1. Sufism starts with purification of the soul
2. Ghazzali's Sufism is replete with philosophical connotations.
3. Sufism is a practical activity not merely a theoretical enterprise.
4. A Sufi receives inspirations and revelations only when he starts his journey to God.
5. In Sufism there may come a stage, when the Sufi loses his consciousness and gets annihilated in the presence of God.
6. Some times a Sufi gets rid of his sense perception and indulges rather in mystical intuitions.
7. Whatever the Sufi revelations or inspirations are these, can't be expressed in an explicit manner, as these evade all articulations.

Ibn Rushd seems to be in disagreement and conflict with Ghazzali on this subject, as he thinks that through Sufi ways, some intentional facts may be discovered, yet

much reliance can't be invested on it. 157/

Ibn Tufayl regards Sufism as a paradigm of knowledge to differentiate between the human world and Divine world. But Ibn Rushd is not satisfied with it, as it is not open to all people. Moreover, Ibn Rushd relies always on rational approach and demonstrative argumentation for the discovery of truths and pursuit of reality. Ibn Tufayl in the manner of Ghazzali too says that the revelations that are dawned on a Sufi defy all expressions and interpretations. In a mystical rapture (*Wasl* or *wajd*) the experiences, which are had by a Sufi are not expressible in human language. Ibn Tufayl says:

"A person who wants to disclose these things to people is like a person who is attempting to achieve an impossible goal. He is like a man who wants to taste the colours as colours or for instance thinks that blackness should assume a form of sweetness or bitterness. He says further that a person in such condition listens a voice, which he discerns, and if he remains constantly in this rapturous condition then he observes such things which can not be seen through eyes, listened by ears, nor apprehended by the heart". 152/

Since Sufis follow the mystic way, they say that the knowledge of God is thrown into the soul from high above, after we have got rid of our earthly desires. But according to Ibn Rushd, this way is not accessible to all mankind, and it abolishes speculation for which people are exhorted all through the Quran. 153/

In *Al Kashf an Manahij il Adillah fi Aqaid il Millah wa Tarif ma waqa fiha bi Hisb il Tawil min Shubhil Muzighah wa Bidill Mudillah*, Ibn Rushd expressed his opinion about Sufism and the Sufis. He challenges Sufis and says that it is not a philosophical method, to which Ibn Rushd wants to remain obediently adherent. He says:

"As to the Sufis their method in theorizing is not a

philosophical method - that is, made up of a number of premises, and syllogisms". 154/

Ibn Rushd says that since the Sufis think that God has given their knowledge to them, by revealing it on their hearts, therefore, it is confined to few people only. He says:

"They (The Sufis) maintain that the knowledge of God, or of anything existent, is found in our hearts, after its detachment from all physical desires, and concentration of mind on the desired object. In support of their principle the Sufis bring many an argument from the exoteric side of Law. For instance they quote the Divine words, "And fear God, and God will instruct you", 155/ and "whosoever do their best endeavor to prompt our true religion, we will direct them unto our ways," 156/ and again, "if ye fear God, He will grant you a distinction", and many other verses of this kind which are considered to be helpful for their purpose." 157/

Ibn Rushd comments after quoting those verses and says:

"We say that this method, if we suppose it to be real, is not meant for all people. Had this method been satisfactory for all people than the philosophical method would have been quite futile, and its existence among the people would have been useless, and with it the existence of the Quran". 158/

Ibn Rushd says that since the Quran invites us to reason and demonstration, we cannot trust in a "subjective" discipline of Sufism for acquiring knowledge. Because "For that (the Quran) always invites us to theorizing, judging, and admonishing by way of philosophy". 159/

In this manner Ibn Rushd discarded Sufism as a universal paradigm of establishing the religious realities,

as he thinks philosophy is.

Since the Sufis insist on self-control, and discipline as a prerequisite of the true knowledge, Ibn Rushd maintains in this regard:

"We of course do not deny that the control of physical desires is a condition for healthy thinking, as physical health is one of its conditions. For the control of desires is profitable in acquiring knowledge by itself, if it be made a condition of it, just as health is a condition for education, though it is not very useful for it. That is why our law has invited all of us to this method and has insisted upon it, that is, for work not that it is sufficient in itself, as these people think, but that it is useful for thinking as we have already discussed". 160/

Ibn Rushd thinks that the knowledge of the soul is not possible, as that of the invisible Maker in case of many people is not possible.

It seems that Ibn Rushd does not see the Sufis claim to attain knowledge of the soul tenable. He says:

"Now as the case of the invisible was unknown in the visible on the part of the many, and none knew it but those who were well grounded in knowledge, the law giver forbade an inquiry into it, as for example knowledge of the soul. If it be needful for the common people to know anything, then the law gives examples from the visible world. And if one example did not suffice for the understanding of the problem in view, then many examples are given". 161/

Ibn Rushd counts Ghazzali's views on Knowledge by privacy, and divine subjects, among the reasons, which led to the confusions and divisions among Muslims. Ghazzali, according to Ibn Rushd himself has accepted that this Sufi knowledge exists only by, guesses and allusions, as opposed to certainties in other sciences. He says:

"Then in his *Mishkat ul Anwar* he mentions grades of

men really knowing God. He says that all but those who believe that God is not the mover of the first heaven and that it is not He from whom this movement originates, are precluded from it. This is an explanation from him of men learned in divine science. He has said in many places that divine science exists only by guesses, as opposed to certainties in other science". 162/

He says further:- "In his book *Munqidh min al Dalal* he has gone against the philosophers and maintained that knowledge can only be acquired by privacy and meditation, and that those in this rank are all very near to the rank of the prophets. He has mentioned this very fact in his *Kimivai Saadat*". 163/

Ibn Rushd regards this confusion which was adopted by Ghazzali in respect of Sufism or divine knowledge, responsible for the divisions among the people. He says: - "Men have become divided into parties on account of this confusion, one party chose to censure the philosophers, while the other agreed to interpret the law, and make it conform to philosophy. All this is wrong. The law should be taken literally, and the conformity of religion to philosophy should not be told to the common people": 164/

In this way Ibn Rushd has very grave disagreements with Ghazzali on the mystical experience and its epistemological validity. Ibn Rushd thinks that philosophy is the surest source of knowledge and Sufism, on the other hand is confined only to few people. Sufi experience is based on subjective inspiration of a particular person, which cannot be communicated to other people as it evades all definitions and articulation. Therefore, speaking epistemologically, mystical experience cannot be entertained, as the knowledge of soul and divine matters is not possible and the Quran has also not ordained it according to Ibn Rushd.

So far we have dealt with the areas of agreement and

disagreement between Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd in the foregoing pages. But if we go a little deeper and scrutinize their actual teachings on various issues, we find that Ibn Rushd has reconciled with Ghazzali's position on the crucial subjects of affinity between Religion and philosophy and role and scope of reason in religious content apart from other subjects. Many scholars have located the differences between these two Islamic philosophers in style of expression and perspective. Katherine Parry thinks that all the matters where we find any difference between these two thinkers is of 'stylistic' and 'attitudinal' in nature, but both the thinkers are right and justified on their part. Ghazzali insists on the unity and non-duality of God and by implication lays stress on getting one's relations severed from all other false gods and goddesses. In the same manner, he rejected the necessary nexus between cause and effect, as it would amount to the belief that world is not dependent on God. Since according to Ghazzali, God is the Absolute power, therefore, He cannot be regarded ignorant or negligent from the affairs of the world even for a moment. According to Ghazzali:

"There is no possibility to deny that God has power over all things and affairs. Therefore, the system of this universe is not self-sufficient, but rather God given." 165/

If Ghazzali's arguments touch reasonableness that is only on the matters, when he provides or presents argumentation on such topics which are beyond the sphere of expression. Hence logic gets curbed to some extent, as Ghazzali remains bound at such places by his scholastic limitations. Ghazzali had to present an orthodox interpretation of Islamic dogmas in the light of the Quran and Hadith to make these comprehensible for the believers. But so far the discussion about the Creator beyond the apparent world is concerned and the reality behind it, Ghazzali seems successful to express his views

on the subject. While as Ibn Rushd regards the phenomenal world, real as Divine Reality. 166/

Moreover, Ghazzali starts his journey from the Absolute Reality. But Ibn Rushd begins his search from material world as a true follower of the Aristotelian tradition of philosophy. With firm conviction that the Divine Nature can be revealed in the light of the natural laws, he adheres faithfully to the material reality of the world. Or he is always down to earth. Then supposing that the similar relations can be established at the higher stages of reality, he strives to attain knowledge pertaining to the divine Being. It is very ironical that some people regard Ibn Rushd as a supporter or advocate of science in contradiction to religion, hence they do not get convinced with the arguments of Ibn Rushd that he presents on his method and philosophy. 167/

Some Scholastic thinkers have also regarded Ibn Rushd's thought very dangerous. But the fact is that Ibn Rushd aimed at attaining knowledge of God through the knowledge of the nature. Ibn Rushd warns that if philosophy is laid in the hands of wrong people, then it will be very disastrous for right belief. But if philosophy is given in the right hands, then it leads us to the knowledge of truth and reality. Therefore, according to Ibn Rushd, philosophy is not apposite to *Kalam* as both search for the same reality though their perspectives are different. Islamic revelation (*wahy*) is very vast, and through which the reality or truth can be observed from various angles, as the Absolute Reality is one and only one. 168/

Here we can easily observe that Ghazzali's *Kalam* views and Ibn Rushd's philosophical ideas are identical about the Absolute truth and ultimate reality. Moreover, Ibn Rushd has reconciled his position with that of Ghazzali by justifying his views in support of philosophy and absolute reality by quoting various Quranic verses

in his support.

According to Ibn Rushd the conflict or disagreement of opinion between the *Mutakallimeen* and philosophers pertaining to the Eternity of the world or the createdness of the world, was just linguistic, verbal and semantic in nature and not a real one. Though the philosophers adhere to the doctrines of eternity of the world- they don't regard it as real eternal. i.e. essentially eternal because the philosophers in general believe in the originator or the creator of this Universe. Ibn Rushd says:

"The creator proceeded in time, and the real eternal is that whose existence does not depend on any other existent". Therefore, the Eternal in his view is only Allah, and the real created is that which we see in this Universe as water, air, Fire etc as all these are dependent for their existence on time, but what about time and the existence which precedes time, are those eternal or created") are the questions which arise.

This problem thus controversial for some people who see these two close to the createdness, as their existence is acquired from Allah. Therefore, according to these people, these are created. There are others who regard their closeness to the Actual Real as not being precedent to time in regard to their eternity. Therefore, according to Ibn Rushd, their discussion about the eternity or createdness of the world remains merely a linguistic or semantic in nature. Moreover, he thinks that since the matter is based on linguistic dimensions and semantic aspects, therefore, no one should be declared as an infidel for advocating these views or beliefs. Since Ghazzali had issued decree of infidelity against the philosophers on the basis of these views, Ibn Rushd tried to reconcile the philosopher's position vis-à-vis these issues with that of Islam. Therefore, he quoted several Quranic verses, which in Ibn Rushd's view supports, the doctrine of eternity of the world.

According to Ibn Rushd such verses indicate that the time used to be prior to this time, for that reason Allah created this world in six days which means He created the world in a particular time of the time, this time was not known to as before the creation of the heavens. This is indicative of the orbital revolutions and the orbital movements were not found prior to it that also indicates that there was time before this time in which the heavens and earth were created. In the same way this verse says that there was an Existence before this Existence and that is the throne and the water. 169/

The same meaning is conveyed by the other verses. This verse indicates according to Ibn Rushd, that Allah created the sky or the heaven from smoke 170/ and not from nothingness (*Al Adm-al-Mahaz*). He thinks that the *Mutakallimeen* interpret the verses externally and in the *Shariah* there is no such teaching as that Allah was with the absolute Nothingness (*Adm i-al-Mahaz*).

In *Fasl al Maqal*, Ibn Rushd tries to prove that the conflict or the dispute pertaining to the eternity of the world or its createdness was a semantic one. (*Nizah i al Lafzia*). The views in this respect are not so diversified contrary and contradictory to each other that will warrant a decree of blasphemy against any one of the disputants. According to Ibn Rushd the world is not created in a real sense of the word (*Hadithun Haqiqah*). But there is an aspect of similarity of it to its being eternal-real (*Bil-Qadeem al-Haqiqi*) and with the created real from another aspect and in this way, it is a controversial subject. The opposition in this respect is rendered affected on one of the similitudes but this opposition must not lead to the leveling of decree of blasphemy of the either disputants as there is not much difference, diversion and contradiction in their opinions.

After giving this detail Ibn Rushd proceeds ahead in order to reconcile his position on the matter with Islamic teachings. He regards that the world is eternal in a sense

and created in a sense. Since the subject is controversial therefore the decree of blasphemy cannot be levelled against anyone even on it, as no agreement on this subject is found, which may be universal. 171/

He explains the matter and says further that the dispute between the philosophers and *Mutakallimeen* is only verbal, The *Al-Hadithal Haqiqi* (the Real created world) is precedent in time (*Al-Masbooq bil Zaman*) according to this view. Therefore it can be said:

"The time which is in other words, the quality or attribute of orbital movements and the Existence of Being (*Al-Majud*) which was prior to this time, are not in reality two real created things because of their not being precedent in time, therefore, not real eternal (*Al Qadeem al Haqiqi*) as the real eternal can never be acquired from a second thing. Therefore there is the possibility of their similarity with the real created from an angle and with the real eternal from another angle. In this way the statement about their eternity or createdness is rather the preference of one of the two similitudes on the other, therefore, this dispute or conflict cannot be regarded as a real one, but only in case when the '*Hadith*' (created) will be regarded as precedent with nothingness (*ʿAdm*) and the eternal is that which was never preceded by nothingness, at that time this conflict and dispute will become a real one. But as long as the '*Hadith*' is regarded as preceded by nothingness, and the eternal as not preceded by nothingness, this dispute and conflict will assume reality."

The *Mutakallimeen* know this matter by these two definitions i.e. '*Al Hadith* is that which is preceded by nothingness, and '*Qadim*' is not preceded by time, therefore, there is no relation between the two. It is in this background that the conflict ensued in the opinions of the proponents of createdness of the world and eternity of the world. According to the *Mutakallimeen*, the *Hadith*

(Createdness) is an attribute of the Being (*Al Mujud*) and they have qualified it with nothingness (*Adm*).

From this passage it has become evident that the *Mutakallimeen* understood *Hadith* in these senses only, the *Hadith al Haqiqi* according to them is that which is preceded by Nothingness (*Adm*) or which has come out from nothing to something. They don't regard time in the sense of '*Huduth*' or '*Hadith*' as has been done by Ibn Rushd, as he sees that it is very difficult, rather impossible to see the precedence of nothingness on Existence of a thing without considering the factor of time.

The other philosophers except Ibn Rushd, see that what is preceded by Nothingness is preceded in the time as well, as they see a necessary relation between precedence in Nothingness and precedence in time as has been said by Tawsi in the commentary of Ibn Sina.

This is the opinion of the philosophers, but the *Mutakallimeen* don't take time in the sense of its being '*al-Hadith*', and what has been said by Ibn Rushd that the idea of precedence of '*Adm*' on the thing without the time is very difficult. This position cannot be accepted, as it would entail very absurd consequences. Because if the precedence of everything over other things would have demanded time, then the precedence of the parts of the time would have been on one another as the requirements of the time. Then for each time would have been an another time as the prerequisite of the time. Then for each time would have been a time, and that is clearly impossible, and secondly that we can't say about Nothingness that it is temporal and qualified with time, as time is a matter of existence or being and '*Adm*' is not qualified with existence. However, Ibn Rushd's statement that every '*Hadith*' should have preceded by nothingness in time, is not correct, as precedence of nothingness of a thing on a thing without of regard to time is not difficult. It is not necessary that every precedent in nothingness

must be precedent in time at one and the same time. 172/

In this sense the time which is the orbital movement (*Harakatul al Aflak*) and the Orbit (*Falak*) itself, will not be such created thing from nothingness without their being precedent in time. Therefore, the dispute in this regard between the philosophers and *Mutakallimeen* was only nominal but not a real one. 173/

Ibn Rushd having shown the views of the philosophers not liable to decree of blasphemy by reconciling their views to those of the Divine Book: has in a way tried to bring an accord between position of philosophy vis-à-vis *Shariah* to adjust Ghazzalian allegations.

Now Ibn Rushd rejected the decree of Ghazzali against the philosophers for their belief in the eternity of the world, from one another angle. He says that the opinions or the views of the philosophers on which Ghazzali has objected to them are not quite evident from *Shariah* commandments, therefore, anyone opposing these matters does not warrant the decree of blasphemy. 174/

Ibn Rushd regards that from the Quranic point of view the being or existence is standing on two footings, the *Mutakallimeen* are interpreting those verses in which this subject is discussed externally, but Ibn Rushd cannot issue a decree against them on the basis of this interpretation as Ghazzali did about their view on the eternity of the world. Ibn Rushd regards them entitled to a single reward in case they have committed a mistake in their *Ijtihad*. 175/

In this way Ibn Rushd thinks about a belief which is clear and evident to a man on rational basis about a transitory and controversial matter, he is not liable to punishment as he is helpless there, and responsibility is valid only on matters on which a man is able to have control.

According to Ibn Rushd a man has no control over belief or disbelief, when he is supported by an argument,

being himself a rational person and able to argue, he may commit a mistake after observing all the necessary precautions in his argumentation and evidence to reach to a judgement (*Tasdeeqh*), he cannot be regarded responsible for a mistake if he commits one.

In this way Ibn Rushd proves that the statement about the eternity of the world is not opposite to *Shariah* as held by Ghazzali. Therefore, the philosopher's position vis-à-vis *Shariah* is made reconciled and the philosophers are shown not to be liable to the decree of blasphemy because of their adherence to this doctrine. 176/

But as a matter of fact that the problem of createdness of the world or its eternity is not the subject of *Ijtihad* as the religious and *Shariah* teachings have clearly fairly made all details about the createdness of the world available without any suspicion. Therefore, for the same reason the Islamic scholars regarded the belief in eternity of the world as denial of the *Shariah* laws. 177/

Though Ibn Rushd tried his best to reconcile philosophy with *Shariah* but the verses which he quoted in his favour are not indicative of the eternity of the world or its createdness, as those matters are not subjects of *Ijtihad*. Though Muslim *Mujtahideen* are different in their opinions about these matters but they are united regarding the problem of createdness of the Universe, we can rather say that all the great civilisations are one on this point. In the religious teachings we find copious references about this belief, for example there are several prophetic traditions about this matter.

Imam Bin Hassain narrates that the inhabitants of Yemen asked the prophet of God (SAW) about the beginning of this matter (the universe). The Prophet (SAW) replied, "Allah, the 'Exalted was prior to every thing and His throne was on water".

In the Hadith of Zarain it is narrated that he asked the prophet of Allah (SAW):

Where was our Lord before He created the Universe? The Prophet (SAW) replied that He was in the "Amaa" (ether). 178/ Ibn Jareer Al-Tabari also considers that there was an existence of the time before this time as was held by Ibn Rushd. 179/

He gave an example of the *Hadith* (createdness) of this time with the differences in the nights and days with light and darkness, and this time is not found apart from these two as their createdness means the *Huduth* of time, but in this manner their togetherness as well, in the Way one will be after the other and this is not the sign of 'Huduth'. In this way no day was found unless there was a day, this also being a sign of createdness. But the existence before this time is not indicative of the eternity of any thing, as the injections indicate explicitly that everything was preceded by *Adm* (nothingness) in the world, and if something were not preceded by this time, still there is no possibility or necessity of *Ijtihad* about the problem of "*Huduth I al Alam*" as it is categorically established, by these *Shariah injections* with clear connotations. 180/

Therefore, after scrutinising the whole matter seriously despite Ibn Rushd's attempt at reconciliation between philosophers and *Shariah*, Ghazzalian decree of blasphemy against them seems more pertinent and convincing. 181/

There are several other issues where Ibn Rushd argues that even though the *Kalam* theologians used different terms than the philosophers, they meant nearly the same thing.

Ibn Rushd says:

"Further, it is self-evident that all events have four causes, agent, form, matter, and end, and that they are necessary for the existence of the effects- especially those causes which form a part of effect, namely that which is called by the philosophers matter, by the theologians condition and substratum, (*Mahall*); and that which is

called by the philosophers form, by the psychological quality". 182/ The Theologians do not admit forms, being universals, as for them there are no universal entities in real nature, and universals are psychological entities, things of the mind. 183/

In the same way, according to Ibn Rushd, the theologians acknowledge that there exist conditions which are necessary to the conditioned, as when they say that life is a condition of knowledge; and they equally recognise that things have realities and definitions, and that these are necessary for the existence of the existent, and therefore they here judge the visible and the invisible according to one and the same scheme. 184/

Philosophers accept causality, and therefore the existence of effects. The theologians speak of signs, even though this also implies a kind of causality.

The main thrust of Ibn Rushd's argument comprises his criticism particularly of the theory of "habit" which was affirmed by Ghazzali as well. 185/ Ibn Rushd points to what he sees to be its inherent ambiguity. "I do not know what they (the Ash'arites) understood by the term "habit", whether they mean that it is the habit of the agent, the habit of the existing thing, or our habit to form a judgement about such things"? 186/

He then argues that God cannot acquire a "habit" (*ʿādah*) that would constrain Him. A soulless being can not acquire "habit" either, because this would mean that it belongs to their nature. Of course, the human intellect is familiar with custom, but from it only a "hypothetical" knowledge is possible. If all knowledge was hypothetical, everything would be the case only by supposition and there would be no wisdom in the world from which it might be inferred that its Agent was wise. 187/

Here Van Der Bergh has brought a very important point to our notice. He says:

"Averroes asks a good question: 'What is really

meant by habit, is it a habit in man or in nature?' There is another question which has been asked by the Greek opponents of this theory, but which is not mentioned by Averroes. How many times must such a sequence be observed before such a habit can be formed? There is yet another question that might be asked: Since we cannot act before such a habit is formed, for action implies causation what are we doing until then"?

Moreover, Ghazzali has dismissed all natural phenomena as occurring through mere custom (*Tard al aadah*), as he says:

"Rather their concomitance is determined by virtue of following custom, like the burning of cotton when it touches fire and the occurrence of coldness in the hand when it touches ice. All this continues to happen by the ordinance of God..." 188/

Ibn Rushd attempts to reconcile with Ghazzali's views by calling it "nature" instead of "habit" or "custom" as used by the latter. He says:

"And if they call such a fact, habit, this may be granted, but otherwise I do not know what they understood by the term "habit" ...whether they mean that it is the habit of the agent, the habit of the existing thing, or our habit to form a judgement about such thing? It is, however, impossible that God should have a habit, for a habit is a custom which the agent acquires and from which a frequent repetition of his act follows, ... If they mean a habit in existing things, habit can only exist in the animated; if it exists in something else, it is really a nature". 189/

For nature, according to Aristotle is concerned, as habit with the invariable, as habit with the frequent. However, Aristotle often says that things that happen by nature happen invariably or in a majority of cases, and Ibn Rushd repeats this in the text.

We find an another example where Ibn Rushd tries to

reconcile his position with that of Ghazzali on the problem of knowledge of particulars. Ibn Rushd shows that the philosophers are not entitled to the decree of blasphemy for their views about the divine knowledge about particulars, as was alleged by Ghazzali.

Ibn Rushd holds that if it be maintained that one does not become an unbeliever by ignoring consensus of opinion in interpretation, as no unanimity is possible in it, what shall we say of such Muslim philosophers as Abu Nasr (Al Farabi) and Ibn Sina, For Abu Hamid Al-Ghazzali has charged them with positive infidelity in his book: *Tahafut al Falasifah*, in regard to God's Ignorance of particulars among other things. 190/

Ibn Rushd replies that from what Ghazzali has said, it is not clear that he has charged them positively with infidelity. For according to Ibn Rushd, in his book ' [Faysal] *Al Tafruqah bain al Islami Wal Zindiqah* ', he has explained that the infidelity of a man who ignores the consensus of opinion is doubtful. Moreover, it is difficult in Ibn Rushd's opinion to establish a consensus of opinion in such matters. 191/

Ibn Rushd attempts to exempt the philosophers from Ghazzali's allegations about their views pertaining to God's knowledge of particulars. He says that the philosophers are only of the opinion that the knowledge of God about particulars is quite different from ours. 192/ For our knowledge is the effect of the existence of a thing. Such knowledge is produced by the existence of a thing, and changes with changes in the thing. On the other hand the knowledge of God is the cause of an existing thing. Thus, according to Ibn Rushd, one who compares these two kinds of knowledge ascribes the same characteristics to two quite different things, He says further that when applied both to eternal and to transitory things the word knowledge is used only in a formal fashion, just as we use many other words for objects essentially different.

193/

While concluding the discussion on God's knowledge of particulars, Ibn Rushd says:

"How can it be supposed that the peripatetic philosophers say that God has no knowledge of particulars when they are of the opinion that man is sometimes warned of the coming vicissitudes of the future through visions, and that he gets these admonitions in sleep, through a great and powerful Director, who directs every thing? These philosophers are not only of the opinion that God has no knowledge of details such as we have but they also believe that He is ignorant of universals. For all known universals with us are also the effect of the existence of a thing, while God's knowledge is quite other than this".

"From those arguments it is concluded that God's knowledge is far higher than that it should be called universal or particular". 194/

Ibn Rushd tries to defend the philosophers against the charges of infidelity; therefore he laid down the theoretical framework as has been shown to reconcile their position with *Shariah*. He is of the opinion that the position which has been established about the philosophers views pertaining to Divine knowledge of particulars, there is no call at all for the dispute on whether or not the philosophers should be charged with disbelief 195/

In *Damimat al Ilmal Ilahi*, however, he raises a problem that might be posed against God's knowledge of the particulars as follows:

"The particulars inevitably include the occurrence of something or the existence of it after its inexistence. That in itself is a change from one condition to another. It follows therefore this that knowledge about the first condition (inexistence), has to be different from that about the second (existence) i.e. it is not only additional but also new knowledge. How then can God be aware of a change

in this reality without a corresponding change occurring in His eternal knowledge"? 196/

Ibn Rushd deems as unconvincing Ghazzali's answer to this question namely, that knowledge and the object known are related in such a way that a change in one of two related things does not necessarily effect a change in the other. Thus, according to Ghazzali, a change in the object of God's knowledge does not effect any change in His knowledge. Ghazzali illustrates this answer with the example of an object moved from the right side of a person to his front, and then to his left and so on while the person himself undergoes no change. 197/

Objecting to this argument, Ibn Rushd observes that though the person himself has not changed, the relation of the object to him has changed from right sided to front-sided etc. Hence, since knowledge is the relation itself, it must change whenever the object changes from one position to the other. 198/

Ibn Rushd then asserts that to resolve this problem, one has to recognise that where beings are concerned, the state of God's eternal knowledge is different from that of originated knowledge. The existence of being is a cause and reason for originated knowledge i.e. our knowledge or human knowledge, while the eternal knowledge is a cause and reason for the beings. If the coming into existence of being were to add to the eternal knowledge as it does to an originated knowledge, it would then follow that the eternal knowledge is an effect and not a cause of beings, and that is absurd. The knowledge of God must therefore not be changeable at all. 199/ No change, Ibn Rushd asserts, occurs in the eternal knowledge when the object of its knowledge results from the latter itself, just as no change occurs in an agent when his act comes into existence. 200/

Ibn Rushd now points out that the error in this matter springs from drawing an analogy between the eternal

knowledge and originated knowledge. This, he observes, is equal to making an analogy between the suprasensible and the sensible, an analogy whose falsity is indisputable. Therefore, the occurrence of change in knowledge when being change is an attribute of originated knowledge only and not eternal knowledge'.201/

Ibn Rushd then concludes that the philosophers hold that God knows the particulars, but with eternal knowledge that is constant and not subject to change as a result of a change in the object known. He emphasises that the connection of the eternal knowledge with beings is different from the connection of originated knowledge with them. The former is that of a reason and cause of the latter, while the latter is an effect of the former. 202/

In the light of the foregoing discussion we can say that Ibn Rushd has tried to reconcile Ghazzali's position about eternity of the world, and God's knowledge of the particulars with that of philosophers.203/

In this way the debate between Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd constitutes the most profound encounter between theology and philosophy. Ghazzali's interest was religious and Ibn Rushd's was philosophical, but both worked in the philosophic medium and both upheld a unified outlook on philosophy and religion.

For Ghazzali there was no conflict between faith and knowledge except in details and in the perversity of the followers of each school. For Ibn Rushd, philosophy was a means to strengthen faith and to deepen one's appreciation for truth. As a matter of fact, Ghazzali set the agenda for Ibn Rushd and hence books of both these thinkers are interlocked as the discussion goes on around the doctrines of philosophers. Only indirectly do they refer to epistemology but the epistemological unity of religion and philosophy remains as a common feature of both the philosophers.204/

The general impression about Ghazzali is that he has

denounced and condemned reason or intellect, while as Ibn Rushd has elevated it to the highest possible status. But as we have shown with ample evidences from the references from Ghazzali's books that he never rejected or condemned reason, though he does not blindly believe that reason is the absolute criterion of truth and certainty as was held by Ibn Rushd. According to Ibn Rushd, religion is identical with reason as it invites us to ponder over the universal phenomena and never discards rational thinking.

Ibn Rushd insists that we must certainly avail the Greek philosophy, especially its positive elements to which the Greek thinkers have reached, despite their paganistic embellishment, as our religion does not prohibit us from acquiring, wisdom, wherever, we may find it.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

1. Jamil-ur-Rehman, *Philosophy and Theology of Averroes*, Baroda, 1921 PP-100-119.
2. Ibid PP-186-190.
3. A Quadir, *Philosophy and science in the Islamic world*, Croomhelm, New York, 1988 P-13.
4. Abul Hassan Ali Nadvi, *Saviours of Islamic spirit*_(Tr.) Op. Cit. P- 72.
5. A Quadir Op. Cit. P-69.
6. Ibid P-67.
7. M.M. Sharief (ed.) *A History of Muslim philosophy*_Volume I Op. Cit. P-545.
8. Ibn Rushd's, *Fasi-al-Maqal* (Tr.) G. Hourani.op.cit P-63
9. IbidP-58.
10. Josep Puig Montada, "Ibn Rushd versus Al-Ghazzali, reconsideration of a polemic", *The Muslim world*_, Volume LXXXII, January-April, 1992, Connecticut U.SA

11. Mohammad Jamil-ur-Rehman, *The Philosophy and Theology of Averroes*, Op. Cit. P-117.
12. Al-Ghazzali, *The Foundation of the articles of faith*_(Tr. of the *Kitab Qawaid al Aqaid of Ihya Ulum-u-ddin* translated by Nabih Amin Faris, Lahore, 1974 PP-20-21.
13. *Iqtisad Fil Itiqad*, op.cit.P-8.
14. Foundations of the articles of faith Op. Cit P-26.
15. IbidP-28.
16. IbidP-29.
17. IbidP-33.
18. Ibid
19. Ibid P-34.
20. Dr. Abd Ur Rehman Shah Wali, *Al-Kindi wa Aarahu-al-falsafiyah*, Majmah al Bahuthal-Islamiah, Islamabad, Pakistan, 1974P-183.
21. As to theology (*Ilm-al-Kalam*), it is solely designed to safeguard the articles of faith that the followers of the usage of the Prophet and righteous fathers transmitted down to us, and nothing else. Anything beyond this would be an attempt to reveal the truth of things in other than its proper way. Al-Ghazzali's *Book of Knowledge*. Op. Cit., P-94
 "As to theology (*al Kalam*) it is solely designed to safeguard the articles of faith which the followers of the usage of the prophet and righteous fathers transmitted down to us, and nothing else. Anything beyond this world be an attempt to reveal the truth of things in order than its proper way" (, Al-Ghazzali of knowledge, Tr. Nabih Ahmad Faris op.cit.P-94)
22. *Ihya*, Vo. I, P-93.
23. Montada, Op. Cit. P-122.
24. Ibn Rushd', s *Tahafut-al- Tahafut*_(Tr. Incoherence of Incoherence, by Simon Van Den Bergh, Volume I, London, 1954 P-20).
25. Jamilur-Rehman OP Cit P-69.
26. IbidP-89.
27. Ibid P-89
28. Montada Op. Cit P-122. The dogmatic *Ulama* of Scholasticism though have the talent to understand dialectical or rhetorical arguments, but are not able to

comprehend the argumentative and demonstrative patterns and unable to use these. See Barakat Mohammad Murad in the Quarterly "Ayyat" Aligarh, Vol. 11 May-August 1990, Ibn Rushd.

29. Abdur Rehman Shah Wali Op. CitP-186.
(The dogmatic *Ulama* of scholasticism though have the talent to understand dialectical or rhetorical arguments, but are not able to comprehend the argumentative and demonstrative patterns and unable to use these) (*Ayyat*, Vol. 11 May-August 1990, Aligarh P 96)
30. Ibid P-184.
31. Al-Ghazzali, *Al-Risalatul-al-Waaziat Fi Maimuh al-Rasail Al-Ghazzali* P-238.
32. Ibid. P-185.
33. Iysa Bello, Op. CitP-145.
34. R.J. McCarthy, *Faysal* (Tr.) op.cit.P-158.
35. Iysa Bello Op. Cit P-58.
36. Faysal (Tr.) Op. CitP-158.
37. Ibid.
38. Al-Ghazzali, *Al-Qistas Al-Mustaqeem*, P-17.
39. Ibid.
40. Al-Ghazzali's *Al-Risalatul-al-Ludniyyah Fi-al-Qasoor al-Awali Min Rasail Al-Imam Al-Ghazzali*, Maktaba Al-Jundi, Misr, PP-119-121.
41. Iysa Bello Op. Cit P-59.
42. Arthur V. Sagadeev, "Ibn Rushd and the Islamic philosophical Tradition". *The Firmest Bond*, No.28, Switzerland. Winter 1987 P-54.
43. Ibid. P-54.

Ibn Rushd was not the originator of this theory; Ibn Sina as expounded it in detail before him by al-Farabi. Eastern Muslim philosophers were already classifying arguments into "apodictic" (demonstrative), "dialectical", rhetorical, "sophistical" and "poetical" in decreasing order of cognitive value, ranging from "absolutely true" apodictic arguments to "absolutely false" poetical arguments.

Poetical arguments occupy the lowest step on the ladder because they take into consideration not the objective existence of objects, but their images, which are the result of the purest subjectivity. These arguments act, on people's

imagination, nor their reason, inciting positive or negative emotions "poetical" and "rhetorical" arguments were identified with speculative theology".

See Artur V Sagadeev, "Ibn Rushd and the Islamic philosophical tradition" *Firmost Bond*, 1987, PP-53-54

44. Barakat Mohammed Murad, "Ibn Rushd Ka Difa-i-Falsafah", The Quarterly "*Ayaat*" Vol. II, May-August 1990, Aligarh. PP-96-97.
 45. *Manahijil-Al-Adillah* (Tr.) P-84.
 46. Foundations of Articles of faith. Op. Cit P-41.
 47. *Manahijil-Al-Adillah* (Tr.) P-84. 47.
 48. Ibid.PP-129-30.
 49. IbidPP-130-31.
 50. Ibid.P-156.
 51. Ibid, P-182.
 52. Ibid
 53. Ibid
 54. Ibid, PP-184-189.
 55. *Tahafut-al-Tahafut* (Tr.) Op. CitP-215.
 56. Montada, Op. Cit. PP-122-23.
 57. *Tahafut-al-Tahafut* OP. Cit P-218.
 58. *Fasl-al-Maqal* Tr. GE Hourani Op. Cit P-66-67.
 59. Iysa Bello, Op. Cit, PP-71-72.
- Ibn Rushd taxes Ghazzali with infidelity for setting down allegorical interpretations in popular writings. However, he excuses himself for also discussing demonstrative questions as such in a popular work with the justification that they are already being publicly discussed. Furthermore, he accuses Ghazzali of inconsistency in his writings as far as doctrine in general is concerned.
- To protect common people, who are not of the demonstrative class, Ibn Rushd suggests that books on demonstration, particularly those of Ghazzali, should be banned to them. For details see *Fasl*, PP-6 I -62, Tr. G.F
60. Shibli Noamani. Azamgarh 1956, PP-131-132.
 61. Al-Ghazzali, *Jawahar al-Quran*, as quoted in *Al-Ghazzali*, Maulani Shibli, Op. Cit P-132.
 62. Ibid P-130.
 63. Ibid, P-133.
 64. Ibid P-133.

65. *Ihya Ulum-id-din* (Tr.) Maulima Fazlul Karim. Vol. I, New Delhi, 1982 PP 8-9.
66. Shibli Noamani op.cit. P-134.
67. Iysa Bello, Ibid P-146.
68. Jamilur Rehman. Op. Cit PP- 310-305.
69. Ibid P-306.
70. Ibid
71. Ibid P p-107-108.
72. Ibid. P-308.
73. Ghazzali's *Al-Qistas Al-Mustaqeem*. Cairo: Mat ba 'at Al-Taraqqi, 1900, PP 111-112.
74. Barakat Mohammad Murad Op Cit P-101.
75. *Fasal*, Tr. RJ. McCarthy PP-155- 157.
76. Ibid P-152.
77. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, *Al-Nazar fi Risalatul-Al-Imam Hujjat-ul-Al-Islam, Tafruqqah Bayn Al-Islam wal-Zindigah*, Matbah Faiz Aam Aligarh P-18.
78. McCarthy Op. Cit P-15 I.
79. *Ghazzali Namah*. Op. Cit P-438.
80. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan Op. Cit P 18-19.
81. *Fasal* Op. Cit P 151.
82. *Ghazzali Namah* Op. Cit P-438, See also Sir Syed Op. Cit P-19 and also Sharfuddin Khurasani in *Dairatul-Al-Maarif Buzarg Iran*, P-582.
83. *Fasal*, Tr. McCarthy Op. Cit P-152.
84. Ibid P-152.

(A famous scholar Ghayasuddin Mansul Dastaki Shirazi (D.948) in his treatise of life hereafter (*Maad*) after quoting Ghazzali's "*Faysl al Tafruqqah*" passed a degree of blasphemy against Ghazzali and counted Ghazzali among the greatest atheists and unbelievers because of his beliefs presented in this book.

But Mullah Sadra, in his famous book *Mubda Wa Maad* (P 294-299, published Tehran), presented views of Ghazzali and those of Ghayasuddin Mansur both in detail in comparison to each other and interpreted Ghazzali in the real perspective vis-a-vis the allegation of the former scholar and criticized him for his allegations against Ghazzali.

(Although Mulla Sadra in his book *Mubda Wa Maad*, PP-

293-99) and also in his treatise *Mazahir* "(which was published as a commentary on the former book (pp-29 1-2) narrated Ghazzali's views regarding the reality of bodily resurrection in detail and explained and elaborated on it and latter on considered it against religion and Shariah". (*Ghazzali Namah*. By Jalaludin Humai, Tehran, 1383 AH P 438-39)

85. Ibid P-153, Sir Syed Op. Cit P-21.
86. *Fasal* Op. Cit P-153.
87. Ibid P-153, Sir Syed Op. Cit P-22-23.
88. Ibid P-55.
89. *Fasal* Op. Cit P-153, Sir Syed Op. Cit P 23.
90. *Fasal* Op. Cit P-154, Sir Syed Op. Cit P-24.
91. *Fasal* Op. Cit P-153, Sir Syed Op. Cit P-24.
92. Al-Quran, refer to 8:67, 2:86, 2:114, 2:130, 3:152 and 4:77.
93. Refer to the Quranic verses as 81:1-14, 82:1-5 and 14:48.
94. Ibn Manzur M M VI.14, P-274, *Lisan Al-Arab*, Beirut, 1956 and also Murtada Al Zabidi MM. VL 10 P-131, *Taj Al-Arus*, Cairo Al-Matbaah Al-Khayriyah, 1888, see for more details Iysa Bello Op. Cit P-56-57. For Critical remarks on the subject see Sir Syed Op. Cit, P 23-25.
95. *Fasal* Op. Cit P-155, See also Sir Syed Op. Cit PP-25-26.
96. *Fasal* Op. Cit P-155, Sir Syed Op. Cit P-26.
97. Sir Syed Op. Cit P-26.
98. Iysa Bello Op. Cit P 57-58.
99. *Fasal* Op. Cit P-157.
100. Ibid P-157.
101. *Fasal al-Maqal* tr. by Jamilur Rehman.
102. Ibid tr. Hourani Op. Cit P-50.
103. Ibid P-51.
104. Ghazzali seems to have changed his opinion in a latter, two of his very last works: *Al-Mustasfa* and *Al-Qistas*. In those works, he suggests that scripture has to be given preponderance over reason, when the conclusion of scripture falls in conflict with reason, as long as the scriptural statement is categorical: carries an exact and unambiguous meaning (See Iysa Bello P 67-68)
105. When contradiction occurs, the Revelation should be interpreted metaphorically except when its conclusion is categorical. Here, Ghazzali in *Mustasfa* (*Al-Mustasfa Min*

Ilm-al-Usul, Cairo, 1902, Vol. I, P 388-9) and *Qistas al-Mustaqim*, Cairo, 1925, P 111-112) seems to have departed from his Asharite doctrine, by giving Revelation preponderance over reason. Ibn Rushd on the other hand maintains that the Revelation still has to be interpreted. (Fasl Hourani, P-5 1)

106. Iysa Bello Op. Cit P-145.
107. Montada, Op. Cit P-12 1.
108. *Fasal al-Maqal* Tr. Jamil Rehman Op. Cit P-52.
109. Abdul Rahman Shah Wali Op. Cit P-1 79
110. *Al-Munqidh min-al-Dalal*, Tr. P-40
111. Ibid tr. Watt P-40
112. *Al-Munqidh min al-dalal*_Tr. Confession,_Claud Field, N. Delhi 1992, P 44
113. Ibid P 44-45
114. Iman Ghazzali's, *Ihya Ulum-id-din*,_Tr. By Maulana Fazlul Karim Vol. I, N. Delhi 1982 pp47-48
115. Abdur Rahman, Op. Cit P 177-179
116. *Al-Munqidh* Tr._Watt, Op. Cit P 44-45
117. *Tahafut -al- Tahafut*_(Tr.) Op. Cit P 361-62
118. Ibid
119. Iysa Bello Op. Cit P-134
120. *Faysal*!, Op. Cit P 106-107, Sir Syed Op. Cit P 43-45
121. *Tahafut-ul-Tahafut* P-360
122. *Al-Munqidh*, Tr. Watt P-32
123. Ibid P-37
124. Iysa Bello P-143
125. Ibid P-126
126. Ibn Sina, *Risalatul-al-Nafs Wa Baiha Wa Maa Diyah*. P 187-188
127. Abdur Rahman Shah Walli Op. Cit P-465
128. *Tahafut-al-Falasifah* Op. Cit P-235
129. Ibn Sina, *At-Najat* P-291

Even so, while philosophers from earliest times, up to and including al Farabi and Ibn Sina, are to be considered heretics, their works are not utterly devoid of truth. Truth and false hood lie side by side with in their works, and this is the essence of the problem. See P-211.

Eric L. Ormosby, *Theodicy in Islamic Thought, The Dispute*

- over Al-Ghazzali's Best of All Possible World.*
130. Abdur Rahman Op. Cit P-465
 131. Al- Taftazani, *Samie-yat Sharh-al-Maqasid* P-98.
 132. *Ghazzali al-Iqtisad fil-Itiqad* P 213-15
 133. Jamilur-Rehaman Op. Cit P 299-300
 134. Ibid P-50
 135. Ibn Rushd, *Talkhis Kitab al- Nafs*_(Ed F. Ahwani) Cairo Egypt 1959, p- 70 see also Iysa Bello P 138-139
 136. Z.H. Massarat, *Aristotle and Ghazzali*_p-92
 137. M.M. Sharif, (ed.) Op. Cit P-228
 138. *Al-Munqidh* Op. Cit Tr. Watt P-54
 139. Ibid P 54-55
 140. Ibid P-55
 141. Ibid P-56
 142. Ibid P-60
 143. Ibid P-61
 144. Claud Field, *The Confession of al-Ghazzali*_,New Delhi, 1992 P-55
 145. *Al-Munqidh* (Watt) Op. Cit P 61-62
 146. *Al-Munqidh*, Watt (Tr.) P-62
 147. Ibid P-62
 148. Ibid P-63
 149. Al-Ghazzali, *The Book of Knowledge*_,Tr. Nabih Amin Faris, N. Delhi 1988, P 23-24
 150. Al-Ghazzali, *Al-Madnun Bihi Ala Ghair Ahlihi*_(Tr. Abdul Qayyum) Delhi. P 46-47
 151. Ibid P-46
 152. Barakat Mohammad Murad Op. Cit. P-89, 1990
 153. Ibn Tufayl, *Hayy Ibn Yaqzan*_,Tahqeeqh Dr. Abdul al-Haleem Mohmood, Egypt. P-116
 154. M.M. Sharif Op. Cit. Vol. I, P-548
 155. Jamilur -Rehman P-1921 Barado P-117
 156. Al-Quran II, 282
 157. Al-Quran XXIX: 69
 158. Al-Quran VIII, 29
 159. Jamilur-Rehman P-181
 160. Ibid P-118
 161. Ibid p-119
 162. Ibidp-179

163. Ibidp-187
164. Ibidp-188
165. Ibid pp-188-189
166. Ibidp-324
167. Katharine Perry, "Ibn Rushd Ka Difai-Falsafeh", *Aayat*.
January
168. Ibid P-145
169. Ibid
170. Abdur Rehman, Shah Wali Op. Cit P-248
171. Ibid P-248
172. *Sharh al-Maqasid* Vol. 3, P-120, quoted by Abdur Rehman
Shah Wali op. cit p-249
173. *Sharh al-Ishara* Vol I, P-134
174. Abdur Rehman Shah Wali Op. Cit P-250
175. *Fasl-al-Maqal* (Tr. p 13)
177. Ibid P-14
178. Abdur Rehman Shah Wali Op. Cit P-252
179. Ibid P-252
180. *Musanad al-Imam Ahmad* Vol. 4 P-431
181. Ibn Jareer al- Tabari, *Tarikhil-al-Umam Wal Maluk* Vol I, p-
11
182. Abdur Rehman Shah Wali Op. Cit P-254
183. Ibid P-254
184. *Tahafut -al- Tahafut* (Or.) *Incoherence of Incoherence* Op. cit
P-319.
185. Ibid P-275
186. Montada, Op. Cit P-126
187. Ibid
188. *Tahafut-al-Tahafut* (tr.) p-320
189. Ibid
190. Al-Ghazzali, *Al-Iqtisad Fil Itiqad* Tr. Zaid Abdur Rahmad
P-19
191. *Tahafut-al-Tahafut* (tr.) Op. Cit P-320
192. *Fasl-al-Maqal* P-26
193. Jamilur Rehman Tr. Op. Cit P 32-33
194. Ibid
195. Ibn Sina Fi, *Manni-L-Ziyarat* P-46, Leiden quoted Abdur
Rahman Shah Wali P-266
196. Jamilur Rehman (tr.) P 36-36
197. Ibid P-37

198. Iysa Bello Op. Cit P 74-75, see also G.H. Hourani, *Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy*. London 1961, P 54- 55
199. Ibn Rusbd *Damimat al-Ilm al-Ilha*_(edited G.F. Hourani) London 1959, P 72-73
200. *Tahafut-al-Falasifah*_(tr.) pp-229- 34
201. *Damimah* Op. Cit P-74.
202. *Ibid* P-74
203. Iysa Bello Op. Cit P-76.
204. *Ibid* P 74-75.

TRANSLATION OF *FASL-AL-MAQAL*

The greatest Jurist and the Chief of Justice, (*Faqiyah ajal allama sadr kabir qazi aadal*) Abu Walid Muhammad bin Ahmad bin Muhammad bin Ahmad bin Rushd (may Allah be pleased with him) has said:

All praises are especially reserved only for Allah, and benedictions and salutations of Allah (*daruud* and *salat wa salaams*) are for Allah's chosen and beloved servant and prophet, Muhammad (SAW). This decisive assertion is made, as our aim is the research about what is the commandment regarding philosophy and the fields of logic from the point of view of the Divine law (*Shariah*)? Whether these fields of knowledge (*Uloom*) are permissible or perilous (*mahduur*) i.e. does Divine law look at them as being only recommendatory or obligatory?

We (indicating Ibn Rushd) say if the real aim and purpose of philosophy is that we can contemplate and view the existing things (*Mojudaat*) through it, from the point that these existing things point out and work as an indication (*Dalalat*) about the Creator, by way of the style of the creations which are patterned (*Masnuaat*); (this is so) as creations always shed light on the Creator.^{1/}

In this case when the knowledge of the creations will be complete, the knowledge of the Creator, the author of nature (*Sanah*) is also supposed to be perfect. Then, in

other words we have every right to say that the Divine law has also commanded us to contemplate and view the existing things and has laid emphasis on this point, notwithstanding the fact that the nature of this contemplation may be regarded as of the status of obligation (*Wajooob*) or it may be considered just as recommendatory (*Mandub ilahi*). However, there is no doubt that Divine law has invited us and has exhorted us to view existing things and natural phenomenon, and also to fully utilize our minds to grasp its subtle knowledge. Accordingly, Allah in several verses of the Quran has instructed humans: -

“Thus, be warned O people who have eyes”...(59:2)

This verse (*ayah*) denotes that the believers and people of insight should use analogy based both on rationalism (reason) and Divine law (*Shariah*) for this purpose. Similarly, Allah says

“Have not these people seen the kingdom of the earth and the heaven, and those things which Allah has created”. “(7:185)

Not only does this verse lay stress on viewing all the existing things from the viewpoint of admonition but also considers this process obligatory. And Allah knows much better who are the custodians of this knowledge as alluded to in this verse. Some instances in this regard have also been given. For example, the Quran mentions that in this knowledge Allah honoured Prophet Ibrahim (AS) and in this regard Allah says: -

“And in this way I made Ibrahim observe the kingdom of earth and the skies”. ...“(6:75)

Allah says, while exhorting others to have a portion from this knowledge:

“Do not these people look at the camel and see how I have created it and don't they look at the sky to see how I have raised it”...(86:11)

And says

“And these people contemplate the creation of the earth and skies” (2:191)

And there are similar numerous verses which occur in this regard, fairly explaining this point.

Therefore, we come to know that the Divine law has supported and ordained, in a clear decree, the use of mind in observing and viewing the existing things (*Mojudaat*) and taking lessons and learning from them. We know in this way that we can infer the unknown from the known, or in other words to reach from the phenomenon to the unknown (*nomena*) or the lesser known (*Majhool*) realms of knowledge through inference (*istanbat*). This is called analogy (*Qiyaas*). From all this it becomes obligatory for us to use the logical analogy (*Qiyaas-i- Aqli*) to study the existing things (*Mojudaat*) and look at them with the purpose of admonition (or getting warnings). By this, the careful vision (*Nazar*) which has been prompted by the Divine law is considered to be a complete sort (*Nau*) of the types of vision (*Anuai Nazar*) or of the analogy (*Qiyaas*) which is called demonstration (*Burhan*). 2/.

In this way the Divine law has emphatically invited us to the knowledge and gnosis (*Marifat*) of Allah and His existing things (*Maujudat*) through demonstration (*Burhan*). The question which arises here is that in which category should we put the understanding of the knowledge of Allah, the Exalted, (*Tabarak-ta'ala*) and His existing things (*Maujudat*) through the medium of reason (*Burhan*)? Secondly what is the status of such activity, i.e. whether it is just good (*afzal*) or a matter of obligatory nature (*al-amr-al-zaruri*) or does it have the status of an important and obligatory command. However, it is incumbent upon anyone, who wants to demonstratively have the knowledge of Allah, the Exalted and all the other existents, to have first understood the nature, types and kinds of demonstration, and the conditions and boundaries of demonstration. Moreover, the knowledge

about the opposition between Demonstrative Analogy (*al-Qiyas-al-Burhani*), Dialectical Analogy (*al-Qiyas al-Jadali*), Rhetorical Analogy (*al-Qiyas al-Khitabi*) and the Sophistical Analogy (*al-Qiyas -al-Mughalati*) is also a prerequisite for such a person. But before this, he has to know the ingredients and varieties or the details (*ajza*) of analogy i.e. the premises, types and kinds of analogy.

For a believer, therefore, the prior knowledge of these matters is necessary, as these constitute the same status in theoretical studies, as instruments have in practical activities. We can understand its example from the practice of a jurist who extracts commandments by doing *tafaquh* 3/ in the *ahkam* 4/, by including what is relevant in it and thereby excluding what is not relevant in it.

Or in other words we can say that Just as it is necessary for the jurist to infer from the Divine command to him to acquire knowledge by taking into consideration (*tafaquh*) the legal commandments on the basis of juristic analogies or syllogisms with their various kinds and valid and invalid conditions, in the same way for the seeker of the knowledge of Allah it is necessary to infer from the matters related to it by giving a ponderous attention and observing the existing things, which warrant the obligatory nature of this metaphysical reasoning. He (the seeker of the knowledge of Allah) has rather a greater claim to rational Analogy and its various conditions than the jurist, since the jurist argues in favour of the necessity of legal analogy (*al-Qiyas -al- Faqih*) from the saying of Allah: "Wherefore take example *from them* O you who have eyes" [Quran 2:59], a seeker of divine knowledge (*aarif*) has a better right to establish the same from it on behalf of metaphysical rational analogy (*al-Qiyas al-Aqli*).

Regarding the question, which any inquirer may raise that since the Rational Analogy (*al-Qiyas al-Aqli*) was not found in the early days of Islam (*Sadr-i-Awal*), isn't it (i.e., its practice), therefore an innovation? In response to this

question it can be said that even legal analogy (*al-Qiyas-al- Faqihī*) was not found during the early days of Islam, however, no one considers this science as innovation. Therefore, in the same way we should approach the observation of Rational analogy (*al-Qiyas al-aqlī*). 5/

There is a reason for this opinion, but it is not the occasion to mention that here. However, most of the people amongst the Muslim community approve of the Rational Analogy except a small minority (who are) from amongst the gross literalists and who are actually disputing this position on the basis of religious ordinances (*al-Nasus*). 6/

When it has been established that the Divine law has made seeking of rational analogy and its various kinds obligatory for us as it has been done in the case of legal analogy; in that case if none of our predecessors has made an effort to enquire into it we should start doing it from the beginning with the successor taking help from the predecessor, until the knowledge is completed. However, it is very difficult, rather impossible that an individual may single handedly acquire this science (of legal reasoning) with all (associated) aspects which are to be known necessarily (in legal reasoning). In the case of rational analogy this task is even more difficult. Therefore, if any person has done some prominent work in this field we should use it to our advantage even if he is from some other religion than ours; for the instrument by which purification is perfected is not made uncertain in its usefulness by its being in the hands of one of our own party, or of a foreigner, if it possesses the qualities of truthfulness and validity (*sahat*). Thus if the conditions of validity are present then we can use that instrument which anticipates right catharsis even though this instrument has been proposed by some people among the ancients, who are not included in the Muslim community, but have taken lead on us in this anticipation.

We see that the ancients have to a great degree used research in this regard. Thus it becomes important for us that we should rush towards their books and peruse and study them so that we should know what these people have written. If all the propositions and issues which they have written are not correct then we should be cautious and should not trust them.^{7/}

So, when we are discharged and free from this operation and are successful in acquainting ourselves with those instruments by which we can look at existing things with an objective of taking instruction and lesson with expertise, the necessary result of which will be that we can also acquire command on the demonstrative knowledge of the creation (*Dalalat-i—San'at*). This is the fact of the matter that whosoever cannot know creation (*San'at*) cannot know its design (*Mozuu*). It becomes an obligation on us that we should research existing things in a proper order, by which we can infer the knowledge of the design of the world (*sanat*). Similarly, we can look at existing things one by one to help acquire their knowledge. In this regard, as already mentioned, we can take the assistance of ancient philosophers and wise men (*Falasifah wa Hukama*), because they have taken the lead on us in this work regarding the acquisition and compilation of this knowledge and its branches (*Uloom*).

We can understand this problem (*Masalah*) by means of a few examples. For example, certain people till today used to consider the art (*Sanat*) of numerals ^{8/} extinct but a person taking into consideration the inquiry into this science gets convinced about its existence. Similar is the example of knowledge of astronomy where it has become possible now to understand the patterns (*maqadir*) of heavenly bodies. If it is possible to determine the size and directions (*Maqadir wa Jahtun*) of heavenly bodies and their shapes and various directions (*Bad-al-Ibad*), it will be very beneficial and advantageous. This is possible in

such a manner that we should attempt to know the distance between the sun and the earth and the distance of the stars provided the person who accomplishes this work should be temperamentally more ingenious and perceptive than their counter parts or should have benefited (*Mustafeez*) from any part of revelation or likeness of revelation.

If such a person would claim that the sun is 150-160 times larger than the earth, then certain people would attribute this assertion to the lunacy of the person, though this issue has been established on the basis of science of astronomy and there is no doubt in the truth and validity of this science. It is irrelevant that the bearer of this science may be any one .We can understand the acquisition and development of these branches of knowledge (*uloom*) by observing that the attainment and expertise in the principles of divine law (*asool-i-fiqah*) could also be completed after a long duration .9/

In this regard today's man can go ahead with the satisfaction of heart in terms of those problems (*Masail*) whose conclusion and deduction has been derived by the followers of other religions especially in the issues of polemics and dialectics (*Manazire*). Although there are exceptions as the People of the western region of larger Islamic cities are worthy (or someone else) show solicitude and exertion regarding these issues, from the point of view of knowledge. But we see that regarding this issue people work with an air of negligence and they do not have command over craftsmanship and skill of knowledge (*Ilmi Sanat wa Hirafat*). When the state of the themes of knowledge is such, then how can we be conversant with the terms of craftsmanship of creator, the knowledge of which is called wisdom (*Hikmat*)?

In this state of affairs it is important for us to benefit from experiences of those who have lived before us and have looked at existing things from the point of view of

research and have obtained it. And we should, by showing favour towards conditions of reason try to find the interpretation of truth and reality (*Haq wa Sawab*) in the proven points in the books of the ancients and we should express gladness at this and be thankful to them. But regarding the interpretations which don't appear consonant with truth (*Haq*) for us, we should be warned about them and we should abstain (*Hazar*) from them, and in this connection we should excuse ourselves from these because of lack of acceptance (*Adm-i- Qabuliyat*).

By this it is obviously clear that to consider the books of ancients as worthy of attention is also obligatory from the point of Divine law provided that the essence, spirit and the purpose of these books is such on which the Divine law has laid stress. And now if some person stops us from things in which acumen of nature (*Zakawat*), equity of divine law and learning a subject of importance of knowledge and creation (*Fazilat-i-Ilmiyat wa Khalqiyah*) are accumulated, then that person has stopped people from that work towards which the Divine law has invited them i.e. towards the knowledge of Allah as is the right of knowing Him and, that will be the extreme ignorance on his part and going astray from Allah, the most Exalted.

Or in other words we can say that if someone goes astray in the observation of Him or a person has lost his orientation owing to his Nature, because of his wrong observation or a deficiency in his natural capacity, or being dominated by his passions, or not finding a teacher to guide him to an understanding of their contents, or a combination of all or more than one of these causes. It does not follow that one should forbid observation to anyone who is qualified to it, and the manner of harm which arises owing to it (those circumstances) is something which is attached to it by accident and not by essence; and when a thing is beneficial by its nature and essence, we should desist from shunning it because of

something harmful contained in it by accident. After the nomination (*Taqarur*) of this thing, when we have the belief that all Muslims consider Islamic law as Allah's law and this law is based on truth, this law has invited us to infer the knowledge of Allah and to look at His creation for the purpose of instruction. This task of verifying these affairs as per his instinct, nature and need of his disposition is important for every Muslim. But the truth is that in the practice of this verification, the dispositions of people are based on different degrees, and (the people) have preferences over one another in certain matters.

Certain dispositions verify only on the basis of demonstration (*Burhan*), while other dispositions verify only on the basis of dialectical verbal statements (*Tasdeeq-al-Jadliyah*). Certain people are impressed by the rhetorical style of speaking (*Al-Aqwal-al-Khitabiyah*) and among them are some that verify the maxims of oratory as the men of reason verify the statements of reason.

Thus, since this divine religion of ours has summoned people by these three methods, assent to it has extended to everyone, except him who stubbornly denies it with his tongue, or him for whom no method of summons to Allah, the Exalted, has been appointed in religion owing to his own neglect of such matters. It was for this purpose that the Prophet (Saw) was sent with a special mission to 'the white man and the black man' alike; I mean because his religion embraces all the methods of summons to Allah, the Exalted. This is clearly expressed in the saying of Allah, the Exalted, and 'Summon to the way of your Lord by wisdom and by good preaching, and debate with them in the most effective manner'.

Probably this is the reason that Muhammad, Messenger of Allah has used different invitational procedures for blacks and whites for affirmation of the Divine law. This was the thought of the Prophet (Saw) on the occasion when he ordered a man to give his brother

honey to drink for his diarrhoea, and the diarrhoea increased after he had given him the honey: when the man complained to him about it, he said, 'Allah spoke the truth; it was your brother's stomach that lied'. Allah's evident assertion of this thing clarifies it:

"Invite the people towards your Lord's way with wisdom and with excellent council. And contend with them in the best way".

When these divine laws are proved, being a part of the Muslim body, we are aware of the fact in a clear cut manner that the demonstrative observation (*al-Nazaru-al-Burhani*) will not contradict what has already been proven by *Shariah*, as truth does not contradict truth but would affirm and rather confirm it. And in addition to this it will be in the forefront as a witness to its validity.

In this way if the demonstrative observation leads to any manner of knowledge about any existent that is inevitably either unmentioned or mentioned in *Shariah*. If it is unmentioned there is no contradiction, its status will be of those categories which are not mentioned in the commandments (*Al-Ahkam*), so that the jurist (*Faqih*) has to infer it by employing *Shariah* Analogy (*Al-Qiyas-Al-Shariahi*). But in the event the *Shariah* has pronounced about it; the apparent meaning of the words inevitably either accords or conflicts with the conclusions of demonstration about it. In the former case, there is no argument. But if the case is that it contradicts with the demonstrative observation, it will warrant an interpretation (*Tawil*). The purport of interpretation is application of the indication and significance of an expression from real (*Al-Dalalatul-Haqeeqiah*) to metaphorical indication and significance (*Al-Dalalatul-al-Majaziah*), without forsaking therein the standard metaphorical practices of Arabic, such as calling a thing by the name of something having similitude and resemblance to it or a cause or consequence or

accompaniment of it, or other things such as are enumerated in accounts of the kinds of metaphorical speech.12/

The problem is when the jurists (*Fuqaha*) in many divine commands demonstrate this course of action, and then the scholar who is perpetrating this course through reason is more entitled to it. This is so because to the jurist (*Faqih*) belongs just the Analogy of conjecture (*Qiyas Zanni*) and in its comparison to the seeker of rational interpretation belongs the Analogy of Certitude (*Qiyas Yaqeeni*). 13/

We are trying to absolutely establish that the thing towards which demonstration and reason direct us and Divine law apparently law opposes it, the interpretation (at that instance) will be made on the basis of linguistic principles of Arabic language. There is no conflict on the subject and no Muslim has any doubt about it or any believer has any suspicion (*Irtiyab*). After coming in terms with this reality, our belief about this issue is further strengthened (so) that like this we should try to combine the extra religious reasonable (*Maqul*) and the reported testimonial statement (*Manqul*) even when apparently at times, we find some discrepancy between the statements of Divine law and rational propositions (*Maqul Qaziyat*). Indeed we may say that whenever a statement in the Divine law conflicts in its apparent meaning with a demonstrative argument (*Burhan*), if the purport of *Shariah* is considered carefully and the rest of its contents searched minutely, there will invariably be found among the expressions of Divine law something which in its apparent meaning bears witness to that interpretation or comes close to bearing witness.14/

This view holds on the consensus of Muslims that divine word cannot always be made applicable for its apparent meanings or necessarily on the basis of interpretation. And neither is its evident meaning

absolved of its external (apparent) meaning on the grounds of interpretation. However, they have difference of opinion over which of them is interpretable (*al-Ma'ual*) from what is non-interpretable (*ghayr ma'ual*) from them. The Ash'arites for instance give an allegorical interpretation to the verse about Allah's settling on the Throne (*istawa*) and the Tradition about His descent, while the *Hanbalites* take them on evident meaning, the reason being the consideration of evident facts. The reason as to why double meaning has been given is to suit the diversified observations of the people and the differences of their natural dispositions (*Qaraihim*) in order to reach any judgment (*Tasdeeq*). The apparent contradictions are meant to stimulate the people who are well-grounded in knowledge (*Rasikhoon -Fil- Ilm*) to a comprehensive interpretation which may reconcile both. 15/

(Someone's saying is) that in the Divine law there are certain things about which the consensus of Muslims is that the meaning is dependent on the apparent meaning, and there are certain matters which will need to be elucidated (with inner meaning). And there are some things where contradiction has taken place which means reason also directs us towards the interpretation over which people have based the apparent meaning to have reached a consensus 'indicating both an apparent meaning and a deeper meaning'. One opinion is that in this condition if the consensus has been assured, then it would be right to do so. Now if the consensus is of the conjectural kind then it is lawful. Because of this reason Abu Hamid, Abul Mali, etc, the proponents of Theoretical Science are of the opinion that we cannot charge a person with blasphemy who in this type of examples does not agree with the consensus. This matter has become explicit for you that in theory consensus cannot be assured completely as in the case of practical matters (where its assurance is possible). In the affairs of world any

consensus (to be held) is not possible till that time when we can completely enclose boundaries to the circumstances of the world. For this, it becomes necessary that the present scholars of the whole world, who are famous amongst us, are available and we are fully aware of their personalities as well as their strength. In this way we find the problems of religion with consistency, and all the records of its affairs. Besides all this too, the complete surety of this matter is possible and that the scholars of this world stand grounded on this as in the Divine law doesn't differentiate between the inside and outside (*Zahir wa batin*). And science does not require any problem to be hidden from any person and the matter that in the Divine law there is present only one way for people should also be known. But contrary to that, it has been reported from the people of early generations (*Sadar Awal*) that they believed that there are two parts of Divine law. They are of the same opinion that it is not necessary for any person to know the actual fact if he is not included among the scholars. Like in the Bukhari, Hazrat Ali narrates that the Prophet (SAW) has said :—

‘Speak to people about the matters that they know. Otherwise the outcome will be that they might disapprove the presence of Allah and the Prophet (SAW)’.

A body of ancient people has narrated similar ideology. Then from any problematic outlook how can an idea of consensus be ‘obtained’? Because we as people are well aware of the matter that any age would not have been without such people who are convinced of the idea that in the divine law there are certain things whose elucidation is necessary for people. This affair (thought) is in contradiction to the religious affairs because people consider its disclosure and expression equal for all the people. And in these affairs (of practice) the attainment of consensus is quite easy. This is the reason that in this

process there is no possibility of disagreement. (While as) in the case of religious affairs attainment of consensus is enough.

(And if you say so) that in the process of interpretation when consensus is broken, doesn't it justify the charge of infidelity (on the consensus breakers)? When in such affairs the occurrence of consensus cannot be imagined then what will be your opinion about these philosophers of Islam like Abu Nasar (Al-Farabi) and Ibn Sina etc. Abu Hamid (Al-Ghazzali) in his well renowned book '*Tahafat-ul-Falasifah*' has decreed these two gentlemen as unbelievers (*Kafir*) because of their beliefs that the world is eternal and Allah doesn't hold the knowledge of all the particulars, and the resurrection of bodies and about the state of the afterlife, in which cases they have reached a different interpretation. We say that in its external assertion this belief is not tantamount to blasphemy (in these two cases). 16/

While Imam Ghazzali in another of his books '*Altafruqa*' with specification has insisted on this issue that in these affairs, there is possibility of infidelity in the breaking of consensus. But as we believe that in these types of problems it is difficult for consensus to take place as even a good number of people from the earlier generations have maintained this position in this matter. These are such interpretations that cannot be illustrated further, otherwise these are the very people who are fit for this work. These people of interpretations are called '*Raskhun Fil-al-i'm*' because our choice and option in reality is dependent on Allah's affirmation, 'He it is who has sent down to you the Book, containing certain verses clear and definite' [and so on] down to the words 'those who are well grounded in science'.

The light of judgment and acceptance will not be so superior (*maziyatun*) when the people of knowledge don't have the knowledge of interpretation because their belief

should be altogether different from those who are not knowledgeable. Allah has surely qualified them that they possess faith of them (allegorical verses) not from the angle of demonstration. But when about this belief it is specifically mentioned by Allah that its proponents are scholars then it must but be based on demonstration and in that case is bound to be not without the knowledge of interpretation (*tawil*) because Allah, the most Exalted, has informed that interpretation (*tawil*) is present, which is the reality (*al-Haqqeeqat*); and demonstration (*burhan*) is nothing but always based on reality. When the situation is such, there is no possibility of consensus beneficial (*mustafaz*) in the interpretations, with which Allah has attributed the scholars to be endowed with. This matter is quite clear for a person who is just.

And this status of man cannot be attained without the know how of interpretation besides (possession of) knowledge. Now among the believers (those) who are not knowledgeable but believe in this matter, for them in this process it is not necessary for the faith to be dependent on argument. Now if the faith is like that which Allah has attributed to special scholars then its existence along with argument is obligatory. 17/

Due to all these reasons we see that Abul Hamid (Al Ghazzali) in the affairs of Peripatetics has accused that when this matter is attributed to them, these people deny that Allah has the knowledge of the particulars, in fact these people in this matter are upholders of this opinion that Allah has knowledge of them which is not similar to our knowledge. Whereas Glorious God's Knowledge of existence is the opposite of this: it is the cause of the object known, which is the existent being. Thus to suppose the two kinds of knowledge similar to each other is to identify the essences and properties of opposite things, and that is the extreme of ignorance. Our knowledge of them (on the other hand) is effect for the object known. And if the

name of 'knowledge' is predicated of both originated and eternal knowledge, it is predicated by pure homonymy, as many names are predicated of opposite things: e.g. *jalal* of great and small, *sarim* of light and darkness. Thus there exists no definition embracing both kinds of knowledge at once, as the theologians of our time imagine. We have devoted a separate essay to this question, impelled by one of our friends.

But how can anyone imagine that the Peripatetics say that Allah, the Glorious does not know particulars with His eternal Knowledge, when they hold that true visions include premonitions of particular events that are due to occur in future time, and that this warning foreknowledge comes to people in their sleep from the eternal Knowledge which orders and rules the universe? Moreover, it is not only particulars which they say Allah does not know in the manner in which we know them, but universals as well; for the universals known to us are also effects of the nature of existent being, while with His Knowledge the reverse is true. Thus the conclusion to which demonstration leads is that His Knowledge transcends qualification as 'universal' or 'particular'. Consequently there is no point in disputing about this question, i.e. whether to call them unbelievers or not. Now if any person, among these two types of sciences first draws similarity between them, then contrasts and unifies their qualities, (he) will be at the height of ignorance. When the knowledge will be used for the knowledge of the created and the ancient, then it will be concerning the question whether the world is pre-eternal or (it) came into existence. The disagreement between the Asharite theologians and the ancient philosophers, especially in the case of certain earlier philosophers, is almost resolvable into a disagreement about naming (*tasmiah*), for they agree that there are three kinds of existents: two extremes and one intermediate between the extremes.

They also agree about naming (*tasmiah*) the extremes; but they disagree about the intermediate class. 18/

One extreme is a thing, which is brought into existence from something other than itself (from some matter), and by something (by an efficient cause); and it (its existence) is preceded by time. This is the status of existents whose generation is apprehended by sense (*hiss*), e.g. the formation of water, air, earth, animals, plants, and so on. About this type of existents all the earlier (philosophers) and Ash'arites, agree in naming this class of existents (*Maujudat*) as 'originated' (*muhaddith*). The opposite extreme to this is an existent that is not made from or by anything, and not preceded by time; and here too all the opposite parties both agree in naming it 'pre-eternal' (*al-Qadeem*). This existent is apprehended by demonstration; it is Allah, Exalted and Sacred, Who is the Maker, provider of existence to all, and Sustainer of the universe; may He be praised and His Power exalted! 19/

This is the world as a whole. Now they all agree on the presence of these three characters in the world. For the theologians admit that time does not precede it, or rather this is a necessary consequence for them since time according to them is something which accompanies (*maqaran*) movements and bodies. They also agree with the earlier (philosophers) in the view that future time is infinite (*ghayr mutnahi*) and in the same way the future is existent.

However, the disagreement among them is about past time (*al-Zaman-al-Mazi*) and past existent (*al-Maujud al-Mazi*): the scholastics maintain that it is finite (*mutnahi*) as Plato and his group of followers uphold this doctrine, while Aristotle and his group hold that it is infinite, as is the case with future time. Thus it is clear that this last existent bears a resemblance both to the existent which is really created (*muhaddith*) and to the pre-eternal Existent

(*Qadeem*). So, those who are more impressed with its similitude to the pre-eternal than its similitude to the created name it 'pre-eternal', while those who are more impressed with its similitude to the created, name it as 'originated' (*al-Muhaddith*). But in truth it is neither really originated nor really pre-eternal, since the really originated is necessarily perishable and the really pre-eternal has no cause. Some others like Plato and his followers-name it 'originated and coeval with time', because time according to them is finite in the past.

Thus the doctrines about the world are not so very far apart from each other that some of them should be called irreligious and others not. For this to happen, opinions must be divergent in the extreme, i.e. contraries, such as the scholastics suppose exist on this question; i.e. [they believe] that the names 'pre-eternity' and 'coming into existence' as applied to the world as a whole are contraries. But it is now clear from what we have said that this is not the case.^{20/}

Over and above all this, these opinions (*ara*) about the world do not conform to the apparent meaning of *Shariah*. For if the apparent meaning of *Shariah* is searched, it will become evident from the revealed verses which inform us about the bringing into existence of the world (*Iejad-I-Aalim*) that its form really is created (*muhaditthatun*), but that the existence itself and time extend continuously at both extremes, i.e. without interruption. Thus the saying of Allah, the Exalted, 'He it is Who created the heavens and the earth in six days, and His throne was on the water', if taken in its external sense will imply that there was an existence before this present existence, that is namely the throne and the water, (*al-Arsh wal maa*) and a time before this water, i.e. the one which is joined to the form of this being, namely the number of the movement of the celestial sphere (*harakatul-Aflak*). And the saying of the Exalted, 'On the day when

the earth shall be changed into other than earth, and the heavens as well,' also indicate in their external sense that there will be a different existence (*wajudan thaniyan*) after this existence. (The same fact has been described) in the saying of the Exalted 'Then He directed Himself towards the sky, and it was smoke', which in its apparent sense implies that the heavens were created from something.

Thus the theologians too in their statements about the world do not conform to the external sense of the Divine law. But (the Scholastics) interpret it allegorically. For it is not stated in the Divine law that Allah was existing with absolutely nothing else (*al-Adm- al-Mahaz*): a text (*nass*) to this effect is never to be found. Then, how is it conceivable that the scholastics' allegorical interpretation (*tawil al-Mutakallimin*) of these verses could meet with unanimous consensus when the apparent meaning of the Divine law that we have mentioned about the existence of the world has been accepted by a school of philosophers! (*firqatun min al -hukama*). 21/

On such difficult questions (*al-Awaseyatun*), the people who make judgements are either correct, and entitled to reward (*musseebun maajurayn*) (from Allah) or wrong but excused (*mukhtein maazzurayn*). For judgement (*Tasdeeq*) to a thing from the side argument arising in the soul is something abiding (compulsory) and not voluntary.

I (Ibn Rushd) mean: it does not behoove us to endorse or not to endorse to choose, as it is to stand up or not to stand up. Now if it is a condition of obligation (*Sharat-ul-Takleefal-Ikhtiyar*), a man who endorses to an error as a result of an ambiguity occurring to him will be excused, if he is a scholar. This is why the Prophet (SAW) said, 'when the judge makes a personal judgement (*ijtihad*) and makes a right decision, he will have a double reward; and if he makes a wrong decision he will have a single reward.' And what judge is greater than he who makes judgements about existence i.e. to say thus or not thus is the case ?

These judges are the scholars (*ulama*), who have been specially chosen by Allah for allegorical interpretation (*tawil*), and this error which is forgivable according to the *Shariah* is only such error as occurs from scholars when they observe the difficult things (*al-Ashiah -awasebah*) for which the *Shariah* has made them obliged to observe.

So far the error proceeding from any other class of people is sheer sin (*ithmun mahazun*), equal whether the error relates to theoretical or to practical matters. For just as the judge who is ignorant of the way of the life of the prophet (*Sunnah*) cannot be absolved of the responsibility if he commits an error in judgement (*al-hukum*), so he who makes judgements about existents (*Maujudat*) without fulfilling the required conditions for making such judgements is not excused but is either a sinner or an unbeliever. And if he who would judge what is allowed and forbidden is required to combine in himself the prerequisites of personal judgment (*ijtihad*), which consists of knowledge of the principles [of the Divine law] and knowledge of how to draw inferences from those principles by reasoning, how much more properly is he who would make judgements about existents supposed to be meeting, i.e. to know the first rational principles and the modes to draw inferences from them!

In general, error in *Shariah* is of two types: it may either be an error which is excused to one who is from among the people of observation (*ahlul-al nazar*) (and the error may be) about that matter in which the error occurs, for example as the skilful doctor is excused if he commits an error in the art of medication and the mature judge if he errors in his judgment. However, commitment of error will be not excused to one who is not possessing expertise in that subject; or error which is not excused to any person whatever, and which is unbelief, if it takes place in the principles of the Divine law, and in case it occurs in something subordinate to the principles or fundamentals

will be a heresy.

This type of error is that which occurs about matters, knowledge of which is provided by all the different methods of arguments, so that knowledge of the matter in question is in this way possible for everyone. Examples are acknowledgement of Allah, Blessed and Exalted, of the prophetic offices and of salvation (*saadah*) and misery in the life hereafter. These three principles are amenable to the three classes of arguments through which everyone without exception can come to reach to an endorsement of what he is supposed to know: I mean the rhetorical (*khitabiah*), dialectical (*jadaliah*) and demonstrative (*burhaniah*) arguments. Therefore any person denying such examples, when these happen to be one of the principles of the *Shariah* (*Asool-i-Shariah*), is an unbeliever, who denies (*maanidin*) with his tongue though not with his heart, or becomes negligent to venture into learning the argument of its truth.

The reason for this being that if he belongs to the demonstrative class of men, he has to take recourse to argument for the endorsement of truth by demonstration as he has been made obliged to do the same; if he belongs to the dialectical class, the way is by dialectic; and if he belongs to the class of people who are to be addressed by sermonizing and admonishing (*al-Muaizatu*) the way for him is by sermonizing and admonishing. The Prophet (SAW) has alluded towards this dimension when he said, 'I have been ordered to fight people until they say "There is no Being entitled to be worshipped but Allah" and by believing in me'; he means attaining belief that is convenient to them by any of the three methods.

With regard to things which by reason of their hidden nature are only knowable by demonstration, Allah has opened His Gracious way in such matters for His servants who have no access to demonstration, on account of their observations (*nazrihim*), habits or unavailability of means

(*adm-i-asbab*) for education. He has cited for them examples (*amthal*) and similitude in these matters, and invited them to endorsement (*al-Tasdeeq*) with these examples, since it is possible for endorsement to those examples to materialize through the common arguments to all men, i.e. the dialectical and rhetorical arguments. This is the reason why *Shariah* is divided into esoteric and exoteric aspects: the exoteric aspect consists of those examples that are coined to stand for those connotations (images stand for ideas) while the esoteric aspect is those meanings [themselves], which are clear only to the demonstrative class. These are the four or five classes of existents mentioned by Abû Hamid in his 'The book of distinction' (*Al Tafaruqah*).

But when it occurs, as we said, that we know the thing itself by the three methods, we do not need to cite examples of it, and it remains true in its apparent meaning, not admitting interpretation (*tawil*). If an apparent text of this kind refers to principles (*al-asool*), in that case an interpreter who interprets it allegorically is an unbeliever, e.g. anyone who thinks that there is no salvation (*saadah*) or misery (*shaqawah*) in the next life, and that the only purpose of this statement is that men should be safeguarded from each other in their body and senses, in that sense it will be but a practical device, and that man has no other purpose than to enjoy his sensible existence.

When this is established, it will have become clear to you from what we have said that there are apparent texts of the Divine law that it is not permitted to interpret allegorically; to do so on fundamentals is unbelief (and) on subordinate matters it is heresy.

There are also apparent texts which have to be interpreted by men of the demonstrative class; for such men to take them in their apparent meaning is unbelief, while for those who are not of the demonstrative class to interpret them and take them out of their apparent

meaning is unbelief or heresy on their part.

Included in this kind of matters is the verse about Allah's settling on the Throne (*istiwa*) and the Tradition about His descent (*nazool*). That is why the Prophet (SAW) said in the case of the black woman (*suda*), when she informed the Prophet that Allah was in the heavens, 'Free her; for she is a believer'. This was because she was not of the demonstrative class (*ahlul-al -Burhan*); and the reason for his declaration was that the group of people to whom endorsement comes only through the imagination (*al-Takhayul*), i.e. who do not endorse a thing except in the way as they can imagine it, find it difficult to endorse the existence of a thing which is not related to any imaginable thing (*shayin mutakhayala*). This applies as well to those who do not understand from the relation stated except the Space (*makan*); these are people who have advanced a little distance and stage (*rutbata*) in their observation (*nazar*) beyond the position of the first class, (rejecting) their belief in corporeality (*al-jismiah*).

Thus the reply to them with regard to such examples is that they belong to the allegorical texts (*mutashabiyat*), and that the pause (*al-waqaf*) is to be placed after the words of Allah, the Exalted 'And no one knows the interpretation thereof except Allah'. The demonstrative class, while in full agreement with them in this hold that this may be interpreted allegorically, may disagree about the interpretation, depending on the level of each one's knowledge of demonstration.

There is also a third class of texts of the Divine law lying uncertainly between the other two classes, on which there is doubt. One group of those who devote themselves to exoteric observation (*al-Nazar-al-zahir*) attach them to the apparent texts which it is not permitted to interpret allegorically, others attach them to the texts with esoteric meanings which scholars are not permitted to take in their exoteric meanings. This divergence in the interpretation

is due to the difficulty and allegorical nature of the class of text itself. One who commits an error about this class is excused, I mean from among the scholars.^{22/}

If it is said, 'when it is clear that the commandments of the Divine law in this regard are of three categories (*maratib*), to which of these three categories (*maratib*), according to you, do the attributes of the life hereafter and its states belong?' We respond: The position clearly is that this problem belongs to the third category about which there is disparity in opinion. We see a section of people (*quman*) who claim to be entitled to be among the people of demonstration say that it is necessary to consider these texts in their exoteric senses, as there was no possibility of demonstration which could lead to the impossibility (*istihalah*) of the apparent meaning in them. This is the manner which has been maintained by the Ash'arites. However, another group of those who devote themselves to demonstration interpret these texts allegorically, and these people are quite divergent in their interpretations of them. In this category of people must be included Abu Hamid and most of the Sufis; some of them attempt to bring affinity between the two interpretations of the texts, as Abû Hamid has done in some of his books.

So, it is quite possible that a scholar with an erroneous judgement in this matter is excused, while one who is correct receives thanks or a reward that is, if he acknowledges the possibility of physical existence [in the life hereafter] and provides a certain type of allegorical interpretation, I mean in the matters relating to the nature of eschatology (*al-Maad*), not of its occurrence, when the interpretation provided does not lead to denial of its occurrence (*wajud*). In this matter only the denial of its occurrence (*jahad-al-wajud*) will be tantamount to infidelity (*kufur*), because it constitutes of one principles of the fundamentals of the Divine law (*Asool-i-Shariah*) and one

of those ways to which endorsement is attainable through the three methods common to 'the white man and the black man'.

Now if anybody is from the non-scholarly people, then for him to practice on the apparent is necessary, and to interpret the text allegorically is an act of infidelity for such a person, as it may lead him to unbelief. Due to this reason we see for the people, for whom belief in the apparent is an obligation, it is a blasphemous act to indulge in an allegorical interpretation, as it may lead them to infidelity. Now, if any one amongst the people of demonstration divulges this to the others (the former ones), then he has invited them towards infidelity and the person who invites towards infidelity is himself an unbeliever.

That is why the interpretations are to be reservedly proved only in the books of demonstration, because when they are in the books of demonstration then, only those people will have access to them who comprise of the members of the category of demonstration. Now if these are found in other than the books of demonstration and in them are used imaginative, rhetorical, or dialectical methods as has been done by Abu Hamid, then he lapsed into an error both in religion and philosophy, even though the person had good intentions. For by this act he was desirous to increase the number of learned men (*Ahlil-ilm*), but in fact he increased the number of the people who are prone to corruption and not learning!

The consequence of this situation was that one group came to slander (*thalib*) philosophy, another to abuse the Divine law (*Shariah*), and another to reconcile these two groups. It seems that this was one of his objectives in his books; and the argument for this is that he wanted by this method to awaken the minds, thus he adhered to no one doctrine in his books but was an Ash'arite with the Ash'arites, a Sufi with the Sufis and a philosopher with

the philosophers, and he represented the person mentioned in the verse: -

‘One day a Yamanite, if I happen to meet a man
of Yemen,
And if I happen to meet a Maaddi, I’m an ‘Adnani’.
23/

The Religious leaders (*aiyimatun*) of the Muslims are responsible for preventing people from consulting his books which abound in the scholarly contents (*al-ilm*), except the learned (*ahli-al-ilm*), just as they ought to forbid demonstrative books to those who are not capable of understanding them, though the damage done to the common people by demonstrative books is lighter, because in most cases only the persons endowed with superb natural prudence (*al-fitr-al-faiqah*) are attracted to the books falling in the demonstrative class, and this class of persons is only misled through lack of scholarly virtue (*Adm Fazilatil-al Ilmiyah*), unorganized reading, and tackling them without a teacher. However, their total attempt at prohibition obliterates the purpose to which the *Shariah* invites, because it is an injustice (*al-zulm*) to the best class of people and the best class of existences. For to do justice to the best class of existences demands that they should be known soundly, by persons qualified to know them profoundly; and these are the best class of people; and the greater the value of the existence, the greater will be the lapse (*al-jur*) on the part of people towards it, which consists of ignorance of it. Thus the Exalted has said, ‘Associating [other gods] with Allah is indeed a great injustice’.

This is what we considered suitable to prove in this type of observation (*al-nazar*), i.e. the correspondence (*al-takalum*) between the Divine law (*Shariah*) and philosophy, and the commandments of allegorical interpretation in the Divine law. Had there been no publicity already given to this subject itself and to these questions among the

common masses, which we have mentioned, we should have been the last to write a word about it, and also we should not have had to seek apology in this matter from the people entitled to interpretation, as the status (*shan*) of these problems and questions is such that these should be discussed only in the books of demonstration (*kutub-al-Burhan*) and not elsewhere. Allah is the Guide and helps us to follow the right course!

You must know that the aim of the Divine law (*Shariah*) is simply to impart true knowledge (*taalim-al-haqq*) and righteous action (*al-aml-al-haqq*). (And) the True knowledge is gnosis of Allah (*Maatrifat-al-Allah*), Blessed and Exalted, and all other existents (*sayir al-Maujudat*) as they essentially happen to be, and the specific view point of *Shariah* pertaining to this issue, and knowledge of salvation (*saadah*) and wretchedness and misery (*al-Shiqa*) in the life hereafter. Righteous action consists in performing the activities (*al-afaal*), which are instrumental for making salvation possible and shunning the activities which bring wretchedness and misery to fore [in hereafter], and it is knowledge of all these activities that is called 'practical science' (*al-ilm al-amali*). As a whole these activities fall into two divisions: (1) outward physical activities; the science of these is named 'jurisprudence' (*fiqh*) and (2) activities of the soul such as gratitude, patience and other aspects of morality, attitudes towards which the *Shariah* has invited us or has forbidden us to go near them; the science of these is called 'asceticism' (*al-zuhud*) or 'the sciences of eschatology' (*ulum-al-akhrah*). On these Abû Hamid (Ghazzali) has dealt a great deal in his book: when the people had given up this sort [of act] and became immersed in the other sort (asceticism), and as this sort involved the greater fear of Allah (*taqwa*), which is the cause of salvation, he called his book 'The revival of the sciences of religion' (*Ahya Ulum al-Din*). But we have deviated from our subject,

so let us return to it

We say: The purpose of *Shariah* is to teach true knowledge (*taalim -al-ilm -al-haqq*) and right action (*al-amal-al-haqq*); and teaching consists of two kinds, i.e. concepts (*Tasawur*) and judgements (*Tasdeeq*), as the scholars of scholasticism have clarified. The methods of judgement available to men are three in number: demonstrative, dialectical and rhetorical, and the methods of forming concepts are two: either the object itself or an analogy of the object. All the people have not the natural ability to accept the demonstrations (*al-brahin*), and not even the capability of endorsing dialectical arguments, let alone demonstrative discourses (*aqawil*) 24/ which are so hard to learn and need a quite long period of time even for those who are qualified to learn them. Therefore, since the purpose of the Divine law is simply to teach everyone, it is necessary for it to consist of every mode of methods (*Inha-i-turq-al-Tasawwur*) and complete methods of judgment (*Inha-i-al-turq-al-Tasdeeq*). The methods of judgement are common for most of the people supporting the occurrence of their endorsement, i.e. the occurrence of assent, as a result of them [is comprehensive]: these are the rhetorical (*khitabiah*) and the dialectical (*jadaliyah*). The rhetorical are more common than dialectical. One of them occurs where the method is common, yet specialized in two respects: i.e. where it is certain in its concepts and judgements, in spite of being rhetorical or dialectical. These syllogisms are those premises, in spite of being based on accepted ideas or on opinions, are accidentally certain (*yaqeeniah*), and whose conclusions are accidentally to be taken in their direct meaning without analogies. The discourses of the Divine law (*Al-aqawil-al-shariah*) of this sort have no allegorical interpretations (*tawil*), and anyone who denies them or interprets them allegorically (*al-mutawil*) is an infidel.

The second sort occurs where the premises, in spite of

being based on well known (*mashurah*) ideas or on conjectural opinions (*madhunah*), are certain (*yaqeeniah*), and where the conclusions are analogies^{25/} for the matters they are intended to work as consequences, rendering these amenable i.e. their conclusions, to allegorical interpretation.

The third is the reverse of this: it occurs where the consequences are the very matters which it was intended to conclude, while the premises are based on well known notions or the conjectural opinions without being accidentally certain. The texts of this sort also, i.e. their conclusions, are not susceptible to allegorical interpretation (*Tawil*), but their premises may require it.

The fourth sort occurs where the premises are based on well known notions or conjectural opinions, without being accidentally certain, and where the consequences are analogies (*mithalat*) for what it was intended to conclude. In these cases the duty of the elite (*al-khawwas*) is to resort to interpretation (*Tawil*) in their case, while the obligation of the masses (*al-jumhur*) is to take them in their apparent meaning.

In general, everything in these matters which renders allegorical interpretation necessary can only be comprehended by demonstration (*al-Burhan*). What is obligatory on the part of the elite (*al-khawwas*) here is to apply such interpretation; while the duty of the masses is to take them in their apparent meaning in both the conditions, i.e. in concept (*al-tasawur*) and judgement (*al-tasdeeq*), since their natural capacity does not allow more than that.

Another method is peculiar to a smaller number of people: this is the demonstrative. Therefore, since the primary purpose of the Divine law is to take care of the majority, the prevailing methods of discourses in religion are the common methods by which the majority comes to form concepts and judgments. These [common] methods

in religion are of four classes: In general, everything in these [texts] that admits of interpretation (*al-Tawil*) can only be understood by demonstration (*burhan*). The duty of the elite (*al-khawwas*) here is to resort to such interpretation; while the duty of the common people (*al-jumhur*) is to take them in their apparent meaning in both situations, i.e. in concept and judgement, since their natural capacity does not allow more than that.

But there may occur to students of *Shariah* interpretations due to the superiority of one of the common methods over another in [bringing about] endorsement (*al-Tasdeeq*), i.e. when the indication contained in the interpretation is more persuasive than the indication contained in the apparent meaning. Such interpretations are common; and their being obligatory is possibly a duty for those whose powers of theoretical comprehension have attained the dialectical capability (*al-quwatul-al-jadaliyah*). In this class belong some of the interpretations of the Ash'arites and Mu'tazilites-though the statements of the Mu'tazilites are generally more sound (*authaqa-aqwalan*). The common people, on the other hand, who are not capable of more than rhetorical discourses (*al-aqawil-al-khitabiyah*), have the duty of taking these in their apparent meaning, and they are not permitted to know such interpretations at all.

Thus people in relation to *Shariah* fall into three categories:

One category is those who are not people of interpretation at all: these are the people of rhetorical category. They are the overwhelming majority (*al-jumhur al-ghalib*), for no man of pure and chaste intelligence (*salim-al-aql*) is exempted from this kind of endorsement

Another category is of the people of dialectical interpretation (*ah-al-tawil-al-jadali*): these are the dialecticians (*jadaliyun*), either by their propensity (*bil-al-tabah*) alone or by nature and habit (*bil-al-tabah wal-al-*

qaadah).

Another category of people is the people of certain interpretation (*al-tawil-al-Yaqeeni*): these are the people of demonstrative class, by nature and learning or training (*bil-al-tabah wal al-sanaat*), i.e. in the art of philosophy (*sanaat al-hikmah*). This sort of interpretation ought not to be explained to the people of dialectical category, let alone to the common masses. When something of these allegorical interpretations is explained to anyone who is not able to understand them -especially demonstrative interpretations (*al-tawilat-ul-al burhaniyah*) because of their lagging behind in common knowledge (*al-maarif-al-mushtarikah*) both he who explains it and he to whom it is explained led into unbelief. The reason for that is that he aims at two objectives. i.e. rejection of the apparent meaning and affirmation of the allegorical one; so that if the apparent meaning is rejected in the mind of someone who can only grasp apparent meanings, without the allegorical meaning being affirmed in his mind, the result is unbelief, if it concerns the fundamentals of the Divine law. Allegorical interpretations, then, ought not to be explained to the common masses nor stated in rhetorical or dialectical books, i.e. books containing discourses of these two kinds, as was done by Abû Hamid. For this reason they should not be explained to this class; and with regard to an apparent text, when there is a self-evident doubt whether it is apparent to everyone and whether knowledge of its interpretation is impossible for them, they should be informed clearly that it is allegorical (*mutashabiah*) and (its meaning) known by no one else than Allah; and that the pause (*al-waqf*) should be put here in the sentence of the Exalted, 'And no one knows the interpretation thereof except Allah'. The same kind of answer should also be given to a question about abstruse matters (*al-amur al-ghamizah*), which there is no way for the masses to comprehend; just as the Exalted has

answered in His saying, 'And they will ask you about the Spirit. Say: The Spirit is by the command of my Lord; you have been given only a little knowledge'.

As for the man (*al-musrih*) who explains these interpretations (*al-tawilat*) to the persons who are not entitled to these, he is an infidel on account of his calling people to unbelief. Because this is contrary to the calls of the prescribed legislation of the Legislator (*al-Sharah*), especially when they are far fetched false interpretations concerning the fundamentals of the Divine law, as has happened in the case of a section of people of our time. For we have witnessed some of them imagining that they were indulging in philosophizing and that they perceived, with their remarkable wisdom, things which conflict with the Divine law in every respect, i.e. (in passages) which do not admit of allegorical interpretation; and that it was obligatory to explain these things to the common masses.

But by explaining those false beliefs (*al-aiteqadati-al-fasidah*) to the common masses they have been instrumental in the destruction of the masses and themselves, in this world and the life hereafter.

The example of the relation between the purpose of these people and the purpose of the Legislator (*sharah*) can be understood by the following: Suppose there is a man, who goes to an expert physician (*tabib mahir*). The purpose of this expert physician is to preserve the health and treat the diseases of all the people, by prescribing for them prescriptions (*aqawil-i-mushtarikah*) which can be commonly endorsed, about the necessity of using the things which will preserve their health and cure their diseases, and avoiding the opposite things. He is unable to make them all physicians, because a physician is one who knows by demonstrative techniques (*bil-al-turq -al-burhaniah*) the things that preserve health and treat disease. Now suppose this man, whom we have

mentioned, goes out to the people and tells them, 'These techniques prescribed by this physician for you are not right'; and he starts discrediting them, so that they are rejected by the people. Or he says, 'They have various interpretations'; but the people neither understand these nor can endorsement be achieved by them in practice. Well, do you think that people in this condition will do any of the things which are useful for preserving health and curing disease, or that this man who has persuaded them to reject what they formerly believed in will now be able to use those (things) with them, I mean for preserving health? No, he will be not able to use those (things) with them, nor will they use them, and so they will all be led to perdition (*al-halak*).

This will happen to them if he expresses to them true interpretations (*tawilat-I-sahihah*) about those things, because of their inability to understand them; let alone if he explains to them false interpretations, because this will lead them to think that there are no such things as health which ought to be preserved and disease which ought to be treated -let alone that there are things which preserve health and cure disease. It is the same when someone explains interpretations to the common masses, and to those who are not qualified to understand them about the subtleties of the Divine law, thus such a person is corrupting them and turns people away from it; and he who turns people away from the Divine law (*Shariah*) is an unbeliever.

No doubt this analogy is certain, not just as imagery, as one may suppose. It presents a true analogy, in that the relation of the physician to the health of bodies (*sahat-ul-abdan*) is like the relation of the Law giver (*sharah*) to the health of souls (*sahatul-al-anfus*): i.e. the physician is he who seeks to preserve the health of bodies when it exists and to restore it when it is lost, while the Law giver works in the similar direction for the health of souls. This health

is what is called 'fear of Allah' (*Taqwa*). The Grand Book has told us to seek it by acts conformable to the Divine law, in several verses. Thus the Exalted has said, 'Fasting has been prescribed for you, as it was prescribed for those who were before you; perhaps you will fear Allah'. Again the Exalted has said, 'Their flesh and their blood shall not reach to Allah, but your fear shall'. 'Prayer prevents immorality and transgression'; and other verses to the same effect contained in the Grand Book. Through knowledge of the Divine law and practice according to the Divine law the Law-giver aims solely at this health; and it is from this health that salvation (*al-saadat- al-Ukhrayyah*) in the life-here-after follows, just as wretchedness (*al-shiqa-ul-al-ukhrawi*) in the future life follows from its opposite.

From this it will be clear to you that right interpretations ought not to be mentioned in books meant for common masses (*al-kutub-al-jumhuriyah*), not to talk about the false ones. The right interpretation (*al-tawil-al-sahih*) is the trust (*al-amanah*) which man was charged to hold and which he held, and from which all beings shied away, i.e. that which is mentioned in the words of the Exalted, 'We offered the trust to the heavens, the earth and the mountains', 26/ (and so on to the end of) the verse. It was due to interpretations-especially the false ones-and the supposition that such interpretations of the Divine law ought to be explained to everyone, that the sectarian divisions in the fold of Islam came to fore, with the result that each one accused the others of unbelief or heresy. Thus the Mu'tazilites interpreted many verses and Traditions allegorically, and explained their interpretations to the common masses, and the Ash'arites did the same, although they used such interpretations less frequently. As a consequence they were instrumental in making people to plunge people into schism, (*snaan*) hatred (*tabaghuz*), infighting, mutual detestation and wars

(*hurub*), tore the Divine law to shreds, and created unbridgeable gulf and divisions among them. In addition to all this, in the methods which they followed to establish their interpretations they neither went along with the common masses nor with the elite: not with the masses, because their methods were more obscure than the methods common to the majority, and not with the elite, because if these methods are inspected they are found deficient in the conditions required for demonstration, as will be understood after the slightest inspection by anyone acquainted with the conditions of demonstration. Further, many of the principles on which the Ash'arites based their knowledge are sophistical, for they deny many necessary truths (*Al-Zaruriyat*) such as the proofs of accidents (*thabut-al-aaraz*), the action of things on other things, the existence of necessary causes for effects, of substantial forms (*al-saur-al-jauhariyah*), and of secondary causes. And their theorists wronged the Muslims in this sense, that a sect of Ash'arites dubbed an anyone an unbeliever who did not attain knowledge of the existence of the Initiator of Creation (*wajud-Al-Bari*) by the methods laid down by them in their books for attaining this knowledge. But in truth, it is they who are the unbelievers and the people who have gone astray! From this point they proceeded to disagree, one group saying 'The primary obligation is theoretical study (*al-wajibat-al-nazar*)', another group saying 'It is belief'; i.e. because they did not know which are the methods common to everyone, through whose doors the Divine law has summoned all people to have their entry; they supposed that there was only one method. Thus they misunderstood the purpose of the Lawgiver (*sharah*), and were both themselves led to misguidance and led others into error.

If it is asked, 'If these methods followed by the Ash'arites and other people of vision (*ahl-al-nazar*) are not the common methods by which the Lawgiver (*Qasad-al-*

Sharah) has aimed to teach the common masses, and by which alone it is possible to teach them, then what are those methods in this Divine law of ours'? We reply: They are the methods set down in the Grand Book. For if the Grand Book is inspected, there will be found in it the three methods that are available for all the people, namely the common methods for the instruction of the majority of the people and the specific method. And if their command is considered, it becomes clear that no better common methods for the education of the common masses can be found than the methods mentioned in it.

Thus whosoever changes them, by indulging in an interpretation which is not apparently warranted, or not more apparent to everyone than they are and that rejecting their wisdom and rejecting their intended effects in procuring human salvation (*Saadat-al-insaniyah*). This is very evident from the condition of the believers of the first Islamic century (*al-sadar-al-awal*) with the condition of those who came after them. For the first believers arrived at complete virtue (*al-fazilat-al-kamilah*) and fear of Allah only by using these discourses (of the Divine law) in comparison to interpreting them allegorically; and anyone of them who did find out an interpretation did not think fit to explain it.

But when those who came after them used interpretation, their fear of Allah started decreasing, and their schisms and differences increased, their love for one another started vanishing, and they became divided into sectarian factions.

Therefore, whosoever intends to take away this innovation (*bidah*) from the Divine law should direct his attention to the Grand Book, and acquire from it the arguments concerning everything in turn that it obliges us to believe, and should exercise his level best for reaching a judgment in looking at its apparent meaning as well as he is able, without interpreting any of it, except

where the allegorical meaning is apparent in itself, i.e. commonly apparent to everyone. For if the discourses laid down in the Divine law for the education of the people are considered, it seems that in mastering their meaning one arrives at an end, beyond which none but a man of the demonstrative class (*ahl-al-burhan*) can extract from their apparent wording a meaning which is not apparent in them. This special property is not found in any other discourse.

For those religious sayings in the Grand Book which are explained to everyone have three salient characteristics (*khawas*) that give an indication about their inimitable nature (*aijaz*). (1) There exist none more perfectly self sufficient and convincing to everyone than they. (2) Their meaning admits naturally of mastery, up to a point beyond which their interpretation (when they are of a kind to have such an interpretation) can only be found out by the demonstrative class. (3) They contain admonition (*al-tanbih*) for the people of truth to arrive at the true interpretation. This specialty is not found in the doctrines of the Ash'arites nor in those of the Mu'tazilites, i.e. their interpretations do not admit of triumph (*al-nusrat*) nor contain the elements of admonition (*al-tanbih*) drawing attention to the truth, nor are they true; and this is why innovations (*al-bidah*) have been abundant. It is our desire to be able to devote our time to this objective and achieve it effectively, and if Allah grants us a respite of life we shall move steadily towards it in order to establish it in so far as this is made easy for us; and it may be that that work will serve as a starting point (*mubdaa'*) for those who come after us. For our soul is in the utmost sorrow and pain by reason of the evil desires and carnal infatuations (*al-ahwa-al-fasidah*) and deviated beliefs (*al-aitiqadat-al-muharifah*) that have entered into the Divine law, and particularly such (afflictions) as have happened to it at the hands of people who claim an affinity with

philosophy. For injuries from a friend are more severe than injuries from an enemy. I refer to the fact that philosophy is the friend and foster -sister of the Divine law; thus injuries from people related to philosophy are the severest injuries (to the Divine law), apart from the animosity, hatred and quarrels which incur between the two, which are colleagues (*al-mustabatan bil-tabaq*) by nature and lovers by substances (*al-mutahaban -bil-jauhar*) and propensity (*Al-Ghazeerah*). It has also been injured by a host of ignorant friends (*al-asdiqiyah-al-Juhal*) who claim an affinity with it: these are the sects that exist within it. But Allah directs all men aright and helps everyone to love Him; He unites their hearts in the fear of Him, and sheds from their hearts hatred and loathing by His grace and His mercy!

Certainly Allah has already lifted many of these evils (*al-sharur*), ignorant traits (*al-jahalat*) and misleading practices (*masalik-al-muzzilat*), by means of this triumphant ordinance (*al-amr-al-ghalib*). By it Allah has opened a way to many benefits (*al-khayrat*), especially to the class of people who have trodden the path of observation (*maslakul-al-nazar*) and were enthusiastic to the knowledge of the truth. This was made possible by summoning the common masses to a middle path (*tariq-I-wast*) of knowing Allah, the Glorious, a path which is elevated above the low level of the followers (*hazizil-al-muqqaladdin*) of authority, but is below the turbulence (*tashgheeb*) of the scholastics; and by admonitions of the elite (*nabh-ul-al-khawas*) to their obligation to resort to a thorough observation (*al-nazar*) of the fundamentals of the Divine law. Allah is the Giver of success and the Guide by His Goodness.

APPENDIX-I

THE QUESTION MENTIONED BY THE SHAYKH ABÛL-WALID IN THE DECISIVE TREATISE

May Allah prolong your grandeur and make your blessedness enduring, and preserve you from the piercing eye of misfortunes! By the superiority of your rational understanding and the magnanimity of your nature, you have surpassed many of those who devote their lives to these subjects, and your unadulterated insight (*nazarakum al-sadid*) has led you to become aware of the skepticism that arises about the eternal, Glorious Knowledge, on account of Its being connected with the things created by It. It is therefore our obligation, in the interests of truth and of ending your skepticism, to resolve this suspicion, after formulating it; for he who does not know how to tie a knot cannot untie it.

The skepticism makes the following necessary. If all these things were in the Knowledge of Allah, the Sanctified and Purified before they existed, are they in their condition of existence, the same, in His Knowledge as they were before their existence, or are they in their condition of existence, which is other in His Knowledge than they were before they existed? If we say that in their condition of existence they are other in Allah's Knowledge than they were before they existed, it follows that the

eternal Knowledge (*al-ilm-al-qadeem*) is amenable to change, and that when they pass from nothingness (*al-adam*) to existence, there appears into existence additional Knowledge (*ilmun zaydun*): but that is incomparable (*mustaheel*) with the eternal Knowledge. If on the other hand we say that the Knowledge of them in both conditions similar, it will be said, 'Are they in themselves', i.e. the existents which come into existence, 'the same before they exist as when they exist?' The answer will have to be 'No, in themselves they are not the same before they exist as when they exist'; otherwise the existence and nothingness (*al-maujud wal-al-maudum*) would be one and the same. If the opponent (*al-khasam*) concedes to this, he can be asked, 'Is not true knowledge (*al-ilm-al-haqeeqi*) knowledge of the existence as it really is (*maarifat-al-wajud*)?' In case he says 'Yes', it will be said, 'Consequently if the object changes in itself, the knowledge of it must also vary; otherwise it will not be known as it really is'. In this case one of two options (*amrein*) is necessary: either the eternal Knowledge varies in itself, or the things that come into existence are not known to it. But both matters are impossible for Allah the Sanctified and purified.

This skepticism (*al-shakk*) is manifested (*ma yuzhiru*) in the state of man: I mean his knowledge of non-existent things depends on the supposition of existence (*taqdeer-al-wajud*), while his knowledge of them when they are found in existence depends on existence itself. Because it is self-evident (*al-bayin binafisihi*) that the two states of knowledge are different; otherwise he would be ignorant of things' existence at the time when they exist.

It is impossible to avoid this difficulty by the usual answer of the scholastics (*mutakalimmun*) about it, that Allah, the Exalted knows things before their existence as they will be at the time of their existence, in respect of time, space and other attributes which exist with an existent and are also proper to each being. For it can be

said to them: 'Then when they come to exist, does there occur any change or not?'-Which in other words indicates the passage of the thing from non-existence to existence. If they say 'No change occurs', they are merely being supercilious (*kabaroo*). But if they say 'There does occur a change', it can be said to them: 'Then is the occurrence (*al-haduth*) of this change known to the eternal Knowledge or not?' Thus the earlier (*al-mutaqadam*) skepticism becomes compelling. In short, it can hardly be conceived that the knowledge of a thing before it exists can be identical with the knowledge of it after it exists. Such, then, is the formulation of this skepticism in its strongest possible form, as we have explained it to you in conversation.

The complete resolution of this skepticism would demand a lengthy discussion (*kalaman tawilan*); but here we intend to go into the decisive point (*nukhtatu*) of the solution. Abû Hamid (Ghazzali) in his book entitled *The Rebuttal [Tahafut -al-Falasifah]* wanted to resolve this difficulty in a way which does not seem carrying any conviction. He made a statement, the gist of which is as follows. He asserted that knowledge and the object known are related; and as one of two related things may change without the other changing in itself, this is just what seems to happen to things in the Knowledge of Allah, The Sanctified and Purified: they change in themselves, but the Knowledge of Allah, the Sanctified and purified, about them does not change. A parallel case of related things would be if a single column were first on the right of Zayd and then came to be on his left: meanwhile Zayd would not have changed in himself. But this argument is not correct. For the relation has changed in itself: the relation which was a right-handed one has become a left-handed one, and the only thing which has not changed is the subject of the relation, i.e. its bearer, Zayd. If this is so, and knowledge is the relation itself, it must necessarily

change when the object known changes, just as, when the column changes, the relation of the column to Zayd changes, coming to be a left-handed relation after having been a right-handed one.

The way to resolve this skepticism, in our view, is to recognize that the position of the eternal Knowledge (*al-ilm-al-qadeem*) with respect to existents is different from the position of originated knowledge with respect to beings, in that the existence of beings is a cause and reason for our knowledge, while the eternal Knowledge is a cause and reason for beings. If, when beings come to exist after not having existed, there occurred an addition in the eternal Knowledge such as occurs in originated knowledge, it would follow that the eternal Knowledge (*al-ilm al-qadeem*) would be an effect of beings, not their cause. Therefore there must not occur any change such as occurs in originated knowledge (*al-ilm al-muhadith*). The mistake (*al-ghalat*) in this matter has arisen simply from making an analogy between the eternal Knowledge and originated knowledge, i.e. between the supersensible and the sensible; or to make analogy of the unseen (*qiyas-al-ghayib*) on the present (*al-shahid*), and the falsity of this analogy is well known. Just as no change occurs in an agent when his act comes into being, i.e. no change which has not already occurred, so no change occurs in the eternal Glorious Knowledge when the object of Its Knowledge results from It.

Thus the skepticism is resolved, and we do not have to admit that if there occurs no change, i.e. in the eternal Knowledge, He does not know beings at the time of their coming into existence just as they are; we only have to admit that He does not know them with originated knowledge but with eternal Knowledge.

For the occurrence of change in knowledge when existents change is a condition only of knowledge that is caused by beings, i.e. originated knowledge.

Therefore eternal Knowledge is only connected with existents in a manner other than that in which originated knowledge is connected with them. This does not mean that it is not connected at all, as the philosophers have been accused of saying, in the context of this difficulty, that the Glorious One does not know particulars. Their position is not what has been imputed to them; rather they hold that He does not know particulars with originated knowledge, the occurrence of which is conditioned by their occurrence, since He is a cause of them, not caused by them as originated knowledge is. This is the furthest extent to which purification ought to be admitted.

Since the demonstration necessitates the conclusion that He knows things, because their issuing from Him is solely due to His knowing; it is not due to His being merely Existent or Existent with a certain attribute, but to His knowing, as the Exalted has said: 'Does He not know, He who created? He is the Penetrating, the Omniscient! But demonstration also compels the conclusion that He does not know things with knowledge of the same character as originated knowledge. Therefore there must be another knowledge of beings which is unqualified, the eternal Glorious Knowledge. And how is it conceivable that the Peripatetic philosophers (*al-hukama*) could have held that the eternal Knowledge does not comprehend particulars, when they held that It is the cause of warning in dreams, of revelation, and of other kinds of inspiration?

This is the way to resolve this skepticism, as it appears to us; and what has been said is incontestable and indubitable. It is Allah, who helps us to follow the right course and directs us to the truth. Peace on you, with the mercy and blessings of Allah.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1-Hourani has translated 'Mojudaat' as 'beings' which is not the complete translation of this term, which includes all the existing things not only animate ones but inanimate too .See Ibn Manzur, *Lisan al-Arab*, Dar Sadir, Beirut, vol. 111,1997, pp. 445-446 and also William Thomson Wortabet, Wortabet's Arabic -English Dictionary, Librairie du Liban, Beirut 1977, pp. 748-749

2-Jamilur Rehman translates it as - "It is obvious that the observation that the Law approves and encourages must be of the most perfect type".

3-*Tafaquh* is an Arabic term which deals with the extraction and application of Divine commandments according to the demands of times or circumstances.

4- *Ahkam* are the commandments found in the Quran or the Sunnah of the Prophet (saw)

5-Jamil al-Rehman: -"One cannot maintain that this kind of reasoning is an innovation in religion because it did not exist in the early days of Islam. For legal reasoning and its kinds are things which were invented also in later ages and no one thinks they are innovations. Such should also be our attitude towards philosophical reasoning." Hourani: - "It cannot be objected: 'This kind of study of intellectual reasoning is a heretical innovation since it did not exist among the first believers.' For the study of legal reasoning and its kinds is also something, which has, been discovered since the first believers, yet it is not considered to be a heretical innovation. So, the objector should believe the same about the study of intellectual reasoning."

6- Jamil ur Rehman : "A large number of the followers of this religion confirm philosophical reasoning, all except a small worthless minority, who argue from religious ordinances.

Hourani: - "But most (masters) of this religion support intellectual reasoning, except a small group of gross

literalists, who can be refuted by [sacred] texts."

7-. Jamilur Rehman: -"Now, such is the case. All that is wanted in an enquiry into philosophical reasoning has already been perfectly examined by the Ancients. All that is required of us is that we should go back to their books and see what they have said in this connection. If all that they say be true, we should accept it and if there be something wrong, we should be warned by it. Thus, when we have finished this kind of research we shall have acquired instruments by which we can observe the universe, and consider its general character. For so long as one does not know its general character one cannot know the created, and so long as he does not know the created, he cannot know its nature".

Hourani: - "So if such is the case, and everything that is required in the study of the subject of intellectual syllogisms has already been examined in the most perfect manner by the ancients, presumably we ought to lay hands on their books in order to study what they said about that subject; and if it is all correct we should accept it from them, while if there is anything incorrect in it, we should draw attention to that."

8-Hourani: - "geometry".

9- i.e. these branches of knowledge were also not present from the beginning but were compiled by people at a later date. (HNR)

10-. Jamiulur Rahman: -"Now, such is the case. All that is wanted in an enquiry into philosophical reasoning has already been perfectly examined by the Ancients. All that is required of us is that we should go back to their books and see what they have said in this connection. If all that they say be true, we should accept it and if there be something wrong, we should be warned by it. Thus, when we have finished this kind of research we shall have acquired instruments by which we can observe the universe, and consider its general character. For so long

as one does not know its general character one cannot know the created, and so long as he does not know the created, he cannot know its nature."

George Hourani: - "If this is so, then whenever we find in the works of our predecessors of former nations a theory about beings and a reflection on them conforming to what the conditions of demonstration require, we ought to study what they said about the matter and what they affirmed in their books. And then should accept from them gladly and gratefully whatever in these books accords with the truth, and draw attention to and warn against what does not accord with the truth, at the same time excusing them."

11-Hourani: - "For every Muslim the Law has provided a way to truth suitable to his nature, through demonstrative, dialectical or rhetorical methods.

Since all this is now established, and since we, the Muslim community, hold that this divine religion of ours is true, and that it is this religion which incites and summons us to the happiness that consists in the knowledge of God, Mighty and Majestic, and of His creation, that [end] is appointed for every Muslim by the method of assent which his temperament and nature requires. For the natures of men are on different levels with respect to [their paths to] assent. One of them comes to assent through demonstration; another comes to assent through dialectical arguments, just as firmly as the demonstrative man through demonstration, since his nature does not contain any greater capacity; while another comes to assent through rhetorical arguments, again just as firmly as the demonstrative man through demonstrative arguments."

12— Hourani: - "We can even say that a man who prevents a qualified person from studying books of philosophy, because some of the most vicious people may be thought to have gone astray through their study of

them, it is like a man who prevents a thirsty person from drinking cool, fresh water until he dies of thirst, because some people have choked to death on it. For death from water by choking is an accidental matter, but death by thirst is essential and necessary.

Moreover, this accidental effect of this art is a thing, which may also occur accidentally from the other arts. To how many lawyers has law been a cause of lack of piety and immersion in this world! Indeed we find most lawyers in this state, although their art by its essence calls for nothing but practical virtue. Thus it is not strange if the same thing that occurs accidentally in the art which calls for practical virtue should occur accidentally in the art which calls for intellectual virtue.

If the apparent meaning of Scripture conflicts with demonstrative conclusions it must be interpreted allegorically, i.e. metaphorically.

If there is agreement between the demonstrative observation and the Divine law, well and good but in the case of opposition we feel the need of elucidation which means we will try to create a comparison between the Divine law and the ingredient of reason. Here the meaning of elucidation is to interfere with its real indication and towards its metaphorical evidence and to apply it in this manner so that in its practice there is no transgression in the practice of the language of the Arab people and the interpretation; secondly, the interpretation is not formerly resorted to for some other interpretation that is either in both topics there is an adherent need to find similitude."

13-Hourani: - "For every Muslim the Law has provided a way to truth suitable to his nature, through demonstrative, dialectical or rhetorical methods.

Since all this is now established, and since we, the Muslim community, hold that this divine religion of ours is true, and that it is this religion which incites and summons us to the happiness that consists in the

knowledge of God, Mighty and Majestic, and of His creation, that [end] is appointed for every Muslim by the method of assent which his temperament and nature require. For the natures of men are on different levels with respect to [their paths to] assent. One of them comes to assent through demonstration; another comes to assent through dialectical arguments, just as firmly as the demonstrative man through demonstration, since his nature does not contain any greater capacity; while another comes to assent through rhetorical arguments, again just as firmly as the demonstrative man through demonstrative arguments.

14- Hourani: - "So we affirm definitely that whenever the conclusion of a demonstration is in conflict with the apparent meaning of Shariah, that apparent meaning admits of allegorical interpretation according to the rules for such interpretation in Arabic. This proposition is questioned by no Muslim and doubted by no believer. But its certainty is immensely increased for those who have had close dealings with this idea and put it to the test, and made it their aim to reconcile the assertions of intellect and tradition. Indeed we may say that whenever a statement in Scripture conflicts in its apparent meaning with a conclusion of demonstration, if Scripture is considered carefully, and the rest of its contents searched page by page, there will invariably be found among the expressions of Scripture something which in its apparent meaning bears witness to that allegorical interpretation or comes close to bearing witness."

15-Hourani has translated '*Rasikhoon fil Ilm*' as 'learned' and '*al-Twail Al-Jamih*' as 'deeper study', which is not an accurate English rendering of these terms. (HNR)

16-Hourani: - "Ghâzâlî's charge of unbelief against Fârâbî and Ibn Sinâ, for asserting the world's eternity and God's ignorance of particulars and denying bodily resurrection, is only tentative, not definite.

You may object: 'If we ought not to call a man an unbeliever for violating unanimity in cases of allegorical interpretation, because no unanimity is conceivable in such cases, what do you say about the Muslim philosophers, like Abû Nasr.... and Ibn Sinâ? For Abû Hamid called them both definitely unbelievers in the book of his known as *The disintegration* [Tahfut],... on three counts: their assertions of the pre-eternity of the world and that God the Exalted does not know particulars' (may He be Exalted far above that [ignorance]!), 'and their allegorical interpretation of the passages concerning the resurrection of bodies and states of existence in the next life.'

We answer: It is apparent from what he said on the subject that his calling them both unbelievers on these counts was not definite, since he made it clear in *The book of the distinction* that calling people unbelievers for violating unanimity can only be tentative.]

17-Hourani:-"Such a charge cannot be definite, because there has never been a consensus against allegorical interpretation. The Qur'an itself indicates that it has inner meanings which it is the special function of the demonstrative class to understand.]

[Moreover, it is evident from what we have said that a unanimous agreement cannot be established in questions of this kind, because of the reports that many of the early believers of the first generation, as well as others, have said that there are allegorical interpretations which ought not to be expressed except to those who are qualified to receive allegories. These are 'those who are well grounded in science'; for we prefer to place the stop after the words of God the Exalted 'and those who are well grounded in science', because if the scholars did not understand allegorical interpretation, there would be no superiority in their assent which would oblige them to a belief in Him not found among the unlearned. God has

described them as those who believe in Him, and this can only be taken to refer to the belief, which is based on demonstration; and this [belief] only occurs together with the science of allegorical interpretation.”]

18-Hourani: -“On the question of the world, the ancient philosophers agree with the *Ash’arites* that it is originated and coeval with time. The Peripatetic only disagree with the *Ash’arites* and the Platonists in holding that past time is infinite. This difference is insufficient to justify a charge of unbelief.] 99

[Anyhow, the apparent meaning of Scripture is that there was a being and time before God created the present being and time. Thus the theologians’ interpretation is allegorical and does not command unanimous agreement.]

19-Hourani: - “The class of being which is between these two extremes is that which is not made from anything and not preceded by time, but which is brought into existence by something, i.e. by an agent.”

20- Hourani: - “Anyhow, the apparent meaning of Scripture is that there was a being and time before God created the present being and time. Thus the theologians’ interpretation is allegorical and does not command unanimous agreement.”

21-The statement of Ibn Rushd that Allah was existing with absolutely something else with Him is rejected by a tradition of the Prophet (SAW) which mentions that Allah was there when nothing else was existing with Him.(HNR)

22- Hourani says that the texts about the future life fall into the third category (texts falling between the other two), since demonstrative scholars do not agree whether to take them in their apparent meaning or interpret them allegorically. Either is permissible. But it is inexcusable to deny the fact of a future life altogether.

23-Hourani: -"But anyone who is not a man of learning is obliged to take these passages in their apparent meaning, and allegorical interpretation of them is for him unbelief because it leads to unbelief. That is why we hold that, for anyone whose duty it is to believe in the apparent meaning, allegorical interpretation is unbelief, because it leads to unbelief. Anyone of the interpretative class who discloses such [an interpretation] to him is summoning him to unbelief, and he who summons to unbelief is an unbeliever.

Therefore allegorical interpretations ought to be set down only in demonstrative books, because if they are in demonstrative books no one encounters them but men of the demonstrative class. But if they are set down in other than demonstrative books and one deals with them by poetical, rhetorical or dialectical methods, as Abû Hamid does, then he commits an offence against the Law and against philosophy, even though the fellow intended nothing but good. For by this procedure he wanted to increase the number of learned men, but in fact he increased the number of the corrupted not of the learned! As a result, one group came to slander philosophy, another to slander religion, and another to reconcile the [first] two [groups]. It seems that this [last] was one of his objects in his books; an indication that he wanted by this [procedure] to arouse minds is that he adhered to no one doctrine in his books but was an Ash'arite with the Ash'arites, a Sufi with the Sufis and a philosopher with the philosophers, so that he was like the man in the verse

'One day a Yamani, if I meet a man of Yaman,
And if I meet a Ma'addi, I'm an 'Adnani."

24-And not 'demonstrative arguments' as translated by Hourani, because for arguments the term *hujaj* is more appropriate.

25-And not the symbols as translated by Hourani.

According to Aristotelian logic, demonstrative proof

that affords necessary, absolute truth must be distinguished from dialectical and rhetorical proofs that only yield probability. The term *Tasdeeqh* is a translation of the Stoic term, assent, and it is synonymous with *Tahqeeqh*, but whereas for the Stoics assent may be given to the single representation, for the Aristotelian logicians in Islam, assent refers always to a proposition. The Arabs divide logic into two parts, the one treating of concepts, *tasawwur*, the other of judgements in so far as they refer to the exterior world, *Tasdeeqh*, and c.f. Avicenna, *Salvation*, ed.H.1331, P-3, see Van Den Bergh, op.cit. Vol.11, p-1

26-Hourani has translated *Amanah* as deposit that is not the correct rendering of the term.

APPENDIX-II

SOME REFLECTIONS ON IBN RUSHD'S THOUGHT AND WORKS

Dr. Aadil Amin Kak

In the first of these works, *The Decisive Treatise*, Ibn Rushd sets out the appropriate methodology for the solution of the problem of the relation of religion (Shariah) and philosophy (Hikmah), and more specifically the way in which philosophical or logical methods of reasoning can be used in religious controversies, or applied to the interpretation of the texts of Scripture. He begins by defining philosophy as *The investigation of existing entities in so far as they point to the Maker; I mean, in so far as they are made, since existing entities exhibit the Maker.* It follows, he goes on to argue, that the study of philosophy is indeed recommended by the religious law (Shariah), as appears from a number of Qur'anic verses, such as 59:2, which urges people of understanding to reflect and verse 7:184, which asks: *Have they not considered the Kingdom of the heavens and the earth and all the things God has created?* For surely, Ibn Rushd asserts, reflection and consideration are forms of logical reasoning or deduction (qiyas), or the extraction of the unknown from the known. He then proceeds to rebut the claim of the literalists and traditionalists that the use

of deduction, which the first generation of Muslim scholars have shunned, is an "innovation" on the ground that juridical deduction, which is analogous to logical deduction, was subsequently practiced by the next generation and was regarded as perfectly legitimate.

Next, Ibn Rushd proceeds to ask whether demonstration (*burhan*), which is the highest form of logical deduction, is compatible with the explicit or implicit prescriptions of Scripture (*Sharia*). His answer is that, like the jurist who draws out or deduces his legal decisions from the sacred texts by recourse to interpretation, the philosopher is perfectly justified in resorting to interpretation in his attempt to elicit, by means of rational deduction, the nature of reality and the way in which it leads to the knowledge of the Maker. He then defines interpretation as the act of eliciting the real connotation of (Scriptural) terms from their figurative connotation without violating the rules of the Arabic language. However, it should be noted that not all the texts of Scripture (i.e. the Qur'an) admit of interpretation; only those parts of it which the Qur'an itself has designated as ambiguous (*mutashabihat*), as against those parts which it has designated as "sound" or unambiguous (*muhôkamat*) in verses 3:5—7. With respect to the former the Qur'an stipulates that their interpretation is imperative, but only God and those well-grounded in knowledge are qualified to interpret it. By those "well-grounded in knowledge", Ibn Rushd is categorical, only the philosophers or "people of demonstration" are intended, followed, in the order of their aptitudes to understand the intent of Scripture, by the "dialectical" class (or the *Mutakallimun*), and the "rhetorical" class (or the public at large). This threefold division of mankind is confirmed, according to Ibn Rushd, by the Qur'an itself which states in verse 16:125, addressing the Prophet: Call to the way of your Lord with wisdom and mild

exhortation and argue with them in the best manner." The second treatise, or Exposition (*al-Kashf*) gives, as a sequel to this methodology, a substantive statement of those articles of faith which are essential for salvation, or as Ibn Rushd puts it, without which the faith (of the Muslim believer) is not complete. This statement, which is reminiscent of similar statements found in Medieval Scholastic treatises, such as St. Thomas Aquinas's *Summa Theologica*, opens with a chapter on the demonstration of God's existence, followed by a discussion of God's unity, His attributes and His transcendence or freedom from imperfection. This first part is then followed by a discussion of divine actions, which include the creation of the world, the commissioning of Messengers, the meaning of the divine decree and predestination, divine justice, and the nature of resurrection. The book closes with a discussion of the rules of interpretation, which had been at the center of the first volume or *The Decisive Treatise*, already discussed. Here Ibn Rushd reiterates his thesis that the statements of Scripture are either explicit, and hence do not call for any interpretation, or ambiguous and hence should be interpreted exclusively by the learned, or "those well-grounded in knowledge", as the Qur'an has put it. However, this interpretation should not be divulged to the general public, who are not able to fathom its meaning.

Earlier in *The Exposition* Ibn Rushd had argued that none of the Muslim sects, whether the literalists, the Ash'arites, the Mu'tazilites or the Esoterics (i.e. the Sufis), who accuse each other of innovation or heresy, are found upon close scrutiny to have conformed, in their interpretations or claims, to the intent of the lawgiver (the Prophet) and are therefore all guilty of innovation or heresy. This leads him to undertake at the outset to draw up a list of those articles of faith, which are not open to question and to define the rules of sound interpretation.

The first rule is that none of the Islamic sects mentioned above is competent to formulate the principles of sound interpretation; only the philosophers or the learned are. The second rule is that Scripture, which addresses the three classes of men, the learned, the theologians and the common people, actually uses the three corresponding methods of proof, the demonstrative, the dialectical, and the rhetorical, to ensure that the intention of the lawgiver is understood by them all. The third rule is that interpretation should be properly understood or applied. According to Ibn Rushd, false interpretations are at the root of the rise of heretical sects in Islam, totaling, according to a prophetic tradition (Hadith 72), of which only one was destined to be saved.

The line of demarcation between those parts of Scripture that may and those parts that may not be interpreted and should be accepted by the masses or common people at their face value is clearly drawn by Ibn Rushd. It is evident from his various statements in *The Exposition* and elsewhere that interpretation is to be sought; firstly, in those cases which have not been the object of consensus (ijma';) by the community; secondly, where the statements of Scripture appear to be in conflict with each other; and thirdly, where those statements appear to be in conflict with the principles of philosophy or natural reason. Ibn Rushd, who was committed to the complete harmony of religious and philosophical truth, proceeds next to set forth the principal propositions around which consensus can be achieved without violating any rational or philosophical precepts, and which can be regarded as constituting the substance of an acceptable Islamic Credo, so to speak.

The list begins with those propositions that purport to demonstrate the existence of God and his unity. Here Ibn Rushd reviews and then rejects the favorite arguments of the Mutakallimun, including the Ash'arites, which rest

upon the premise of the temporality of the universe (hôuduth). This argument which goes back to the philosopher al-Kindi (d.c.866), who was known for his Mu'tazilite sympathies, and beyond him to John Philoponus, known in the Arabic sources as the Grammarian (d.586), states that the world, being created in time (hoadith or muhådath) must have a Creator or Originator (Muhdith) who created it in time. The first premise of this argument, as Ibn Rushd observes, is supposed to be the corollary of the thesis generally adhered to by the Mutakallimun that the world is made up of indivisible particles or atoms, which by nature are evanescent. However, this thesis, according to him, is far from being demonstrable in a manner accessible to the general public or even skilled logicians. The second argument, favored by the Ash'arites, as propounded by al-Juwayni (d.1086), Al-Ghazali's illustrious teacher, is the argument from contingency, which Avicenna (d.1037) himself had adumbrated. It states that the world's being contingent (*ja'iz* or *mumkin*) requires that there be a determinant who is not contingent, whom Avicenna designated the Necessary Being. Ibn Rushd rejects this argument on the ground that the major premise, the contingency of the world, is purely rhetorical and rests on the repudiation of the universal principle of causality, which entails that the world is causally ordered in a way which manifests the wisdom of its Creator. Thus, whoever repudiates this principle, not only repudiates that wisdom, but is unable in fact to offer a coherent proof of God's existence. He is, consequently, forced to concede that the world is the product of the blind forces of chance, or simply random (*'Ittifaq*).

Significantly, Ibn Rushd proposes two alternative proofs for the existence of God, that of providence and that of invention, to both of which "the Precious Book" (the Qur'an) has drawn attention, as he puts it, in a variety

of verses. The former rests on the premise that all existing entities here below have come to exist in order to subserve the interests of mankind and for this reason are necessarily due to a willing and intending Agent and cannot be the product of chance. The other argument rests on the premise that everything in the world is "invented" or made by an Inventor or Maker, who is God. Ibn Rushd then goes on to argue that the knowledge of God as Inventor or Maker of the world is not possible, unless one knows the reality of things, whereby the reality of invention exhibited in all existing entities is revealed to him.

II

With respect to the attributes of God, explicitly given in the "Precious Book", they are in fact the so-called seven attributes of perfection found in man; namely, life, knowledge, power, will, hearing, sight, and speech, which attributes the Mutakallimun, whether Mu'tazilites or Ash'arites, actually concurred in. However, Ibn Rushd disagrees with both sects regarding the mode of predicating them of God. Thus the Ash'arites hold that the attributes of knowledge and will are eternal, adding that God knows created entities by means of an eternal knowledge and wills them by means of an eternal will. Both notions, according to Ibn Rushd, are logically absurd. For knowledge is consequent on the existence of its object and so is will. It follows that God knows an entity when it comes to exist or ceases to exist as He wills it to exist or to cease to exist. To contend that God knows and wills entities created in time by means of an eternal knowledge and will leaves unexplained the lapse of time intervening between God's will to create an entity in time and its actual coming to exist in time, in the light of God's infinite power. The explicit teaching of Scripture, according to Ibn Rushd, is simply that created entities are known to God

and willed by Him at the very moment He wishes them to exist; it does not determine whether such knowing and willing are temporal or eternal. Such knowledge and will are entirely different from our own and the mode of predicating them of God is unknown to us, as he has stated in *The Incoherence*. In *The Decisive Treatise* and *The Appendix* he states that God's knowledge of the object is the cause of that object, whereas our knowledge is the effect of the object.

As for speech, around which controversy raged for centuries between the Mu'tazilites, who held that God's speech, as embodied in the Qur'an, is created or temporal, and the Hôanbalites and the Ash'arites, who believed it to be uncreated or eternal, Ibn Rushd's position is that speech is the corollary of knowledge and action. God, as the supreme Knower and Maker, must be capable of speech, and this speech is revealed to mankind through the prophets, either directly or indirectly through the intermediation of angels. However, there is an additional part of God's speech, which He communicates to the learned, who are the heirs of the prophets in the form of demonstrative knowledge,⁷ by which Ibn Rushd undoubtedly meant the highest form of philosophical discourse. On the question of the status of the Qur'an, which is God's speech, Ibn Rushd distinguishes between the meanings of the words denoting this speech and the words we use in speech; the former are created by God, the latter are our own work, "by God's leave".

With respect to the two attributes of hearing and seeing, Ibn Rushd takes the line that God must possess those two attributes, by reason of the fact that hearing and sight bear on certain apprehended properties which pertain to existing entities, but are not apprehended by reason. God, being the Creator or Maker of these entities must be capable of knowing everything pertaining to them and must, accordingly, possess the two attributes of

hearing and sight, whereby they are thoroughly known, not only as objects of thought, but as objects of sense, as well.

III

The first part of The Exposition, as we have seen, deals with God's existence and his attributes, or *de Deo Uno*, as the Medieval Latin Scholastic treatises have it; the second part deals with His actions. Under this rubric, Ibn Rushd deals with five questions: the creation of the world, the commissioning of prophets, divine justice, the divine decree, and resurrection.

With respect to the first question, Ibn Rushd inveighs against the Ash'arite methods of proving that the world is the creation of God on the grounds that they are neither demonstrative, nor suited to the learned, "common", or general public, since they base those proofs on complex premises which confuse, rather than instruct the latter, and fall short of the criteria of demonstration laid down by the former. The method Scripture itself has adopted is actually the simple method commonly agreed and resting on the principle of providence. The crux of this method is the observation that everything in the world is ordered according to a fixed causal pattern which is conducive to serving the universal goal of the existence and well-being of mankind, as the Qur'an itself asserts in a series of verses. By repudiating the principle of causality, as we have seen, the Ash'arites have abandoned the world to the vagaries of chance and cast doubt on divine wisdom, which is revealed in this orderly pattern and is the key to demonstrating the existence of its Author.

The question of the duration of the world, which was at the center of Al-Ghazali's attack on the Muslim Neoplatonists Al-Farabi and Avicenna, and beyond them Aristotle, gives Ibn Rushd the opportunity to counter Al-Ghazali's arguments and reassert Aristotle's thesis that

the world is eternal and indestructible. In *The Decisive Treatise*, he argues that the differences between Al-Ghazzali and the Ash'arites, on the one hand, and "the ancient philosophers", with Aristotle at their head, on the other, are purely semantic, and are not so divergent as to justify the charges of irreligion (Kufr) leveled at the philosophers by Al-Ghazzali. In fact, the Ash'arites, contrary to their allegations, cannot produce a single Qur'anic verse in support of their thesis that the world has a beginning in time. Rather the contrary, many Qur'anic verses appear to assert that the form the world is created in reality, but its existence and temporal duration are continuous a parte ante and a parte post. Thus, verse 11: 7, which states that it is He who created the heavens and the earth, while His Throne rested on water, implies on the surface of it that the Throne, water, and the time which measures their duration existed prior to the moment of creation. Similarly, verse 41: 11, which states: Then he arose to heaven which consisted of smoke, implies that the heaven was created from something already existing, which is smoke.

In *The Exposition*, Ibn Rushd justifies the use of such language on the ground that Scripture, in its attempt to instruct the common people, has resorted to the method of "sensuous representation" accessible to them, since creation out of nothing and in no time is something which the common people, and even the learned, are unable to grasp. In such cases it is the duty of the learned to interpret such representations; that of the common people to accept them at their face value. Ibn Rushd, who never in fact abandoned the Aristotelian thesis of an eternal universe, whilst willing to entertain the Islamic concept of a created universe, believed it necessary to distinguish between continuous (da'im) and discontinuous (munqati') creation, as he has put it in *The Incoherence*. The former, the eternal creation is certainly more appropriate where

the actions of the Omnipotent Creator are concerned, since it is inconceivable that an interval or lapse of time should intervene between His willing and His action, as is the case with finite agents.

IV

On the question of commissioning prophets or divine Messengers to mankind and the probative grounds of authenticating their claims to be genuine Messengers or emissaries of God, Ibn Rushd is critical of the Ash'arite thesis that miracle is an essential warrant of the truthfulness of prophetic claims. The Qur'an itself, he argues, confirms this point, as appears from those verses in which the Prophet is said to have declined to meet the challenge of his hearers to cause springs to gush out from the ground for us (Qur'an 17: 90), on the ground that he was nothing other than a human messenger" (17: 93). This is confirmed by God's own refusal, in verse 17: 60, to send down miraculous "signs" to sway the unbelievers. The only miracle the Prophet resorted to in summoning mankind to believe in his message was "the Precious Book" whose miraculousness is affirmed in such verses as 17: 89, which challenges men and jinn to come up with the like of this Qur'an, without any prospect of success, even if they were to back one another up.

The evidence for the miraculousness of the Qur'an is then given by Ibn Rushd as follows. First, the theoretical and practical prescriptions that it has laid down are not the product of human ingenuity, but rather of divine revelation, especially since the Prophet who transmitted them to mankind was illiterate. Compared to the prescriptions embodied in the Scriptures of Jews and Christians, those of the Qur'an are far superior. Secondly, the prognostications embodied in the Qur'an confirm the Prophet's claims. (Significantly, Ibn Rushd does not give any instances of those prognostications, unlike the

majority of the commentators and biographers of the Prophet.) Thirdly, the Qur'an's literary excellence sets it apart from any product of the pen of the greatest Arab literary masters and cannot for that reason be the product of human deliberation or reflection. Ibn Rushd, then, concludes the discussion of miracles by comparing the miracles attributed to Jesus and other 'divine messengers', such as Moses, to the Qur'an, Muhôammad's greatest miracle. For him, the miraculousness of the former is extrinsic, whereas that of the latter is intrinsic, and this proves conclusively that it is superior.

The third and fourth questions of the second part of The Exposition deal with two related issues of moral theology, predestination and divine justice. With respect to the first question, Ibn Rushd rightly observes that the evidence of Scripture (Shar') is found upon close scrutiny to be conflicting. Thus we find in both the Qur'an and the Traditions of the Prophet statements which appear to support free will or acquisition (iktisab, kasb) and its opposite. This has led to the rise of three rival sects; the Mu'tazilites, who support free will; the Determinists, who deny it; and the Ash'arites, who tried to mediate between the two parties and introduced in the process the concept of "acquisition". What is more, observes Ibn Rushd, even the evidence of reason appears to be conflicting, due to the diametrically opposed arguments which can be advanced in support of both free will and predestination. Thus determinism (jabr) may be criticized on the ground that it renders religious obligation meaningless and any provision for the morrow, in the expectation of bringing about certain advantages and warding off certain disadvantages, entirely irrational. This in turn would render all human arts and crafts futile. To reconcile the two views, as Scripture itself appears to demand, we should understand, as Ibn Rushd argues, that human actions are the product of those internal faculties which

God has implanted in us as well as those external forces which allow for the realization of our deliberately chosen aims. It is because those forces operate in accordance with a thoroughly rigorous causal pattern which God has imposed on the whole natural order, and which is in fact synonymous with the "Preserved Tablet" or the divine decree, that our own actions become possible and accord with our own deliberation and choice.

In defending the principle of causality against the attacks of Al-Ghazzali and the Ash'arites in general, who held that this principle conflicts with the consensus of Muslims that God is the Sole Agent, and accordingly is at liberty to act freely and miraculously in the world, Ibn Rushd argues that the term "agent" admits of two senses, real and figurative. God is indeed the real and ultimate Agent, who operates by means of those figurative, secondary agents or causes that He not only creates, but preserves in existence. Both reason and observation confirm this. For, but for the specific natures and properties pertaining to existing entities as we know them, on the one hand, and the influence of external, physical agencies, such as the stars, wind, rain, and sea, on the other, it would not be possible for plants, animals or humans to subsist, let alone to act effectively in the world. The Qur'an itself confirms this, in those verses which speak of God subjecting day and night, the sun and the moon and whatever is in heavens and on earth to mankind⁷ (Qur'an 28: 73; 45:12; 14:33) as an instance of His mercy.

For all these reasons, Ibn Rushd concludes that neither the Mu'tazilite (or libertarian) position nor the Hanbalite (or deterministic) position is tenable. The Ash'arite position, which purports to mediate between the two positions, is meaningless. For it rests almost exclusively on the alleged difference between the voluntary movement of the hand, which they call acquired or free,

and the compulsory movement of convulsion. However, since neither movement, according to them, is due to us, but rather to God, the difference between the two movements turns out to be semantic or even fictitious; it does not contribute in the least to the solution of the problem of free will or acquisition.

With respect to divine justice, the Ash'arites, according to Ibn Rushd, have taken the position which is repugnant to both reason and religion, that justice and injustice are entirely dependent on divine commands and prohibitions, so that no action is just or unjust in itself. It follows on this view that the worst sins, such as blasphemy or disobeying God's orders, would have been just had God commanded them. The Qur'an itself, however, has asserted repeatedly that God is not unjust to his servants" (verses 8:53; 22: 10 etc.) and elsewhere that Surely, God is not unjust to people, but people are unjust to themselves" (10:45).

Ibn Rushd next examines the arguments advanced by the Ash'arites in support of their view that God is entirely at liberty to do what He pleases. They refer to the statements in the Qur'an which speak of God leading astray and guiding aright. Those statements, he argues, should not be taken at face value, because they are contradicted by those other verses, such as verse 39: 9, which asserts, that God does not approve of disbelief in his servants, and hence will not lead them astray. The right interpretation of the verses which speak of God leading astray or guiding aright is that they refer to His prior will which stipulated that there shall exist among the innumerable variety of existing entities some wayward people; I mean, some who are disposed by their own natures to go astray, and that they are driven thereto by what surrounds them of internal and external causes that lead them astray see p. 117. Thus the responsibility for leading people astray is not God's, but rather their own

natures, the external causes operating on them or the two together.

Ibn Rushd does not question the thesis that God is the Creator of both good and evil; he simply argues that this thesis should be properly understood. God, in fact, creates the good for its own sake, whereas He creates evil for the sake of the good that may ensue upon it, so that His creating evil cannot be said to be unjust. Add to this the fact that if we compare the evil ensuing upon the creation of a certain entity, such as fire, with the parallel good, we will find that the good is definitely preponderant. The common people should be urged to accept the view that God creates both good and evil at its face value, lest they should question the measure of God's power and in particular whether He is capable of creating that which is absolutely good or free from evil. That possibility is, for Ibn Rushd, logically foreclosed, since the creation of the absolutely good, or God's equal, is logically impossible.

VI

The last substantive question dealt with in *The Exposition* is that of resurrection or survival after death (ma'ad), which had been at the center of the controversy between the philosophers and the Mutakallimun from the earliest times and which Al-Ghazzali regarded as the third grievous error of the philosophers, especially those, like Avicenna, who stopped short of bodily resurrection. For Ibn Rushd, survival after death is something upon whose reality all religious scriptures are in accord with the demonstrations of the learned. The various religious scriptures, however, disagree regarding the mode of such survival. Some have regarded it as spiritual, pertaining to the soul only; others to both soul and body. However, the difference between the various scriptures turns on the kind of "representations" they resort to in speaking of the

fate of the soul after death, which in perfect agreement with the philosophers, they all regard as immortal. Thus, some religious creeds represent the pleasures and pains in store for the soul in the hereafter in gross sensuous terms, such as the Garden and Hellfire, because such representations are more effective in compelling the assent of the general public, as is the case with this our own religion, which is Islam. Other religions (presumably Christianity) resort to "spiritual representations", which are less effective in compelling the assent of the common people.

Ibn Rushd proceeds next to distinguish three categories of Muslim sects, regarding the mode of survival after death. (1) Some Muslims, he observes, have held that the mode of man's existence in the hereafter is identical with his existence in this world with one difference; namely, that the former is permanent, while the latter is ephemeral; (2) others have held that the mode of man's existence in the afterlife is spiritual, as the Sufis have held; (3) still others have held that the corporeal existence of mankind in the hereafter is different from the corporeality of the present life.

The last view appears to be the one with which Ibn Rushd is in sympathy and is characterized by him as the one appropriate to the *philosophers*; that is, the philosophers. It is absurd, he argues, that the same body which has disintegrated at death and turned into dust; which changed into a vegetable, which was consumed by a male, and subsequently turned into semen, which gave rise to an infant, can be resurrected unchanged after death. It is more reasonable to assume that the resurrected body is analogous to, rather than identical with, the terrestrial body. Ibn Rushd concedes, in conclusion, that the obligation incumbent on the believer is to assent to that mode of resurrection commensurate with his understanding, so long as he does not question the fact

of resurrection, or as he consistently says, survival after death (ma'ad). The Qur, he adds, confirms this survival, an which speaks in verse 39: 43 of the death of the soul as something analogous to sleep. What is corrupted in both cases is actually the organ or instrument (Allah), not the soul itself. He even compares this view to Aristotle's statement in *De Anima* (408 b21), that were the old man given an eye similar to that of the young man, he would be able to see just as well as the young man. The inference here appears to be that the body is to the soul what the instrument or organ is to its user, as Plato had actually held. Aristotle himself had struggled hard in *De Anima* to rid himself of this view of his master.

As mentioned earlier, the whole treatise closes with an appendix On the Canon of Interpretation, in which Ibn Rushd lists the cases in which interpretation of scriptural passages is permissible and those in which it is not. He inveighs in this connection against those, who like Al-Ghazzali, were unwilling to recognize this distinction and consequently the class of people to whom those interpretations may be divulged. The result has been that they led the common people astray and contributed to the rise of sectarian strife in Islam. He expresses the wish at this point to have the opportunity to discuss the totality of the statements of Scripture and elicit in the process what should be interpreted or not, and if interpreted, to whom (such interpretation) should be addressed; I mean, regarding those passages of the Qur'an and the traditions of the prophet [Hadith] (see p. 131).

Ibn Rushd never fulfilled this wish, as far as we know, but *The Exposition* stands out nonetheless as a remarkable instance of his judicious and rigorous application of the method of interpretation and remains unparalleled in the whole history of Islam. Of his predecessors, only Al-Kindi (d.c.866) comes closest to shouldering this task of scriptural interpretation, upon which the Hôanbalites, the

Malikites, and, to a lesser extent, the Ash'arites had frowned. Al-Kindi's performance in that respect, at least as far as those of his works which have reached us are concerned, pales into insignificance when compared to this determined effort of Ibn Rushd to apply the canons of rational discourse to the problematic or ambiguous passages of Scripture.

Index

- Abu al-Walid Muhammad bin Rushd, [7](#)
 Ahmad's, [86](#)
AlAlim at Rasikh, [85](#)
 Al Risalah al Qudsiyah, [65](#)
 Alexander of Aphrodisias, [16](#)
 Al-Ghazzili, [17](#), [19](#), [30](#), [38](#), [45](#), [82](#), [194](#), [200](#)
Al-ilm al-muhadith, [176](#)
 Ali Syed Amir, [2](#)
 Al-Kindi, [2](#), [203](#)
Al-Masbooq bil Zaman, [114](#)
Al-Maznum Ala Ghair Ahlihi, [62](#)
Al-Nazam-al-Zahir, [157](#)
Al-tawil-al-Yaqeeni, [165](#)
 Al-Qudeen-al-Haqiqi, [114](#)
 Al-Quran, [132](#)
Al-zaman-al-Mazi, [151](#)
 Allah, [149](#), [170-173](#)
 Arab City of Baghdad, [6](#)
 Arabian Peninsula, [1](#)
 Arab Philosophy, [6](#)
 Arab Students went to Takshashila in North India, [4](#)
 Aristotle's Commentary, [35](#)
 Aristotle's Organs, [3](#)
 Aryan Culture of Persia, [5](#)
 Astronomy, [36](#)
- ## B
- Bammate Professor, [43](#)
 Basic Thought, [37](#)
 Bello Iysa, [134](#)
Burhan, [53](#)
- ## C
- Christian Europe, [4](#)
 Christian Theologians, [41](#)
 Contributions of Ibn Rushd, [12](#)
- ## D
- Daminat al-Ilmal Ilahi*, [122](#)
 Day of Resurrection Death, [76](#)
De Anima, [202](#)

Divine Law, [63](#), [137](#), [172](#)
 Doctrines of Islamic, [37](#)

E

Encyclopaedia of Science, [3](#)
 European Thought, [40](#)

F

Fasl al-Muqal, [52](#)
Faqiyah ajal allama sadr Kabir qazi aadal, [135](#)

G

Glorious God's [149](#)
 Glorious Knowledge, [173](#)
 God, [2](#), [12](#), [30](#), [41](#), [56](#), [67](#), [74](#),
[87](#), [96](#), [99](#), [101](#), [117](#), [122](#),
[182](#), [192-93](#), [200](#)
 God and the World, [17](#)
 God the Almighty, [36](#)
 Grand Mosque of Cordoba, [7](#)
 Grand Quzi, [7](#)
 Greatest Jurist and the Chief
 of Justice, [135](#)
 Greek Philosophical, [83](#), [89](#),
[99](#)
 Guilanme Alfred, [37](#)

H

Hadith, [55](#)
 Hadith of zarain, [117](#)
 Hafiz Abu Muhammad Ibn
 Rizq, [7](#)
 Hamid Abu, [70](#)

Hasan Abul, [4](#)
 Hassain Imam Bin, [117](#)
[Hisjra](#), [1](#)
 History of Islam, [1](#), [202](#)
 Hourani, [180](#)
Hujjat at Haq, [65](#)

I

Ibn al-Abber, [37](#)
 Ibn Arabi, [8](#)
 Ibn Massara, [8](#)
 Ibn Rushad, [60](#), [63](#), [68](#), [112](#),
[116](#), [195](#), [201](#), [203](#)
Ijtihad, [117](#)
 Ilmul al-kalam, [49](#)
 Imam of the Grand Mosque
 of Cordoba, [7](#)
 Imperial Library of the Emir,
[6](#)
Inha-i-al-turq, [162](#)
 Indo-Aryan Culture, [5](#)
 Islamik Credo, [190](#)
 Islamik Ideology, [1](#)
 Islamik World, [1](#)

J

Jamil-al-Rahman, [1](#)
Jawahir al-Quran, [64](#)
 Juntas, [34](#)
 Jurisprudence, [36](#)

K

Kafir, [148](#)
 Kar Aadil Amin Dr., [1](#), [187](#)
Kitabul-al-Ilm of Ihya ulum Al-

Dinjoy knowledge of Allah, [173](#)

L

Law, [107](#)
Lord, [118](#)
London, [134](#)

M

Mahadi-ul-Moujudat, [3](#)
Manahij al Addilah, [52](#), [68](#)
Messenger of God, [103](#)
Middle Ages in Europe, [6](#)
Middle Commentary on Plato's Republic, [35](#)
Montada Josep Puig, [82](#), [125](#)
Moral and Political Philosophy, [23](#)
Music, [36](#)
Muslim Community, [139](#)
Muslim Contribution to Civilization, [43](#)
Muslim Neoplatonists Al-Farabi and Avicenna, [194](#)
Muslim Society, [7](#)

N

Nadvi Abul Hassan Ali, [125](#)
Nizah-i-al-Lafzia, [113](#)

O

Overwhelming Mass, [57](#)

P

Philosophy, [15](#)
Philosophy of Language, [29](#)
Plato, [39](#)
Prince of Alappo, [3](#)

Q

Qudim, [114](#)
Qasimul Batiniyyah, [65](#)
Quzi ul-quzat of all Andalusia, [3](#)
Qiyaas-i-Aquli, [137](#)
Quran, [1](#), [26](#), [39](#), [55](#), [69](#), [78](#), [91](#), [94](#), [106](#), [182](#), [196](#)
Quranic Concepts, [34](#)
Quranic Verses, [92-93](#), [112](#)
Qurani Point of View, [116](#)
Quran or the Sunnah of the Prophet, [178](#)
Quswa, [93](#)

R

Rafiabadi Hamid Naseem Dr., [44](#)
Raskhun fil-al-ilm, [148](#)
Rehman Jamilur, [179](#)
Rehman-ur-Jamil, [125](#)
Role of Philosophy, [26](#)
Rushd Ibn, [16](#), [29](#), [37](#)

S

Saif ud-Dowla Ali bin Hamadan, [2](#)
Sanskrit Books, [5](#)

Sharief M.M., [125](#)

Sina Ibn, [29](#)

Solomon Ben Abraham Ben
David, [13](#)

Soul, [21](#)

Spirit of Islam, [2](#)

State University of New York
Press, [35](#)

T

Tahafut al-Tahafat, [35](#)

Tasdeeq-al-Jadliyah, [35](#), [143](#)

U

Umar-God, [55](#)

University of the Emir, [6](#)

W

Wajoob, [136](#)

Wajud, [158](#)

Wali Abd Ur Rehman Shah
Dr., [126](#)

Wortabet William Thomson,
[178](#)

Y

Yaqub Abu, [8](#)

Yemen, [160](#)

Z

Zahabi Ibn Jafar, [36](#)

Zakawat, [142](#)

Zanadiqun, [51](#)

Zaud, [175](#)

Zuhr Ibn, [14](#)

Dr. Hamid Naseem Rafiabadi

is a Reader and Former Director of Shah-I-Hamadan Institute of Islamic Studies, University of Kashmir. He has more than 25 books. on various aspects of Islamic philosophy and Comparative Religion, to his credit, which includes *Muslim Philosophy, Science and Mysticism and Emerging from Darkness-Ghazzali's Impact on Western Philosophers.*

Dr. Aadil Amin Kak is a senior lecturer at Dept. of Linguistics, University of Kashmir Srinagar. He had his doctoral degree from the prestigious Delhi University in Linguistics and has several research papers to his credit.



SARUP AND SONS (PUBLISHERS)

4740/23, ANSARI ROAD, DARYAGANJ,

NEW DELHI 110002 Fax : 23268760

Phones : Off. 23261029, 23244664

E-mail : sarupandsonsini@hotmail.com

Website : www.sarupandsons.com

ISBN:81-7625-413-4

